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On Korea began in December 2006 with the initiation of KEI’s Academic Paper 
Series, a year-long program that provides an opportunity for both leading 
Korea scholars and new voices from around the world to speak and write on 
current events and trends on the Korean Peninsula.
Each year, KEI commissions papers and distributes them to over 5,000 
government officials, think tank experts, and scholars around the United States 
and the world. Authors are invited to the Korea Economic Institute of America 
to discuss their research before a Washington, DC policy audience. At the 
conclusion of each series, the papers are compiled and published together as 
the On Korea volume.
To learn more about how to contribute to future Academic Papers Series 
forums and other programs at KEI, please visit: www.keia.org.
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About the Korea Economic  
Institute of America
The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) is a leading not-for-profit policy 
outreach and educational organization focused on promoting economic, political, and 
security relations between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. Located in Washington, 
D.C., KEI aims to broaden and deepen understanding among American policy leaders, 
opinion makers, and the public about developments in Korea and the value of the U.S.-
Korea relationship. Since its founding in 1982, the Institute has organized programs 
across North America and published research on a diverse range of issues, including 
U.S.-Korea trade and investments, the North Korea nuclear program, alliance issues, 
the role of Korean Americans in U.S. politics, and China’s growing role in the Asia-
Pacific region. Through its publications, outreach programs, social media outlets, and 
website, KEI provides access to in-depth and current analyses about the two Koreas 
and issues impacting U.S.-South Korea relations.
KEI's current accomplishments include:
• Publishing three celebrated annual compilation volumes—On Korea, Joint 
U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, and Korea’s Economy—used by experts, leaders, 
and universities worldwide.
• Bringing Korea experts and government officials to colleges and civic groups to 
lecture on timely events related to the Korean Peninsula and region.
• Reaching thousands of global listeners through its featured podcast show, 
Korean Kontext, where Korean and American policy, civic, and cultural leaders 
are engaged in a casual conversation about recent events, their work, their 
personal lives, and advice to those interested in the field.
• Holding the annual Ambassadors’ Dialogue program where the Korean 
Ambassador to the United States and the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea embark 
on a series of private and public outreach programs on U.S.-Korea relations.
• Hosting a premier luncheon program every year on Korean American Day to 
recognize the contributions of the Korean American community to the U.S.-
Korea alliance and to honor prominent Korean Americans who have excelled 
in their field or career. 
For more information about these programs and upcoming events at KEI, please 
visit our website, www.keia.org.
KEI is contractually affiliated with the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), 
a public policy research institute located in Seoul and funded by the government of the Republic 
of Korea.
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Preface
The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) is pleased to issue this seventh 
volume of On Korea, compiling the KEI Academic Papers released in 2013. 
KEI Academic Papers are commissioned following a call for proposals to academic 
and policy communities in the United States, South Korea, and around the globe. 
The objective is to provide opportunity for recognized specialists and new voices 
to present fresh research and innovative works on Korea. Moreover, these papers 
provide great examples of the breadth and depth of issues centered on Korea and 
those that affect the U.S.-Korea alliance. These papers are original pieces written 
exclusively for this volume, and most of the authors also present their findings at 
KEI before a Washington, DC policy audience. KEI prepares each paper for pub-
lication and distributes it to more than 5,000 recipients in governments, the private 
sector, policy institutes, and educational communities around the world. 
Economics is obviously a major focus at KEI, and the reader will note underlying 
economic themes in many of our papers. There are two papers dealing primarily 
with economic themes: Korea’s focus on building its “creative economy,” and the 
increasing problem of Korea’s large household debt. Moreover, Korea’s growth as a 
country and economy is seen in its desire to responsibly export nuclear technology 
and defense equipment. KEI was able to look at the nuclear issue further with a paper 
analyzing the dynamics with the U.S.-Korea civil nuclear cooperation agreement 
negotiations. In addition to these issues connected to economics, this publication 
also has two papers on security and diplomatic relations dealing with luxury goods 
in North Korea and comparing China-Taiwan relations and inter-Korea relations. 
All together, these reports make up this year’s fascinating On Korea volume, which 
we hope you will enjoy. 
For over 32 years, KEI has been dedicated to promoting objective and informative 
analyses and highlighting interesting policy research on Korea. We encourage stu-
dents, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to submit original papers to KEI 
for consideration in future On Korea volumes or other Institute publications. We 
also welcome your comments on this and our other publications, all of which may 
be downloaded from our website, www.keia.org. 
The Honorable Donald Manzullo
President and CEO 
Korea Economic Institute of America
February 2014
1Korea's Domestic Economy
CONNELL: Building a Creative Economy in South Korea 3
Building a Creative Economy 
in South Korea: Analyzing the 
Plans and Possibilities for New 
Economic Growth
 Sean Connell
Abstract
In her inaugural address on 25 February 2013, Korean President Park Geun-hye 
announced her vision to create a “Second Miracle on the Han River” through 
a new policy focus on developing a “creative economy.” Much as economic 
democratization was a leading theme of Korea’s 2012 presidential election, Park 
has seized on the concept of “creative economy” during her first months in office 
as the core of her administration’s economic growth agenda. Though previous 
Korean governments have taken steps to support Korea’s transition to an advanced 
innovation-driven economy, the Park administration has significantly heightened 
the level of priority of these efforts in order to foster the innovation and new 
engines of economic growth that will drive Korea’s future prosperity. The success 
of these policies requires a focus by Korean policy stakeholders, including 
government, businesses, researchers, and consumers, on addressing fundamental 
challenges within Korea’s innovation ecosystem. These include regulatory, 
structural, educational, and cultural obstacles that constrain Korea’s ability to 
fully foster and utilize its innovative capacities. Getting these fundamentals right 
will support Korea as it seeks to foster new industries that will drive its future 
growth and competitiveness. This requires a long-term commitment beyond 
President Park’s five-year term in office, but actions can be taken in the near term 
to build the foundation for future successes.
Key words: innovation policy, creative economy, Park Geun-hye, regulatory reform, 
Korean economic policy
Mr. Sean Connell is a former POSCO Visiting Fellow and Japan Studies Fellow at the 
East-West Center. 
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Introduction
What exactly “creative economy” means, from a policy perspective in Korea, 
remains a topic of discussion.1 Korean President Park Geun-hye herself defined 
“creative economy” in her inauguration speech as the idea of creating new engines 
of growth and employment through “the convergence of science and technology 
with industry, the fusion of culture and industry, and the blossoming of creativity 
in the very borders that were once permeated by barriers.”2 This focus on new 
forms of convergence of information and communications technologies (ICT) 
with traditional industries, as well as culture and content, has been a recurring 
theme in her statements on the creative economy agenda. What is not ambiguous 
is the desired outcome: job creation. From the beginning, Park has articulated 
the creative economy agenda as a means to achieve the goal of economic 
democratization and creating new employment opportunities she pledged to 
pursue, including raising Korea’s employment rate to 70 percent.3 
This paper examines the Park administration’s creative economy agenda and 
its potential implications for Korea. It will first review concepts of innovation, 
and considerations for approaching innovation within public policies aimed at 
promoting economic growth. It will then examine the broader economic context 
in Korea in which the Park administration is pursuing these goals, and which 
shapes and constrains Korea’s innovation ecosystem. Following a review of some 
of the major actions and policy proposals introduced by the Korean government to 
implement the creative economy agenda, it assesses these proposals and suggests 
areas for the Korean government and other policy stakeholders to focus attention, 
in particular getting the fundamentals right and addressing regulatory, structural, 
and cultural barriers to innovation. 
The “Creative Economy” and Role of  
Innovation Policies
The term “creative economy” is perhaps most appropriately seen in the case of 
Korea as a guiding theme for economic policies, much like “green growth” was 
during the previous Lee Myung-bak administration. More significant is the Park 
administration’s decision to emphasize innovation front and center in Korea’s 
economic policy agenda, and its recognition of the importance of cultivating the 
most conducive ecosystem possible to foster the innovation needed to support 
Korea’s future growth. In examining the creative economy agenda, it is useful 
to consider ways in which innovation is defined and addressed more broadly 
within the context of public policy. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has 
defined innovation as the “implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new 
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organization method in business practices, workplace organization or external 
relations.”4 Innovation can also be described as a dynamic, interactive process 
encompassing a diverse range of interconnected areas, levels of society, and 
actors.5 These include research and development (R&D), education, and 
physical and regulatory infrastructure, along with intangible assets such as 
intellectual property (IP), organizational management, tacit knowledge of 
human capital, workforce training, marketing, and design. Framework policy 
and economic conditions that shape the innovation ecosystem include, but are 
not limited to, labor mobility, tax burdens and incentives, trade and investment, 
IP protections and enforcement, standards-setting processes, regulatory burdens, 
and societal attitudes. Key actors in innovation include government, researchers, 
the private sector—ranging from entrepreneurial startup businesses and large 
firms conducting their own R&D to the scope of financial, legal, and other 
professionals whose services support these activities—and consumers, who 
ultimately determine which products, services, and business models succeed. 
Countries pursue innovation policies to increase growth, competitiveness, and 
jobs.6 The complex range of factors outlined above, coupled with the dynamic 
and disruptive nature of innovation, presents policymakers with the question of 
how to design and manage innovation policy instruments. The most effective 
role for governments to play in this process is increasingly viewed as shaping the 
framework conditions within which innovations emerge, and coordinating and 
facilitating among the broader networks of actors and policies described above, 
in order to foster the most conducive possible environment for innovation.7 This 
is an important distinction for a country such as Korea in which the government 
has at times taken a direct, hands-on role in shaping the economy.
Entrepreneurship is an increasing area of attention within innovation policies, 
and there is growing consensus about the important role of entrepreneurs 
as “carriers of innovation” in introducing innovative products, services, and 
business models. The Kauffman Foundation, citing U.S. government data, has 
estimated that entrepreneurial companies generated nearly all net job creation 
in the United States between 1980 and 2005.8 Perhaps significant for Korea, 
recent research on Japan’s economy found that from 1996 to 2006, virtually 
all new jobs created in Japan were by newly established companies or foreign 
invested businesses, rather than established Japanese companies.9 The Park 
administration has placed strong emphasis within the creative economy agenda 
on encouraging entrepreneurship and startup businesses, though an important 
consideration for Korea is what kind of support is most appropriate, and 
conducive, for entrepreneurs and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
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The Creative Economy Agenda in Context:  
Measuring Korean Innovation Capabilities
Korea has successfully made the leap to becoming an advanced economy that 
today rates highly across several internationally recognized indicators and 
measures of innovation. For example, Korea is now the world’s fourth-largest 
source of triadic patents, an important indicator of the quality of its innovation 
capabilities. Korea’s gross domestic expenditure on R&D in 2010 was equivalent 
to 3.7 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), one of the highest levels among 
OECD member economies. Korea is a prolific source of ICT-related patents, and 
Korean companies including Samsung and LG Electronics are global leaders in 
this sector. Home to one of the world’s most networked societies in terms of ICT, 
Korea has one of the strongest internet infrastructures of any country. The ICT 
sector represented 13.2 percent of total value added in Korea’s economy in 2009, 
and accounted for 6.2 percent of Korea’s business sector employment.10 Korean 
students consistently rank at or near the top of international math and science 
assessments, and Korea has among the highest level of university graduates 
among OECD member economies. 
These impressive statistics, at first glance, may seem to call into question the 
need for a “creative economy” policy agenda. However, a broader examination of 
Korea’s national innovation system shows some imbalances, which are illustrated 
in the graphs below:
a. Competences and Capacity to Innovate
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Figure 1: Comparative Performance of National Science and Innovation Systems, 2011
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Source: See Reader’s guide and methodological annex of the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 
2012 country profiles.
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As shown in these figures, Korean R&D is heavily weighted towards applied 
research, rather than basic research. In 2009, 71.1 percent of Korea’s R&D was 
funded by the private sector, primarily large companies, which also conducted 
74.3 percent of Korea’s R&D.11 Eighty-eight percent of Korean R&D was in the 
manufacturing sector, 48 percent of which was in the single category of radio, 
television, and communication equipment. R&D activity by Korean public 
research institutions and universities, venues where basic research is traditionally 
carried out, is comparatively weak: in 2009, Korean universities accounted for 
just 0.9 percent of R&D funding and conducted 11.1 percent of R&D. Because 
basic research is more likely to be conducted at universities and research institutes 
than by the private sector, this has important implications for Korea’s innovation 
trajectory as the country reaches the technology frontier.12
In addition, R&D conducted by Korean SMEs and in the services sector—both 
of which are important generators of innovative products and services—is 
comparatively low. It is worth noting that R&D expenditures by SMEs have 
increased significantly in recent years, growing five-fold from 12 percent to 
24 percent of Korean firms’ total R&D expenditures in 2006, but still pale in 
comparison with those of large companies.13 
Also noteworthy is Korea’s relatively low levels of international collaboration 
on R&D.14 For example, in 2010, 26 percent of Korean science articles and 4 
Source: OECD, Patent Database, February 2012
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2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
5.5 8.8
% of PCT patent 
applications filed by 
universities and PRIs
Bio- and nano-technologies ICT Environment-related 
technologies
EU27KoreaOECD median Korea (1997-99)
Notes: 
• Data relate to patent applications filed under the Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT), at international phase. 
Patent counts are based on the priority date, the inventor’s country of residence and fractional counts. 
• The revealed technology advantage index is calculated as the share of country in patents filed in a given field 
relative to the share of country in total patents. 
• Only economies with more than 500 patents over the periods are included in the figure. 
Figure 3: Revealed Technology Advantage in Selected Fields, 2007-09
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percent of Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patent applications were produced 
with international co-authorship.15 Although a leader in ICT patents, Korea rates 
lower among OECD economies in patents for biotechnology, nanotechnology, 
and environmental technologies, sectors Korean policymakers and industries 
have targeted as future growth engines.16 
These indicators reflect some of the broader challenges facing Korea as it seeks 
to foster new innovation-driven economic growth. The emphasis on applied 
research, comparatively low levels of R&D conducted by Korean universities, 
SMEs, and the services sector, and low levels of international collaboration, 
reflects the nature of much of Korea’s R&D being conducted in-house by 
large company conglomerates (chaebol).17 During Korea’s period of rapid 
industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, when the Korean government focused 
on rapid export-led growth through developing heavy industry through the 
chaebol, SMEs and the services sector were neglected. While chaebol dominate 
the Korean economy today, SMEs account for 99 percent of Korean businesses 
Source: OECD, MSTI Database, June 2012; OECD RDS Database, June 2012; NESTI data collection 2010 and 
2011 on R&D tax incentives; Van Steen, J. (2012), “Modes of Public Funding of Research and Development: 
Towards Internationally Comparable Indicators,” OECD STI Working Papers, June.
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and nearly 90 percent of private sector employment, and services comprise 
more than 60 percent of Korea’s GDP.
SME growth and development has been limited in part by the relatively closed 
nature of Korea’s vertically-integrated corporate structure, in which chaebol 
rely on in-house knowledge and resources, and conduct trade and business 
within conglomerate families, with fewer propensities for new competitor entry, 
spin-off businesses, and open innovation.18 In these arrangements, compounded 
by lack of competition and enforcement of competition rules,19 SMEs have 
served mostly as suppliers and subcontractors for large companies, rather 
than as resources and partners for innovation, and their ability to develop their 
own innovative capabilities have been limited. The resulting distortions of 
this economic structure were recognized by Korean government officials and 
analysts by the 1980s,20 but successive efforts to create a support infrastructure 
for SMEs to bolster R&D activities failed to bridge these gaps.21 Over time 
disparities have increased. SMEs are estimated to have only 35 percent of the 
productivity of large Korean companies—27 percent of the productivity in 
the case of manufacturing firms—and only 0.07 percent of small companies 
grow into large companies.22 SME wages are about 62 percent of those of 
large companies, and service sector wages are 55 percent of those in Korea’s 
manufacturing sector.23 Additionally, government support programs for SMEs 
can create disincentives for SMEs to grow,24 and government bailouts of SMEs 
in the wake of the 1997-1998 and 2008 financial crises may have exacerbated 
these challenges by increasing SME reliance on public funds.25 
Indicators also point to relative weaknesses of Korea’s universities in R&D, 
which reflect some challenges within Korea’s education system. Korean experts 
have long urged improvements in the quality of education, urging less focus 
on rote learning and more on creativity and research, and have pointed to the 
emphasis in universities on teaching rather than research as a “bottleneck” 
for technology learning.26 They have also cautioned the explosive growth of 
the private education industry, driven in part by the extreme competitiveness 
among students to pass admissions tests for Korea’s most elite universities that 
are seen as guarantees for high-prestige employment with large corporations 
and the government. One consequence is that Koreans pay more for education 
than their counterparts in just about every other OECD nation.27 At the same 
time, unemployment levels for university graduates have escalated while jobs 
with chaebol have become increasingly competitive, and SMEs—which lack 
the prestige, salaries, and benefits enjoyed by employees of large companies—
face challenges filling jobs. Forty-three percent of SMEs responded in a 2011 
Korean government survey that they face or expected to face a labor shortage, 
in part due to a lack of qualified applicants, low salaries and benefits, and high 
expectations of job applicants.28
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For a country whose entrepreneurs of the 1950s and 1960s built the chaebol of 
today, Korea is perceived as a challenging country for entrepreneurship. People 
in Korea speak of considerable family and societal pressure on young people to 
pursue stable careers in government or large companies, versus small businesses 
or starting their own companies.29 In 2012 the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM), which conducts the world’s largest survey on entrepreneurship, found 
that 59 percent of Korean respondents viewed entrepreneurship as a good career 
choice, and 70 percent agreed that entrepreneurs in Korea received a high social 
status. However, the survey found comparatively negative views among Korean 
respondents of perceived opportunities, including starting a business where they 
live (13 percent), having the necessary skills and knowledge to start a business 
(27 percent), and a relatively high fear of failure (43 percent).30 A recent survey 
conducted by the Hyundai Research Institute found starkly more negative views: 
more than 80 percent of respondents saw conditions for starting a new business 
in Korea as negative, and respondents in the 20-30 year age range were even less 
interested in pursuing a high-tech startup than older people were. The survey also 
found that 92 percent of respondents worried about a failed startup enterprise 
resulting in debt delinquency or a poor credit rating, and three-quarters said that 
Korea is a difficult place to recover from bankruptcy—reflecting an important 
barrier to entrepreneurship and risk taking.31 The relatively negative outlook 
towards risk-taking and entrepreneurship reflects a range of cultural and structural 
factors that shape and constrain Korea’s environment for innovation. 
These aspects of Korea’s national innovation system and economic structure have 
become more pressing challenges as Korea has reached the limits of its previous 
economic development approach predicated on catching up with other advanced 
economies. Korea’s potential growth rate per capita, which slowed from about 7 
percent in 1995 to a present level near 4 percent, is projected to further decrease to 
almost 2 percent during the 2030s. This decline reflects a decrease in productivity 
and labor inputs. Important contributing factors include Korea’s inflexible labor 
market, which reduces employment mobility and has created an increasingly 
dualistic system of regular employees and non-regular workers lacking the same 
levels of salaries, benefits, protections, and training opportunities. Korea has one 
of the world’s lowest fertility rates, coupled with low levels of women in the 
workforce. Wage growth has failed to keep up with GDP growth, contributing 
to rising economic inequalities, and addressing these challenges is an important 
priority for Korea to regain growth momentum.32
The Creative Economy Policy Agenda
The above challenges have long been recognized by Korean policymakers, and 
Park is not the first Korean president to talk about the importance of innovation 
or introduce initiatives to enhance Korea’s science, technology, and innovation 
12 2014 Volume 7  n  ON KOREA
capabilities to support new growth. What distinguishes the Park administration 
from its predecessors is its heavy emphasis on innovation, in the form of the 
“creative economy” concept, as the centerpiece of its economic policy agenda.
During Park’s first months in office, the Korean government has moved swiftly to 
develop and implement this agenda, including through three broad policy actions. 
These include, first, the establishment of a new Ministry of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning (MSIP), which was created by combining three previously separate 
government agencies and tasked with leading the development, coordination, 
and implementation of creative economy policies within the Korean government. 
MSIP’s policy objectives include creating an ecosystem conducive to facilitating 
startups, including through strengthening IP protections; strengthening Korea’s 
R&D and innovation capabilities; making software and content core industries 
of the Korean economy; promoting international cooperation and globalization 
of Korean businesses and technologies; and developing science, technology, and 
ICT to support social needs and improve people’s livelihoods.33 
MSIP’s objectives reflect the “creative economy action plan” introduced by 
the Korean government on 4 June 2013, the second major action by the Park 
administration to advance the creative economy agenda. This plan targets 
creating new employment and industries based on creativity and innovation; 
strengthening Korea’s global innovation leadership; and establishing a society 
“where creativity is respected and manifested.” The plan incorporates six 
strategies to achieve these goals: establishing an ecosystem that promotes the 
creation of startups; strengthening the role of startups and SMEs within Korea’s 
economy and enhancing their ability to enter global markets; generating new 
industries as growth engines; fostering world-class creative talent; strengthening 
Korea’s science, technology, and ICT to increase innovation capabilities; and 
promoting a creative economic culture within Korean society.34
The creative economy action plan incorporates a set of “Measures to Develop 
a Venture-Startup Funding Ecosystem” announced by the Korean government 
on 15 May 2013 that focus on eliminating financial and regulatory barriers 
to entrepreneurs and SMEs. These target the goal of creating a “free-flowing 
virtuous cycle of enterprise creation, growth, investment withdrawal, and 
reinvestment” along the lines of Silicon Valley’s venture ecosystem, including 
by improving the environment for financing and increasing the availability of 
investment capital available to entrepreneurs. Specific proposals to achieve 
this include tax incentives and deregulation to stimulate angel investment and 
reinvestment by successful entrepreneurs in new startups; establishing new 
funds to support startups and mergers and acquisitions (M&As); introducing 
a crowdfunding scheme; and regulatory reforms to remove barriers to M&As 
related to technology. The proposals also include incentives for Koreans working 
overseas to invest in and provide mentorship to domestic entrepreneurs, and 
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creating an “entrepreneur visa” to encourage highly-skilled foreigners to start 
businesses in Korea.35 
Other tasks outlined in the creative economy blueprint tackle several issues 
long identified as challenges to Korea’s innovation environment and broader 
economy. For example, to boost Korea’s innovation capabilities, the plan calls for 
increasing funding for basic research by 40 percent by 2017, along with improving 
the relatively weak linkages between universities, research labs, industry, and 
government, and support for researchers to commercialize innovative technologies. 
It pledges improvements in the infrastructure for generating, protecting, and using 
IP. To bolster the content and services industries, it targets improving industry 
productivity through ICT and software convergence and strengthening the 
software sector, including through measures to develop cloud computing, promote 
big data analysis and utilization, and expand education and training of Internet 
security professionals. The plan calls for increasing government procurement 
opportunities for new convergence technologies, reflecting the important 
role government procurement can play in bringing innovations to market, and 
localization support to startups with promising products to enter global markets. 
In education, it calls among other things for extracurricular activities to expose 
students to successful entrepreneurs and startup competitions in order to build 
their interest in entrepreneurship opportunities.
In tandem with these plans, the Korean government announced on 12 June 2013 
a set of measures intended to enhance the productivity of SMEs more broadly.36 
These include initiatives to strengthen SME technology development capabilities, 
enhance their ability to train and retain skilled workers, and expand markets 
including through successful commercialization of new technologies. They aim to 
increase synergies between SMEs and large companies, and to improve the support 
infrastructure available for SMEs including through more effective collaboration 
among government agencies to monitor policy efficacy and eliminate burdensome 
regulations. As part of these measures, the Korean government pledged to increase 
public funding for technology development by SMEs to 18 percent of the national 
R&D budget by 2017, and to prioritize SMEs in transferring publicly-funded 
technologies from universities and institutes. To address chronic SME labor 
shortages, the plan includes scholarships for university students that commit to 
SME employment.
A third set of actions by President Park and her government has been active public 
outreach efforts to promote the creative economy agenda, and to champion the 
value of innovation and entrepreneurship. Park and senior government officials 
have made frequent site visits to promising Korean startups, and have held highly-
publicized meetings with internationally renowned entrepreneurs such as Bill 
Gates, Larry Page of Google, and Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook to seek their 
ideas for actions Korea should take to foster the creative economy. 
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The Creative Economy Agenda in  
Historical Perspective
Several aspects of the creative economy policy proposals have precedents in 
Korea. For example, in 1997 the Korean government enacted the Special Law 
on Science and Technology Innovation, with the goal of improving Korea’s 
science and technology capabilities to the level of advanced economies. A 
related five-year plan that entered into effect in 1998 called for increasing the 
R&D budget to 5 percent of the total government budget by 2002, improving 
science and technology policy coordination, and increasing investment in basic 
research. It also included provisions to increase technology promotion funding, 
expand technology assistance programs for SMEs, introduce financing options 
allowing the use of technology and IP as collateral, and strengthen tax incentives 
for R&D and human resource development. At the time these laws were enacted, 
observers commented that they did not go far enough to address challenges with 
Korea’s national innovation system, including removing institutional barriers 
and silo tendencies between institutions, which limit the diffusion of innovation 
and interactive learning; limited labor mobility; limited incentives to increase 
university-industry collaboration; and stricter protections for IP—criticisms that 
still echo today.37 
Economic and other reforms implemented by the Kim Dae-jung administration 
following the 1997-1998 financial crisis included emphasis on boosting Korea’s 
science and technology capabilities and R&D activities, and provided significant 
financial support for startup businesses. At a time when chaebol were restructuring 
and downsizing, Korea experienced a boom of high-tech startups, which grew from 
100 to 5,000 companies just within 1999, but which collapsed in tandem with the 
U.S. dot-com crash.38 The Park administration has pointed to a heavy reliance on 
loans as the primary form of government financial support for these startups as a 
contributing factor to their failure, which underlies its policy focus on improving the 
overall environment for investment in startup firms so that they do not need to be as 
reliant on loans. The Kim Dae-jung administration also established the Ministry of 
Science and Technology as a separate entity, though it lacked the power to effectively 
coordinate science and technology policies across other government ministries.39 
The Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak administrations also emphasized the need 
to upgrade Korea’s science, research and education capabilities and made similar 
efforts to increase R&D funding and enhance policy coordination within the 
government on science, technology, and innovation.40
Assessing the Creative Economy Agenda
Park has described the creative economy agenda as a “paradigm shift” for Korea. 
The ultimate success of these policies requires such a shift, for it will involve 
changing the ways in which the Korean government and broader public measure 
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and perceive success, and the steps for getting there. The desired outcomes of the 
creative economy agenda are long term in nature, for which a commitment and 
time horizon beyond Park’s five-year term as president are essential. To succeed, 
they will also necessitate tackling reforms that will be politically sensitive. 
Pragmatism and flexibility are required, for many successful examples of the 
“creative economy” that Park and her administration have highlighted were not 
preordained. Ensuring an enabling environment for innovation that does not 
hold back unanticipated surprises, even if they do not align with government or 
other expectations, is important. 
Although implementation of the creative economy agenda is still at an initial 
stage and it is too early to assess its performance, below are three areas where 
leadership by the Park administration will be valuable in building momentum 
for this initiative and in enhancing Korea’s environment for innovation. 
Regulatory Reform and Getting the Fundamentals Right: It is important that 
the Korean government not lose focus on creating the most conducive environment 
possible for innovation. Regulatory, tax, labor mobility, and other reforms that 
will encourage businesses both small and large to enhance their innovative 
activities and capabilities, improve their productivity, and create new jobs will be 
beneficial.41 As it proceeds with implementing its policy initiatives, it is important 
for the Park administration to recognize the limitations of the government’s 
role and ability to shape the creative economy, and avoid market interventions 
that could inhibit Korea’s economy to meet the challenge of rapidly changing 
technologies.42 John Howkins, who is credited with coining the term “creative 
economy,” has pointed out that governments “cannot enforce creativity.”43 
Park and her administration have stated that deregulation is the key to 
fostering the entrepreneurship that will drive the creative economy, and they 
have pledged to eliminate unnecessary regulations. At the same time, more 
than 500 regulatory measures have reportedly been introduced by the Park 
administration since taking office, after increasing significantly during the 
previous four years.44 It is important for the Park administration not only 
to identify and eliminate regulations that constrain the broader innovation 
framework, but also be mindful of their potential to do so. One example 
of such kind of unexpected consequences are long-standing Korean cyber 
security laws mandating use of the ActiveX security software, which over 
time and in practice has constrained Korean consumers’ ability to make 
online payments by de facto limiting them only to use of Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer web browser.45 Additionally, proposed cloud computing legislation 
under discussion in Korea has generated concern within the global IT industry 
as attempts to regulate the cloud that could create new market barriers for both 
Korean and global cloud services providers.46 
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Park’s creation of MSIP is a well-intended effort to increase policy coordination 
within the Korean government and overcome bureaucratic silos. However, it 
represents the third major reorganization of the Korean government’s science, 
technology and innovation governance system within the past decade. These 
frequent changes, coupled with public expectations for quick outcomes, present 
the risk of adverse effects resulting from lack of continuity and merging together 
different institutions and their respective organizational cultures.47 
The Park administration’s focus on supporting SMEs and entrepreneurs and 
boosting the services sector, both in facilitating new opportunities and by 
strengthening IP and other protections, addresses important components of 
Korea’s national innovation system that have not achieved their full growth 
potential. Implementing these provisions should be coupled with broader 
actions beyond the creative economy agenda to foster a more level playing 
field for SMEs in the domestic market. These include tackling unfair business 
practices, but also eliminating disincentives for SMEs to grow and by ensuring 
they do not become dependent on public funding. Chaebol have a vital role 
to play in advancing the creative economy agenda, and deregulation and 
incentives that enable them to expand their R&D activities are important. The 
Park administration has pushed chaebol to explore “win-win” opportunities to 
partner with SMEs in bringing innovative technologies to market, including as 
part of its economic democratization goals to reduce the gaps between large and 
small companies. Some large companies have announced plans to partner with 
and open new business opportunities for SMEs,48 and moving forward it will be 
useful to monitor successful incentives and cases that could present models for 
best and effective practices. 
Fear of failure represents a significant constraint to entrepreneurship in Korea, 
and the creative economy agenda. The Park administration has taken an early 
focus and emphasis in its plans to tackle this, particularly in regards to financing 
for SMEs and entrepreneurs. However, it is also important to consider other 
regulatory, legal, and institutional factors that increase the cost of failure and 
contribute to the risk aversion beyond cultural attitudes. For example, Korea’s 
strict bankruptcy laws have been identified as a challenge,49 and changing 
these laws in ways that would encourage more entrepreneurs to try launching 
a new business could be beneficial. Studies on the effects of reforms to Japan’s 
bankruptcy laws in the 1990s found an uptick in entrepreneurial behavior in the 
following years.50 
Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Global Markets: The Park 
administration has discussed within the creative economy agenda supporting 
promising Korean startups entering global networks, attracting funding and 
mentorship from overseas Koreans, and offering an entrepreneurship visa to 
attract foreign entrepreneurs to set up business in Korea. However, somewhat 
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missing from the Park administration’s creative economy discourse has been 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), and the important role these can 
play in facilitating innovation, both through introducing new knowledge and 
technology spillovers and generating increased market competition.
Korea’s free trade agreements with the United States and European Union 
represent important opportunities to advance the creative economy agenda in this 
regard.51 Full implementation of these agreements and the regulatory reforms 
they incorporate will benefit Korean businesses by reducing burdens, fostering 
a more competitive market, and bringing Korea in closer alignment with global 
standards. The agreements provide Korean SMEs and entrepreneurial startups 
new opportunities to introduce their innovative products and services in these 
important international markets. They also open the door to new FDI that could 
help foster the new creative industries sought by the Park administration. Several 
elements of these agreements, including eliminating barriers to market entry 
and FDI, increased transparency, and enhanced competition policies, among 
others, have been identified as keys for strengthening Korea’s underperforming 
services sector.52 The Korean government should be looking how most 
effectively to leverage these agreements, along with other trade agreements 
Korea is currently negotiating or may join in the future, to create synergies with 
its creative economy initiatives and help innovative Korean businesses enter 
global markets.
Communicating the Importance of Innovation: The Park administration 
has an important role to play in building public consensus around the creative 
economy agenda, including through communicating the value of innovation and 
entrepreneurship. It will need to clearly articulate how related policy actions 
and reforms, including some that may be politically sensitive, will advance the 
creative economy agenda, as well as manage public expectations about outcomes 
that could take years to manifest. While it is prudent not to define “creative 
economy” in the public consciousness as narrowly as the Park administration 
has sometimes risked doing with its emphasis on ICT convergence, overuse of 
the term for unrelated and counterintuitive projects could risk generating public 
perceptions of the term as an empty slogan.
Because many barriers to innovation in Korea are cultural in nature, the education 
sector should be a primary area of focus of the creative economy agenda. Efforts 
to overcome these constraints, create more tolerance for failure, and broaden 
perceptions and public definitions of what success means, would benefit through 
infusing these principles in to the education system early. Groups like the Korea 
Entrepreneurship Foundation are taking an active role in Korea to encourage this. 
To support change, sustained and consistent messaging from the president and 
other senior government and business leaders will be paramount.
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Conclusion
The Park administration’s creative economy agenda represents an important and 
needed effort by the Korean government to build the foundation for Korea’s future 
sustained growth and prosperity. It additionally presents new approaches and 
opportunities to tackle pressing social and demographic challenges increasingly 
confronting Korea. Moving forward, it is important that the Park administration 
not lose focus of its goal of ensuring the best potential ecosystem in Korea for 
innovation, entrepreneurship, and fostering creative new industries. Addressing 
regulatory, structural, and cultural barriers requires a long-term approach and 
commitment, and may not yield short-term results. This will require patience 
in implementing this agenda, and in demonstrating and communicating to the 
broader Korean public positive outcomes and new ways of measuring success 
more appropriate to Korea’s future growth trajectory. While this would be 
challenging for any government, Korea has demonstrated time and time again a 
remarkable capability and dynamism to adapt to new paradigms, and the creative 
economy agenda will hopefully be no exception.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization with 
which the author is affiliated.
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The Impact of Household Debt on 
Korea’s Economy and Society 
Jongsung Kim 
Abstract
The topic of household debt has not only economic implications for consumers 
and the country as a whole, but it is also a significant factor affecting the social 
stability of its citizens. This problem also parallels the recent financial crises in 
the U.S., the aftermath of which still plagues its economy. Against this backdrop, 
this paper aims to review and investigate the trends and determinants of the rising 
household debt and declining savings in Korea so policies can be implemented 
to deter and effectively counter the problems that low savings and countervailing 
high debt will pose on the Korean economy. This study will add to the existing 
literature by providing new evidence of its implications toward the household 
debt problem in Korea. I argue that globalization, government policies and 
generous credit resulting from the low interest policy contributed to the increase 
in debt in Korea. The tight restrictions on commercial banks’ lending practices 
will put the borrowers at a much worse position, exacerbating the low saving and 
high debt problem. Despite the volume and the seriousness of the household debt 
in Korea, the efforts to reduce it have not been satisfactory. To address the rising 
household debt problem, it is recommended that an active intervention should be 
implemented toward job creation, employment security and closer monitoring of 
the lending practice. It is also recommended to offer more information about the 
loans for indebted low-income class and to simplify the procedures to apply for 
those loans.
Key words: Korea’s household debt, savings, debt relief, national happiness fund 
Dr. Jongsung Kim is a Professor of Economics at Bryant University in Smithfield, 
Rhode Island.
24 2014 Volume 7  n  ON KOREA
Introduction 
The first years of 2000 marked the outbreak of the household debt in Korea as the 
most significant potential risk factor that can threaten the stability of the financial 
system, especially when it is linked to the economic slowdown and ongoing real 
estate slump after the global financial crisis.1
On April 22, 2013, Bank of Korea (BOK) Governor Kim Choong-soo remarked 
that “The nation’s household debt reached a limit” in his report to the Korean 
National Assembly. He was also recently quoted as saying, “The household debt 
has been rising faster than income and the nature of household debt has also 
deteriorated. Efforts should be exerted not only to reduce the volume of debt but 
also to improve the vulnerable structure of household debt.”2 His remarks along 
with statistical evidence reported in the next paragraph signify the seriousness 
of household debt in Korea. Against this backdrop, this paper reviews the 
trends of household debt in Korea and investigates the background of its rise in 
recent years along with a discussion on the current policy measures taken by the 
Korean government to address the rising household debt. 
As of 2012 4th quarter, the household credit3 in Korea reached 963.8 trillion 
won ($853.7 billion at the exchange rate of $1=1129 won on June 12, 2013) 
that includes household loans of 905.9 trillion won, a 5.2 percent year-on-year 
increase and a purchase on credit of 57.9 trillion won, a 3.1 percent year-on-
year increase.4 Since the household disposable income rose 4.1 percent, the 
ratio of household debt to disposable income reached 136 percent, the highest 
level since 2003 when the related data began to be collected. Accordingly, the 
household debt per capita reached the highest level at 19.3 million won, almost 
74 percent of GDP per capita, as the average household debt also increased to 
53 million won.5 The banking sector mortgage loan balance also rose to 316.9 
trillion won at the end of 2012 from 264.2 trillion won at the end of 2009, an 
increase of 19.9 percent. 
Korea’s household debt also poses potential threats to the nation’s economy 
when the debt is viewed from the international perspective. According to OECD 
statistics, which also include the financial debt of non-profit organizations, the 
ratio of Korea’s household debt to disposable income rose to 150.8 percent in 
2010 from 116 percent in 2004 and 139 percent in 2007. An increase of 11.8 
percent from 2007 to 2010 after the global financial crisis is higher than that of 
other OECD countries. In 2010, the average debt-disposable income ratio of 25 
OECD countries for which data was available was 128.8 percent; in comparison, 
the average debt-disposable income ratio in the U.S. was 122.5 percent in 2010, 
the lowest since 2003 and a 13.9 percentage point decline from its peak (136.4) 
in 2007.6 The ratio of household debt to GDP reached 81 percent in 2010, higher 
than the OECD countries’ average of 73 percent.7 
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A major consequence of Korea’s rising household debt is the decline in household 
savings. Korea’s household savings rate declined significantly after the financial 
crisis from over 20 percent in the mid-1990s to a mere 2.7 percent in 2011. This 
is only half of the average household savings rate of 5.3 percent among the 23 
OECD countries where data was available. For the U.S., in comparison, the 
average household savings rate was 4.2 percent in 2011.8 The sudden decline of 
Korea’s household savings rate, which registers as one of the lowest along with 
New Zealand (2.3 percent) and Japan (2.9 percent), is unprecedented in terms 
of the time period of the overall drop in savings among the OECD countries.9 
The average household savings rate in Korea from 2000 to 2010 was 4.7 percent, 
which is less than one-fourth of the average savings rate (19.8 percent) from 1990 
to 1999. The savings rate in Korea especially plummeted after two periods of 
economic distress: from 1998 to 2002 after the Asian financial crisis when the 
savings rate dropped from 21.6 percent to 0.4 percent; from 2004 to 2008 after 
the credit card crisis, the savings rate declined from 8.4 percent to 5.8 percent.10
From the macroeconomic view, the decline in savings rate caused from the rise 
in household debt turns a virtuous cycle into a vicious cycle among savings, 
investments and economic growth. Therefore, the lack of sufficient savings in 
an economy will retard economic growth in the future.11 At the household level, 
the decline in savings will exacerbate the household debt problem and can create 
more credit defaulters and bankruptcies. The limited existing evidence which 
foreshadows only the tip of the magnitude of the problem also underscores the 
claim that the rising household debt, despite the government policies to rein in 
the problem, remains one of the predominant risk factors that could threaten the 
stability of the Korean economy.12 
Trends of Korea’s Household Debt
There are two ways to define household debt in Korea. First, if the household 
is the focus of analysis (as it is with this paper), the term for “household debt” 
is synonymous with “household credit (가계신용),” which is defined as the 
sum of household loans and purchases on credit. Second, however, for cross 
national comparison, the term for household debt is “individual financial debt 
(개인금융부채),” which also includes debt incurred by the self-employed and 
non-profit organizations in addition to households, better represents the household 
debt since such statistics are prepared according to an accepted global method 
(System of National Account).13 This paper uses the first definition of household 
debt (“household credit (가계신용)”) to be consistent with other related studies.14 
Figure 1 shows that Korea’s household debt has risen continuously since 2000, 
although the rate of increase varies from time to time, and has declined since 
2010. The household debt problem in Korea has arisen as the result of the 
interplay among many factors such as accommodative monetary policy, lending 
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practices of financial sectors, booming real estate market, and untimely policy 
responses of the regulating authorities. Other contributing factors are decline 
of household savings due to the changes in demographic structure and the 
expansion of real estate ownership of baby boomers.15 After the Asian financial 
crisis in the late 1990s, financial institutions shifted their business focus from 
lending to companies to private and household lending. Korea’s household debt 
since then has grown over 10 percent a year on average, much faster than the 
nation’s GDP growth rate.16 
Figure 1 shows that the average growth rate of household debt from 2000 to 2012 
is 12.1 percent, much higher than that of the nominal GDP at 7.6 percent during 
the same period. The growth rates of the household debt were much higher from 
2000 to 2002 exceeding 25 percent. Excluding these years, the average growth 
rate of household debt (7.6 percent) becomes much similar to the average growth 
rate of the nominal GDP (7.5 percent). The annual growth rates of household 
debt from 1997 to 1999 are 20.9 percent, -13 percent and 16.5 percent. Including 
these years, the average growth rate of household debt from 1997 (when the Asian 
financial crisis hit) to 2012 is 11.3 percent. 
Although the growth rate of the household debt has declined from 11.8 percent 
in 2006 to 5.2 percent in 2012 except in 2010, the amount of household debt 
has increased 58.7 percent during the same period and reached a level that was 
described by the current BOK Governor as a limit. 
Figure 1: Trends of Household Debt in Korea
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Figure 2 shows the trends in the share of household debt to disposable income. 
The share has risen continuously from 2004 and reached the record high level 
of 136 percent in 2012. As shown in Figure 3, while the growth rate of personal 
disposal income has been greater than that of CPI since 2000, the growth rate 
Figure 2: The Share of Household Debt to Disposable Income
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of household debt has exceeded that of personal disposable income since 2005, 
presenting evidence of households’ economic hardship. 
Despite the widespread concern over Korea’s household debt, it is also argued 
that major credit default is not on the horizon since the debt is more concentrated 
in the high-income households as shown in Figure 4, which depicts the shares of 
households with debt, the volume of household debt, and the share of total debt 
by income quintiles in 2012. 
In Figure 4, the household debt was concentrated in the 5th quintile (top 20 
percent) that has ability to service the debt. Eighty-one percent of the households 
in the 5th quintile have an average debt of 162.7 million won. On the other hand, 
32.2 percent of the households in the 1st quintile have an average debt of 30.5 
million won. The 5th quintile’s share of total debt stands at 44.5 percent whereas 
that of the 1st quintile was much lower at 3.7 percent. Based on this, some would 
argue that the household debt problem in Korea still is not at a serious level.17
Nevertheless, the rise of household debt also affects overall demand and 
consumption. There are three ways through which household debt leads to changes 
in private consumption.19 First, consumption may rise as the households have more 
Figure 4: Share of Debt-Holding Households, Average Debt and Share of 
Total Debt by Income Quintiles in 2012
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purchasing power from incurring debt. Second, the wealth effect from the rising 
value of assets acquired with the debt may also raise consumption. However, the 
interest payment burden from the debt would lower the disposable income, leading 
to a decline in consumption. The third channel is less direct, involving expectations 
of the household-debtors. To the extent that people expect that the economy keeps on 
stagnating, they preemptively respond by lowering consumption. It is also important 
to note that when the bubble bursts in an overheated asset market, the ensuing rapid 
decline in asset value will result in a precipitous decrease in consumption. While 
household debt may raise consumption in the short run, its impact on investment is 
estimated to be negative, which along with low savings will dampen the long-run 
growth potential of an economy. 
In summary, despite arguments that it is not a problem, the household debt in 
Korea will affect the Korean economy in the following ways. First, the rising 
household debt will reduce savings and investment which can slow down 
economic growth and potential economic growth rate. Also the lower savings 
rates can make the Korean economy more dependent on foreign capital and 
susceptible to the fluctuations in the global financial markets. Second, as the 
household debt rises, private consumption and demand in the housing market will 
decline. This will also retard economic growth. Third, the mounting household 
debt may lead to insolvency when debtors are unable to repay their loans on time, 
creating instability in the financial system. Fourth, if the number of households 
struggling under heavy debt burden rises, the government may need to step in and 
increase its subsidies (or transfer payments), which will correspondingly raise 
the government debt.20 Fifth, when the household debt is rising or has reached 
a critical point, the government will not be able to freely use interest rate policy 
to stabilize the economy to control inflation by increasing interest rates as such 
a move will put households into a more difficult financial position because they 
will be burdened with higher interest payments. Sixth, the rising household and 
government debt can make the Korean economy more vulnerable to exogenous 
shocks. To the extent that the existing size of household and government debt is 
viewed as a structural weakness, an event such as a global financial crisis will 
lead to insufficient foreign currency reserve due to capital flight, and fluctuations 
in exchange rates. This may negatively affect Korea’s international credit rating. 
Lastly, the rise of household debt can also exacerbate the income inequality, 
creating uncertainty and instability in Korean society.21 
Reasons for the Rise in Korea’s  
Household Debt22
The household debt in Korea has expanded through four channels. First, the policy 
change at the end of the 1990s created the liquidity effect, marked by an excess 
liquidity in 2003. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the target price level 
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for price stabilization was set too high and this led to a supply of excess liquidity. 
The accommodative monetary policy helped to maintain the interest rates at a low 
level after the financial crisis. 
Second, after the Asian financial crisis, the Korean government at the end of 1997 
“adopted the policy to encourage the use of credit cards to boost the economy 
through raising consumption”23 and increasing the transparency of financial 
transactions, which would in turn provide an information source to allocate tax 
schemes that were fairer. This benign intent, however, led to a rise in credit card 
use and raised the competition among credit card companies that over-issued 
credit cards to non-qualified applicants. Eventually, this led to the credit card 
crisis at the end of 2003 when the delinquency rate of credit cards rose as the 
result of declining household income and repayment ability, worsened by the 
delayed recovery in the Korean economy.24 
Third, the artificially created low interest rates induced large credit creation. The 
boom in the housing market linked with low interest rates also helped the household 
debt to expand.25 The rising value of real estate, especially in residential housing, 
induced people to borrow heavily to purchase more real estate in expectation 
of profits. For example, the expansion of real estate ownership by Korean baby 
boomers, who were born between 1955 and 1963 and comprise one-fifth of the 
population, is cited as a reason for the rise of household debt in the 2000s. 
Fourth, after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korean financial institutions lacking 
appropriate risk management systems, such as credit appraisal, shifted their focus 
from lending credit lines to firms to household loans, as firms became more risk 
averse. This was facilitated with the continuation of low interest rates from the 
accommodative monetary policy. What also fueled the expansion of household 
debt were loose regulations and the lack of systemic accountability, which 
contributed to the inability of Korean financial regulators to adequately supervise 
the banking sectors and also paved the way for other unregulated non-banking 
sectors that can freely lend for-profit loans. Such unrestrained household loans 
from non-banking financial institutions could create real estate bubbles.26 
The notion of the so-called “realty invincibility” can also partially explain the rise 
in household debt in Korea. This is due to the Korean banks’ lending practices 
through which the debtors can acquire additional loans as their portfolio increases. 
This is accomplished through additional acquisition of assets (collateral) with an 
increased valuation (appraisal), which would have accumulated on the original 
collateral due to the constant and intense real estate market speculation. 
As a result, the banking sector mortgage loan balance rose significantly. 
Mortgages and home equity loan programs in Korea typically have a few years 
of an interest only repayment period built in at the beginning, during which 
debtors pay only the interests on the loan until the end of the designated term at 
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which time the payment of the principal must be paid in full. This type of loan is 
equivalent to a balloon payment in the U.S.27 However, in a highly speculative 
and burgeoning real estate market, the housing prices will inevitably rise during 
the repayment period. This will create an incentive for the borrower to take 
additional risks by purchasing more real estate with the increase in the asset 
valuation gained during the repayment period. The original asset then would 
be sold with a significant profit to pay off the original loan. The rising value 
of real estate also contributed to the expansion of real estate related project 
financing (PF) loans. It was reported that as of March 2009, the volume of PF by 
financial institutions as a whole stood at 81.7 trillion won. Financial institutions 
concentrated on the home equity loans, for which the risk management is 
easier since the loan only occurs with secure collateral. Since the housing price 
depends on the structural changes in the housing market, the lending practice 
concentrating on home equity loans creates structural vulnerability.28
If the returns from the booming housing market exceed the amount of loans 
and associated financial costs, the rising household debt (and declining savings) 
incurred in expectation of the future profits from the booming housing market 
would not pose a problem, since the gained equity will be sufficient to pay off the 
debt. But the recent housing market stagnation created some pessimism giving 
less credence to the past trend of a robust housing market. Despite the government 
policy to boost the housing market, which will be discussed more in detail later, 
the stagnating housing market does not show sufficient signs of upturn. 
According to a recently released BOK report, 34.7 percent of the sample 
households replied that the price of real estate they owned declined (8.2 percent 
for significant decline), whereas the percentage of households that replied 
that the value of real estate they owned rose was 24.4 percent (5.1 percent for 
significant rise). Not surprisingly, the household debt problem is expected to 
exacerbate as 58.9 percent of the households replied that they are having a 
difficulty in their daily lives due to the repayment of principal.29 
Especially vulnerable groups are the low-income class with bad credit, debtors 
with multiple loans, and small-scale self-employed merchants whose debt 
structure is worsening. As the result of stricter regulations on loan appraisal, 
those with relatively lower credit ratings are forced to take out loans from the 
non-banking financial institutions30 that would charge higher interest rates.31 
According to a report from Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) released 
in 2012, as the banks shifted their lending practices to those with collaterals 
categorized as lower risk assets, the share of loans extended to borrowers with 
low credit ratings, i.e., those whose credit ratings are below category 7, declined 
from 14.5 percent in 2008 to 11.4 percent in 2012. The report also showed 
that the share of low-income class in taking loans from the non-banking sector 
rose from 43.2 percent at the end of 2008 to 47.3 percent in June 2012.32 The 
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delinquency rate for the New Hope Dream Loan Program, designed to cater to 
individuals with poor credit ratings, also rose from 1.7 percent in 2011-end to 
2.6 percent in September 2012.33 
While some supervision of the financial sectors was actively implemented 
from the Early Warning System (EWS), especially centered on the home-
equity loan, the strength of the supervision was not sufficient to rein in the 
expansion of household debt as it only focused on the Loan to Value (LTV)-
oriented regulation and the different regulation systems for different financial 
sectors. Accordingly, in the early stage of increase in housing prices, the 
regulation centered on the LTV failed to effectively rein in the expansion of 
household debt. The failure of sequentially implementing the Debt to Income 
(DTI) regulation after the LTV regulation, due to the resistance from the 
financial sector and arguments against the use of DTI as it is an excessive 
policy intervention, is also regarded as a reason that the exploding rise of 
household debt was not preemptively suppressed.34 
The LTV ratio is the most effective policy tool that the financial regulation 
authority can use to manage risks associated with the fluctuation in the 
value of real estate. The LTV ratio in Korea, except the savings banks and 
financial companies specializing in loan business, is still lower than that of 
other countries. However, the LTV ratio can be underestimated if it does not 
properly account for the Jeon Se deposit, a unique system in Korea where 
substantial deposit is required to lease a property. Currently, in the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area (수도권) that includes the city of Incheon and Gyeonggi 
Province, the LTV ratio is 50 percent on houses of price lower than 600 million 
won and 60 percent on others. Also DTI ratio is 50 percent in Seoul, and 60 
percent in the Seoul Metropolitan Area.35 Even the DTI-oriented regulation, 
which was fully implemented by the end of 2006, had little desired effect, as 
the regulations had to be adapted to accommodate the global financial crisis 
at that time. 
Another concern is the pattern of debt transfer from household to government 
(i.e., welfare). If the rising household debt puts some households in an 
economically dire situation, the government may need to intervene and increase 
assistance and welfare payments such as college tuition breaks and other forms 
of subsidies. The rise of government welfare payment will also enlarge the 
government debt. In 2012, the government debt stood at approximately 774 
trillion won or 35 percent of the GDP when only the government debt is 
considered. If the debt of government-owned (or subsidized) companies is also 
considered, the amount becomes approximately 1,255 trillion won or 65 percent 
of the GDP, approaching a dangerous level.36 
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Remedies Attempted by the Korean Government 
To alleviate the rising concerns regarding the household debt in Korea, many 
policies were implemented with a varying degree of success. Two such measures 
are “Comprehensive measures to induce a soft landing for household debts” in 
June 2011 and “Supplementary rules for non-banking household loan activities” 
in February 2012. Despite the government policies to rein in the household debt 
problem with which the growth rate of household debt has slowed, the household 
debt problem still remains one of the most significant risk factors threatening the 
stability of the Korean economy. 
The rising household debt in Korea emerged as one of the major issues in the 
2012 presidential election. During the campaign, candidate, now President, Park 
Geun-hye, made a pledge to launch a National Happiness Fund (NHF)—a form 
of debt relief fund—of 18 trillion won (approximately $17 billion) to ease the 
debt burden of the low-income class, in particular the 3.22 million people who 
are unable to service their debts. This election pledge was fulfilled and the NHF 
was launched on March 29, 2013. The Fund “aims to help credit recovery of 
delinquent borrowers and heavily-indebted low-income earners with programs 
including restructuring debt, easing debt servicing burden on student loans, and 
converting high-interest loans to lower-interest ones.”37 
The NHF gives debtors more time to repay their loans and reduce their interest 
rates for a limited time. In particular, loans with interests in excess of 20 percent 
were targeted to reduce their rates to 10 percent range for loans taken out from 
financial institutions that charge high interests, sometimes over 20 percent. Those 
who had been diligently paying off debts for the six months leading to the end 
of February 2013 may be entitled to this debt relief program with maximum loan 
amount of 40 million won.38 
Obviously, this plan can create a moral hazard as the government will help the 
borrowers repay their debts. One expert added that “The NHF plan is quite 
unrealistic, because the government will have to issue bonds that are ten times 
greater than their original value.”39 They are also skeptical of the efficacy of the 
NHF as the funding sources for the plan are too small and it is applicable to only 
a minority of people who took out institutional loans.40 
The biggest criticism against the NHF policy is that the debt relief is a form of 
political populism that threatens the market order and creates conflicts among 
debtors who have sincerely tried to pay their debts. Some experts even say that 
the use of bankruptcy court or rehabilitation procedure is more advantageous than 
the use of NHF. In addition, individuals who are classified as the basic livelihood 
security recipients rarely have the ability to repay. One economist opined that 
although the NHF writes off a portion of the debt, 70 percent at the maximum, it 
would be more advantageous for some debtors to declare bankruptcy since the 
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redemption by installment for the balance, 30 percent of the debt at the least, 
would not be easy for the basic livelihood security recipients who eke out a 
bare existence from day to day.41 Although it is not easy to distinguish those 
who would be better served by declaring bankruptcy, it is reasonable to expect 
that a basic livelihood security recipient who is dependent on a minimum daily 
wage for sustenance would have a very hard time repaying the debt even after 
70 percent of the debt is written off. 
The long redemption period of ten years was also pointed out as an obstacle to 
the success of NHF. If a NHF beneficiary fails to meet the terms stipulated by 
the NHF for only a year after successful compliance for nine years, the efforts 
would turn out to be in vain. However, the Financial Services Commission 
(FSC) responded that the longer redemption period lowers the amount of 
each payment installment. The FSC’s support for the NHF is premised on 
the argument that the use of bankruptcy procedure will leave a record that 
may prevent the bankrupt from engaging in economic activities (and limit 
their financial transactions). The FSC further claimed that the same negative 
consequence is not true for those who utilize the NHF. While the NHF is not 
the fundamental solution to the household debt problem, the fund expects to 
ease some of the acute debt burden of the least privileged. For this reason, the 
NHF should be understood in light of social security and rehabilitation rather 
than credit amnesty.
The NHF and other related policies mainly focus on the rehabilitation of 
vulnerable social groups and credit recovery. However, not enough policy 
attention is paid to lower the total volume of the household debt. The competing 
effects of policies are also responsible for difficulties in implementing the 
right policies that address household debt by boosting economic conditions. 
For example, the recently announced “4.1 Real Estate Measures,” for which a 
series of major bills related to real estate were already passed in the National 
Assembly, is viewed as a policy to stabilize and boost real estate transaction 
which will in turn stimulate the economy. This measure along with the lower 
interest rates announced by the BOK already began to boost the housing market.42 
As of May 20, 2013, the market price of high-rise residences apartments has 
been increasing in the last eight consecutive weeks in the Seoul Metropolitan 
Area and eleven consecutive weeks in the non-Seoul Metropolitan Areas, and 
reached a level higher than that of end-2012 by 0.18 percent.43 
The “4.1 Real Estate Measure” is expected to raise home equity loans and 
household debt. The recently passed April 30, 2013 amendment to the Tax 
Reduction and Exemption Control Act exempts the transfer income tax for a 
newly-built housing unit for a household under the value of 600 million won or 
85 square meters, acquired from April 1 to December 31, 2013, if the unit is to 
be transferred within five years of acquisition. 
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Proponents argue that this amendment is a desperate measure to normalize real 
estate transactions, adding that this limited-time measure aims to facilitate the 
disposal of housing for the poor and the middle/low-income class. Opponents of 
the amendment argue that the bill is inconsistent; they favor smaller housing units 
that meet space requirements in affluent areas over the bigger units that are slightly 
over the price restrictions in non-Seoul Metropolitan Areas that more urgently 
need assistance for this type of bill. Another line of criticism leveled against 
the bill is based on the short-term nature of the supposed remedy. One National 
Assembly member argues that the short-term benefit will be overshadowed by 
the long-run harmful effect, as the profit-seekers entering the housing market can 
destabilize the housing market. 
Although condition in the housing market is one of many factors affecting the 
household debt, the controversies revolving around the “4.1 Real Estate Measure” 
depict the difficulties in addressing policy objectives including household debt. 
Also, due to the rise of household debt, the Korean government is not able to boost 
domestic demand by stimulating personal consumption. 
Recommendations 
Although major sources of the household debt problem in Korea are factors related 
to financial and banking sectors, the remedies to alleviate the problem should be 
found in more fundamental areas in Korean economy and society. First, in order to 
address the household debt problem, job creation should be considered especially 
for the least privileged. Since secure employment is one of the most important 
bases for living and related economic activities including the payment of debt, 
more endeavors are called for to create decent jobs, better employment security, and 
employment training programs. Despite the low unemployment rate of 3 percent 
in 2012, “the quality of new jobs being created is declining” and many of them are 
concentrated in the service sector and are on short-term contract basis.44 
To the extent that the NHF recipients have a hard time finding regular 
employment, the workers in the non-regular sectors (비정규직) need special 
assistance in finding employment, such as job fairs targeting low-income areas. 
Providing employment opportunities (through job creation) to the recipients of 
debt reduction (or debt relief) is also necessary to sustain the momentum of 
easing household debt. Unless the structural weakness of the household debt for 
the low-income class and other vulnerable individuals is addressed, the current 
stagnating economy45 along with the slump in the real estate market will further 
exacerbate their ability to generate income and service debts. 
Second, in order to control the size and composition of the household debt, policy 
attention should be paid to both debtors and lenders. For debtors, more financially 
supported policies such as microfinance and petty loans for the low-income class 
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are needed within the range that does not create or minimizes moral hazard. To 
relieve the indebted individuals with low income from the acute financial burden 
at least temporarily, policy efforts are necessary to adjust the loan structures by 
flexibly transferring high-interest debt into lower-interest debt as well as to extend 
the repayment period. 
Although there are policies such as Smile Loan and Sunshine Loan already in 
place to alleviate the financial difficulties, problems occur since barriers to those 
policies are still high due to the lack of information and complex procedures 
for application for such loans. Opening more branches dealing with these loans, 
offering extended business hours, and disseminating loan application information 
more effectively (such as setting up a call center for credit management 
counseling) are recommended. Policies, such as the LTV and DTI regulations, 
should also be implemented in a timely manner to guide all forms of lenders to 
be careful not to overextend loans. Due to the lag between the implementation of 
policies and actual impact, preemptive measures are urgently called for, such as 
the adjustment of LTV and DTI ratios. 
Finally, all the implemented policies must be monitored and data should be 
collected to see if these policies are actually working. 
Conclusions 
The household debt in Korea has become one of the most significant potential 
risk factors that can threaten the stability of the financial system, especially when 
it is linked to the economic slowdown and ongoing real estate slump after the 
global financial crisis. This paper has reviewed and investigated the trends and 
determinants of the rising household debt and declining savings in Korea so that 
policies can be implemented to deter and effectively counter the problems that 
low savings and countervailing high debt pose on the Korean economy. 
Korea needs to address the rising household debt problem in a more proactive 
manner by adopting the recommendations grounded in the more fundamental 
areas in Korea’s economy and society. By doing so, Korea can alleviate this 
serious problem to its economy and society and provide greater strength and 
flexibility for the domestic and international markets. 
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Abstract
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States has been the largest supplier of 
defense systems to the Republic of Korea (ROK). The imperative of maintaining 
military interoperability with the U.S. armed forces often proved a decisive factor 
for ROK decision makers. However, ROK officials have tried to increase the amount 
of military equipment, technology, and services that South Korea acquires from 
non-U.S. sources, with a priority given to domestic suppliers. ROK procurement 
officials have concluded that U.S. companies do not always provide the best deals 
in terms of cost, performance, and timeliness. In addition, they are frustrated 
with the restrictions and terms typically associated with U.S. defense imports, 
especially limitations on the transfer and re-sale of U.S. technologies as well as 
the problems entailed in meeting South Korean demands for substantial offsets. 
ROK governments have also sought as much as possible to draw on the country’s 
own burgeoning defense industries. At first, ROK defense companies' low private 
R&D spending, overcapacity and other structural inefficiencies, small number of 
exportable products, limited competitiveness in foreign markets, and bans on the 
sale of items with U.S. technology to third countries constrained their actual and 
potential contributions. But over time ROK firms have overcome many of these 
obstacles. In addition, the same factors that have enabled South Korea’s industry 
to substitute for previously imported defense items have made them better able to 
compete for foreign sales: the growing sophistication and size of South Korea’s 
civilian economy, the companies’ improving human capital and productivity, 
mandatory technology transfers and offsets, and extensive ROK government 
support for the industry.
Key words: weapons, arms, technology transfer, defense, military 
Dr. Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military 
Analysis at the Hudson Institute. 
44 2014 Volume 7  n  ON KOREA
Introduction
During the past decade, the ROK has become a global player with worldwide 
interests. ROK policy makers have raised their country’s international profile 
by hosting high-level events, participating in international peacekeeping, and 
promoting South Korea as a model for combining democracy with rapid economic 
development. Seoul hosted the November 2010 G-20 Summit, the November 2011 
High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and the March 2012 Nuclear Security 
Summit. South Korea has vigorously participated in the activities of various 
subsidiary and specialized UN agencies, as well as other international organizations. 
In October 2012, several years after a South Korean foreign minister was selected 
as UN Secretary General, the ROK was elected to hold a non-permanent seat on 
the U.N. Security Council for the 2013 and 2014 terms. South Korea is also a 
committed member of various international nonproliferation regimes, such as the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Missile Technology Control 
Regime, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
The United States and the rest of the international community have benefitted from 
South Korea’s growing global leadership and engagement. The United States and 
South Korea are also coordinating more effectively and comprehensively on global 
diplomatic, development, and defense issues. South Korea has more development 
workers serving abroad than any other country after the United States. ROK and 
U.S. planners have discussed ways that their two militaries can support each 
other in humanitarian and disaster-relief missions, as well as other extra-Korean 
contingencies, by building on their existing Peninsula-based cooperation. Not 
only does the ROK accept the necessity for U.S. Forces Korea to contribute to 
its possible extra-peninsular missions, but also South Korea’s own military 
modernization program, the Defense Reform Project 2020 adopted in 
2005, has increased its capacity to participate in missions outside of Korea. 
South Korea now stations hundreds of its troops overseas, and has twice 
commanded multinational counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. The 
ROK has deployed a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan and is 
helping train the Afghanistan National Security Forces as they prepare for 
the departure of most Western combat forces at the end of 2014.2
Despite its small size and limited population, the ROK’s economy has become 
one of the world’s largest. South Korea has joined the elite Group of Twenty 
(G-20) leading industrial countries and has negotiated free trade agreements 
with many foreign partners. ROK companies are expanding their presence 
in global markets as well. For example, South Korea has rapidly emerged 
as one of the world’s leading suppliers of civil nuclear energy technologies 
and services. Many of these trends are also replicated in the defense sector. 
South Korea has built up one of the most impressive defense industrial bases 
among the newly industrialized states in the Asia-Pacific. The country’s total 
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military expenditure surpassed $31 billion in 2012, making it the third largest 
defense spender in Asia and the 12th largest in the world.3 South Korea has 
become one of the largest markets for conventional weapons for its military, the 
world’s eighth largest with some 680,000 soldiers, 2,500 tanks, 850 fighter jets, 
100 helicopters, and about a dozen submarines and major surface warships.4 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, during the 
2008-2012 period, South Korea accounted for five percent of all global imports 
of major conventional weapons; of these imports, 77 percent came from the 
United States, 15 percent from Germany, and 5 percent from France.5
Yet, over time, South Korea has reduced the percentage of these weapons that 
it has purchased from U.S. sources, while raising the share of arms imported 
from non-U.S. companies and the proportion of weapons manufactured in South 
Korea. Meanwhile, ROK companies have become major players in the global 
defense industry, which has for decades been dominated by Russian, European, 
and U.S. firms. South Korea’s annual arms exports reached $2.4 billion in 2011 
and the government hopes to achieve $3 billion in arms exports in 2013.6 The 
South Korean Defense Agency for Technology and Quality expects this figure to 
double to $4 billion by 2020.7 ROK defense exports compete internationally in the 
armored vehicle, shipbuilding, and aerospace sectors. Among other considerations, 
the ROK’s changing role in international arms markets poses new challenges and 
opportunities for its foreign partners, including the United States. 
Buying Beyond the United States
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States has been the largest supplier of 
defense systems to South Korea due to the two countries’ strategic ties, joint military 
commands and exercises, South Koreans’ long familiarity with U.S. weaponry, 
and interoperability considerations. Initially, South Korea lacked a major defense 
industrial sector, and buying weapons from the United States was seen as a natural 
means of reinforcing the bilateral alliance upon which the new state of South Korea 
depended. Beginning in the mid-1970s, South Korea initiated an aggressive and 
increasingly ambitious defense industrialization program, with the long-term goal 
of establishing “a basic foundation for a self-defense capability for the twenty-
first century.”8 The motives for this indigenous defense industrialization were not 
only military, but also economic and political. The ROK consciously pursued 
a parallel strategy of “security and development,” that is, building up its heavy 
industry and high-technology sectors while striving for greater self-sufficiency in 
arms production.9 Moreover, South Korea pursued an advanced arms production 
capability to enhance its international status and influence.10
By the 1980s, the South Korean defense industry was producing a variety of 
unsophisticated combat equipment, including small arms like the K2 rifle, short-and 
medium-range missiles such as the Hyunmu, short-range field artillery like 155mm 
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self-propelled howitzers, small-scale naval vessels like fast attack patrol boats, the 
Hughes 500MD helicopter, and the F-5E Tiger II fighter aircraft.11 But the United 
States still had a dominant role in South Korea’s developing defense industry due to 
these ROK firms’ licensing and co-production agreements with major U.S. defense 
companies. In turn, U.S. corporations received large ROK defense contracts to co-
produce these ROK weapons as well as supply more advanced systems that the ROK 
industry was unable to manufacture. U.S. firms also enjoyed the opportunity to 
import inexpensive defense components from South Korea’s manufacturing plants, 
which typically had lower labor costs and other production expenditures.12 One 
reason why the United States and ROK governments favored this close cooperation 
was that their militaries benefited from using the same weapons, making it easier to 
share logistics, tactics, and other military elements. The imperative of maintaining 
military interoperability with the U.S. armed forces has often proved a decisive 
factor in Seoul’s defense procurement decisions. In recent years, significant U.S. 
sales and co-production of defense equipment have included: the K-1 (Type 88) 
Tank, SAM-X surface-to-air missile, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, F-16 C/D fighters, 
UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, the T-50 “Golden Eagle” advanced trainer jet, F-15K 
jet fighters, and the KDX III Naval Destroyer. These systems continue to form the 
backbone of the ROK’s military. 
However, during the past two decades, ROK officials have tried to increase the 
military equipment, technology, and services that South Korea acquires from 
non-U.S. sources, with a priority given to domestic suppliers. The policy of 
diversifying beyond U.S. defense firms began in the 1980s, but was accelerated 
when the Roh Moo Hyun government sought to enhance South Korea’s ability to 
pursue policies independent of Washington, manifested in part by Roh’s decision 
to seek wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korea’s armed forces.13 
More recently, commercial rather than economic considerations have been driving 
Seoul to buy more non-U.S. weapons. ROK officials have concluded that U.S. 
companies do not always provide the best deals in terms of cost, performance, and 
timeliness. In addition, the policy now reflects ROK officials’ frustrations with the 
restrictions and terms typically associated with U.S. defense imports, especially 
limitations on the transfer and re-sale of U.S. technologies as well as the problems 
entailed in meeting South Korean demands for substantial local content and other 
offsets. Competing foreign governments and companies have often proven more 
forthcoming than their U.S. counterparts in agreeing to transfer sensitive military 
technology to South Korea to offset defense sales. 
Over time, the ROK has increasingly acquired its weapons from other countries 
as well as manufactured its own weapons systems. At first, foreign defense firms 
complained about the difficulties of competing with long-established U.S. rivals 
in the ROK market. But in recent years, South Korean officials have resisted 
Washington’s pressure to buy some expensive U.S.-made weapons systems, such 
as the PAC-3 air and missile defense system, the SM-3/Aegis ballistic missile 
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defense system, and the Apache attack helicopter, while making major contracts 
with other foreign competitors. In August 2011, the Ministry of National Defense’s 
Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced it would procure 
antisubmarine helicopters. The British AgustaWestland AW-159 Wildcat helicopter 
and the U.S. Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk helicopter were the main competitors. 
Given the advantage of interoperability and the traditional relationship between 
the United States and South Korea, it seemed likely that Sikorsky would win the 
contract. During the DAPA evaluation in September 2012, the SH-60 Seahawk 
helicopter had a higher rating. But the DAPA unexpectedly announced in January 
2013 that AgustaWestland won the tender.14 In 2012, the DAPA rejected the 
U.S. plan to sell four Global Hawk UAVs, worth $1.2 billion, to South Korea. 
In June 2013, the DAPA announced that it would buy the Taurus KEPD-350, a 
joint venture between European groups MBDA and Saab, rather than Lockheed 
Martin’s AGM-157, for its Joint Air to Surface Standoff missile project.15 A major 
reason for the decision was the U.S. government’s reluctance to relax restrictions 
on the export of its most advanced missile technologies.16 Other notable European 
successes in the South Korean defense market include the SAM-X project, which 
purchased the German MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2; the K-2 Black Panther Tank; 
Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI)’s Surion (helicopter) research and development 
contract with Eurocopter; and the MBDA Missile System’s Mistral missiles. 
Furthermore, on August 27, 1995, Israel and South Korea signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on Cooperation in Logistics and the Defense Industry, which 
established a committee that meets regularly to exchange information about 
military technology. Between 2005 and 2010, Israel exported $187 million worth of 
defense commodities to South Korea.17 In January 2011, the ROK awarded Israel’s 
Elisra Electronic Systems a $29 million contract to supply Airborne Electronic 
Warfare (AEW) Suites and missile warning systems for the ROK air force’s CN-
235 aircraft. In addition, the ROK purchased Israel Aerospace Industries’ Harpy 
loitering anti radar UAV and its Green Pine phased array long radar.18
Import Substitution
While considering a wider range of foreign suppliers, the South Korean 
government has sought to purchase more defense items from the country’s own 
burgeoning defense industries. More than a decade ago, the ROK’s Defense 
White Paper 1999 affirmed a commitment to acquire “the ability to independently 
develop primary weapons systems for core force capability.” The more recent 
Defense Reform Plan 2020, enacted in 2005, emphasized a self-reliant defense 
posture through increasing indigenous capabilities and defense R&D. The Plan 
aimed to grow the defense budget 11.1 percent annually through 2015 and 7.1 
through 2020.19 Although defense spending has not grown as rapidly as planned, 
private defense R&D investment increased from $132.2 billion in 2005 to $410.7 
billion in 2008.20 South Korea’s defense R&D budget in 2010 was 1,795 billion 
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won, or approximately US$1.5 billion, comprising around 6 percent of total 
military spending.21
At first, ROK defense companies’ limited private R&D spending, overcapacity 
and other structural inefficiencies, small number of exportable products, limited 
competitiveness in foreign markets, and bans on the sale of items with U.S. 
technology to third countries constrained their actual and potential contributions. 
For a while, most arms manufacturing centered on licensed production of foreign 
military systems, such as the U.S. F-5 and F-16 fighters and the German Type-
209 submarine. Production gradually progressed to indigenously developed 
equipment, such as the T-50, the K1/K1A1 main battle tank, and the KDX-I, II, and 
III destroyers. In recent years the ROK has built a broad-based defense industry 
with particular strengths in the aerospace, land ordnance, and shipbuilding sectors. 
At present, 80 percent of South Korea’s arms are procured domestically, including 
main battle tanks, armored vehicles, warships, submarines, and many missiles 
and combat aircraft.22 South Korea has recently developed its own anti-ship and 
land-attack cruise missiles, a new tank (the XK-2) and infantry fighting vehicle 
(the K21), and it plans to build its own class of attack submarines and a variety of 
advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).23
The South Korean government has used defense contracts and other means to 
develop the country’s private defense industry. Like Japan, South Korea has 
relied heavily on the country’s small number of large industrial conglomerates 
(chaebol), such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG, rather than state-owned 
enterprises to carry out national arms production. Local arms manufacturing 
is heavily concentrated in just a few chaebols: Hyundai Rotem builds main 
battle tanks; Doosan Infracore, armored vehicles; LIG Nex 1 (formerly LG 
Precision), missile systems and electronics; Samsung Techwin, jet engines 
and artillery systems; and Hyundai Heavy Industries, surface combatants and 
submarines. In addition, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI, jointly owned 
by Samsung, Doosan, and Hyundai) produces all of the country’s military aircraft, 
including the T-50, the KT-1 ‘Woong-Bee’ intermediate trainer, helicopters, and 
some UAVs. 
The South Korean government has been heavily involved in the arms production 
process by providing direct and indirect subsidies to manufacturers, underwriting 
defense research and development planning, and designating firms (such as KAI) 
as monopolistic suppliers of critical military equipment.24 Defense research and 
development (R&D) in South Korea is managed by the Agency for Defense 
Development (ADD), which has a staff of several thousand people, mostly 
engineers, technicians, scientists, and other personnel engaged in research 
and development. ADD undertakes the R&D of weapons systems and core 
technologies, manages the development of dual-use and core technologies, and 
conducts operational testing and evaluation of developmental systems. It is 
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responsible to the DAPA, which oversees armaments acquisition in South Korea, 
including determining requirements, approving R&D projects, and assessing 
testing and evaluation results. ADD works directly with the local defense industry 
on prototyping and production of ADD-development weapons systems, as well as 
with industry think tanks, universities, and research institutes on basic and applied 
research and on core technology development. ADD is comprised of seven R&D 
institutes (precision-guided munitions, command, control, communications 
and computing [C4], intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR], ‘neo-
technologies,’ ground systems, naval systems, and aircraft systems) and one test 
center. Each R&D institute operates its own network of research laboratories.25
As in Japan, South Korea’s increasingly advanced civilian dual-use industries 
have facilitated the growth of the country’s defense sector. The ROK’s improving 
civilian information technology, heavy machinery, shipbuilding, and aerospace 
sectors have made it easier to manufacture more advanced defense systems. 
In addition, the South Korean government has helped the defense industry 
by demanding that foreign partners transfer technology and provide other 
assistance to local firms. Under new procurement policies, foreign contractors 
are required to provide a guarantee in advance that the proposed technologies 
will be approved by the respective government or regulatory agencies for transfer 
to South Korea prior to the approval of the offset contract. So far, most U.S. 
defense contractors have acquiesced to ROK demands to maintain their strong 
foothold within the country, but their continued cooperation on technological 
restrictions may prove difficult as ROK firms compete more directly with U.S. 
industries in third-party markets.
Seeking Global Markets
The same factors that have enabled South Korea’s industry to substitute for 
previously imported defense items have made them better able to compete for 
foreign sales: the growing sophistication and size of South Korea’s civilian 
economy, the companies’ improving human capital and productivity, mandatory 
technology transfers and offsets, and extensive ROK government support for the 
industry in the form of billions of dollars for domestic military contract and R&D 
efforts. ROK governments have favored exports as another means to give other 
countries a stake in South Korea’s security as well as an opportunity to create 
more high-tech jobs and lower unit costs for the ROK armed forces through larger 
production runs. For example, the Lee Myung-bak administration’s goal was to 
make the defense industry an “engine of growth” that would make $4 billion in 
yearly exports and employ 50,000 people by 2020.26 From 2001-2008, military 
aircraft (especially F-16 fighters, K-1 trainers, and T-50 advanced trainers) 
accounted for the largest percentage (32.1 percent) of the ROK’s total military 
exports, followed by ammunition (22.3 percent), off-set based exports (18.3 
percent), and artillery and other ground force equipment (18 percent).27
50 2014 Volume 7  n  ON KOREA
The United States has been the main purchaser of South Korean arms exports, 
especially ammunition and parts and services for older U.S. combat aircraft. 
Turkey has been the second largest buyer, procuring self-propelled howitzers, 
trainer jets, and technology for a new main battle tank.28 South Korean firms 
have also contributed to meeting the surging demand for arms in Southeast 
Asia, where China’s growing military power and assertive territorial stance has 
been alarming Beijing’s neighbors. The sale of the KAI’s KT-1 Woongbi and 
T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer aircraft, jointly developed by KAI and 
Lockheed Martin, to Indonesia in 2011 made South Korea only the sixth country 
to export supersonic jets.29 Indonesia has also purchased armored personnel 
carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, 16 T-50 trainers, and 
three Type 209 1,200-ton submarines made by Daewooo Shipbuilding & Marine 
Engineering, and also agreed to contribute one-fifth of the costs for developing 
South Korea’s experimental next-generation fighter jet.30 South Korean firm 
LIG Nex1 also plans to sell the latest antisubmarine technology to Indonesia, 
including the Blue Shark lightweight torpedo, which is a submarine torpedo that 
can be deployed by helicopters, ships, and aircraft.31 In recent years, Malaysia 
has spent from $100 million to $400 million annually on South Korean arms.32 
In 2012, South Korea held its first military talks with Vietnam to expand defense 
cooperation and has bolstered ties with the Philippines.33 Thailand has also 
expressed interest in the Surion utility helicopter, developed jointly by KAI and 
Eurocopter, and the T-50 Jet.34 In October 2013, India signed a contract to buy 
eight countermeasure ships from South Korea’s Kangnam Corp to replace some 
aging vessels purchased from Russia.35 Meeting Indian demands for technology 
transfer, under the offset agreements, two ships will be built in Kangnam’s naval 
shipyard in Busan and India’s Goa Shipyard will manufacture the remaining 
six.36 Furthermore, President Park Geun-hye and Philippine President Benigno 
Aquino III signed a defense industry cooperation in October 2013 that calls for 
enhanced exchanges in military technology, defense information, and more visits 
between their military personnel and analysts.37 The Philippines is also looking 
to spend $650 million on South Korean frigates.38 Earlier this year, South Korea 
signed a defense cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, perhaps portending 
an ROK breakthrough in the profitable Middle East arms market that would build 
on previous large sales to Iraq.39
The FA-50 light combat aircraft is proving to be an especially popular export 
item in Southeast Asia, with Indonesia in 2011 and now the Philippines seeking 
an inexpensive plane for close-air support missions. The FA-50 is a light attack 
variant of the T-50. It can be armed with air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, 
machine guns, and precision-guided bombs and its Israel Elta System EL/M-
2032 PULSE Doppler radar has a range of 100 kilometers.40 Earlier this year, the 
Philippines announced that it would purchase 12 FA-50s for $443 million to make 
up for its lack of fighter aircraft since retiring its fleet of F-5s in 2005.41
 WEITZ: South Korea's Defense Industry 51
To meet its goal of selling 1,000 FA-50 and T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainers 
during the next 30 years, KAI sees South America as an expanding market.42 
The DAPA, along with ROK firms, have recognized the potential business 
opportunities in South America, as these governments seek to replace aging 
military equipment to enhance security capabilities to keep in pace with economic 
development.43 Since 2006, South American countries have imported $48.9 
million worth of ROK defense gear including trucks, flak vests, ammunition, 
and communication devices.44 In 2010, DAPA Commissioner Chang Sooman 
and Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo Rivera signed a memorandum, which 
the ROK hopes will help them break into Colombia’s emerging defense industry. 
Colombia is potentially interested in the ROK’s tanks, armored vehicles, and 
guided missiles.45 In November 2012, KAI signed its first aircraft sale in Latin 
America, when Peru agreed to purchase 20 KT-1 trainers worth $200 million.46 
Another Korean firm, Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering Co. (DMSE) is 
seeking a bid to modernize a Peruvian naval ship.47 Historically, Colombia has 
had close ties with the U.S. military in order to combat the illegal drug trade, but 
the ROK’s willingness to transfer key technology has enabled Colombia to look 
for alternative suppliers instead of their traditional client.
In what the ROK administration hopes will be the first of several defense sales to 
Europe, Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski said he wanted to purchase the 
T-50 when South Korean President Park visited Poland this October. They also 
agreed to form a bilateral defense cooperation agreement that could see Poland 
considering ROK suppliers for planned upgrades to its arsenal of submarines, 
patrol aircraft, and helicopters.48 KAI plans to compete directly with Lockheed 
Martin for the U.S. Air Force T-X program contract; the Pentagon could pay 
several billion dollars for the 300 aircraft.49 One technique ROK defense firms 
may employ to further boost their exports is to partner with other developing 
countries seeking to develop their own defense industries. For example, South 
Korean firms have shared military technology with Indonesia and partly funded 
their joint development of jet fighters (KFX/IFX) and 1,400-ton submarines.
However, South Korea’s defense industry experienced a significant setback in 
2012 when Israel selected Italy’s Alenia Aermacchi M-346 rather than the Korea 
Aerospace Industries’ T-50 Golden Trainer for a $1 billion contract for 30 new 
supersonic fighter training aircraft.50 Another problem has been that China has 
objected to some ROK defense sales to the Philippines and may continue to protest 
ROK defense exports to Vietnam or other countries that have territorial conflicts 
with Beijing.51 Furthermore, the ROK’s defense industry remains heavily focused 
on meeting domestic demand. In contrast, other Western countries expend more of 
their defense production. Exports only account for 7 percent of defense-related trade 
in Korea. In 2011, South Korea exported $2.3 billion worth of military equipment, 
but the defense industry trade deficit amounted to $8 billion, second only to India.52 
In addition to South Korea’s heavy domestic consumption, ROK firms still lag 
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behind global leaders in some core technologies, which they have to import; these 
include aviation electronics, flight/armament controls, stealth/composite materials, 
rotor design, and certification technology related to aviation.53 Defense analysts also 
call on the ROK government to improve the cost system, exempt exports from 
royalties, and work with the defense industry to establish a one-stop support service, 
and take other initiatives to expand exports.54
Policy Implications 
It is important not to exaggerate the extent of these changes. The United States’ 
grip on the international arms market is declining, while South Korean defense 
firms are experiencing growth, but the United States still remains the largest 
international arms dealer, with a 30 percent share of total arms exports in 2012, 
worth more than $200 billion, while South Korea imported nearly 12 percent of 
U.S. arms exports.55 Furthermore, the United States is the world’s largest supplier 
of combat aircraft (62 percent of total exports), which happens to be South Korea’s 
major military import.56 South Korea is the world’s fourth largest arms recipient 
(5 percent) and 55 percent of its total imports are military aircraft.57 Almost 77 
percent of the ROK’s military aircraft comes from the United States.58 The ROK 
also relies heavily on U.S. firms for surveillance and reconnaissance technology.59
South Korea’s unexpected decision earlier this year to annul its tender to 
purchase 60 advanced fighter planes highlights how U.S. companies will often 
remain the supplier of choice for the most advanced weapons systems. Boeing’s 
F-15 Silent Eagle, an upgraded version of the F-15E, the dominant model in 
the ROK Air Force, seemed set to win the $7.7 billion tender in the F-X fighter 
acquisition program. This is the most expensive defense contract ever offered 
in the ROK, derived from the need to replace its aging fleet of F-5 and F-6 
fighters. Boeing’s was the only bid to fall under the proposed parliamentary 
budget ceiling, and would be cheaper to maintain thanks to the ROK’s earlier 
Boeing purchases. Boeing also pledged $2 billion in technology transfer and to 
buy $1.5 billion in South Korean aircraft parts as well as build a sophisticated 
LVC simulator. But the South Korean military insisted on considering the 
more advanced Lockheed Martin F-35A (aka the Joint Strike Fighter), which 
is the only genuine fifth-generation fighter (fully stealthy) among those planes 
on offer. Lockheed Martin also pledged to engage in joint projects with South 
Korean companies worth more than $5 billion, transfer considerable technology 
to ROK manufactures, and launch a military communication satellite that would 
be under South Korean control. 
The government will now develop a new budget and tender, which may require 
raising the spending ceiling, lowering the number of planes ordered below 60, 
or delaying the desired entry into the fleet of the first plane after 2017. Although 
the conventional combat aviation threat from North Korea is minimal, the ROK 
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military might want the ability to attack North Korean nuclear weapons, mobile 
missiles, or long-range artillery with conventional manned aircraft as well as its 
arsenal of ballistic missiles and armed drones. In any case, the ROK Air Force’s 
points of comparison are China and Japan—the latter country is buying the F-35 
while China is developing its own stealth fighter. The other F-X competitor, 
EADS, offered a strong supplementary package along with its Typhoon plane, 
which included pledging to invest $2 billion in the KFX (Korea’s next jet fighter) 
project and produce only 7 Typhoons in Europe and the other 53 in South Korea, 
which would bring technology and jobs to ROK industries. The Typhoon—co-
developed by three firms from the four partner countries of Britain, Germany, 
Italy, and Spain—can perform complicated maneuvers at supersonic speeds 
but lacks some stealth capabilities, now considered an essential attribute of any 
top-line air force despite the higher unit costs.60 Since the collapse of the deal, 
Lockheed Martin has taken orders for the F-35 from the Netherlands, Britain, 
Turkey, Australia, Italy, Norway, and Japan. Given the increased production of 
the F-35, it is possible that Lockheed Martin will reduce the price of its tender 
bid.61 Boeing, for its part, insists that it has not given up and remains engaged with 
South Korea over the possible sale of F-15 fighters.62
Furthermore, in late October 2013, the ROK announced its intention to purchase 
112 Raytheon GEM-T Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles from the United States as 
it develops the KAMD (Korean Air and Missile Defense) program.63 The GEM-T 
is an updated version of the PAC-2 system currently in South Korean service.64 
Pushing forward with KAMD means committing to an independent ROK missile 
shield, although South Korean officials insist that it will operate in close concert 
with its American counterpart on the peninsula.65
In any case, the recent fighter and missile defense contracts are misleading in 
that such high-end deals, where only a few Western firms can meet the strenuous 
demands, will be increasingly rare. To keep the United States a defense partner 
of choice in more competitive tenders, the U.S. treatment of South Korean 
defense companies could prove critical for the future bilateral defense industrial 
relationship. The Pentagon purchased more than $1.1 billion worth of South 
Korean goods and services in fiscal year 2011, which marked a 12.6 percent 
increase from the $991 million for FY2010. South Korea’s share of U.S. military 
procurement rose from 3.5 percent to 4.7 percent during the same period, making 
the ROK the Pentagon’s seventh largest foreign national vendor. However, 
the defense trade remains heavily balanced in favor of the United States, with 
South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration continuing to buy 
major U.S. systems. ROK procurement officials may limit purchases of the 
U.S.-made F-35, or demand extensive offsets, due to this imbalance. Increased 
U.S. purchases of South Korean defense articles could lessen pressures on ROK 
officials to buy non-U.S. military products. Such purchases should also increase 
support for controversial U.S. defense industrial initiatives, such as its ballistic 
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missile defense program, and help reduce tensions over ROK-U.S. negotiations 
regarding how much host-nation support South Korea should provide the U.S. 
U.S.-ROK competition on third-party defense markets presents less of a problem 
in terms of alliance relations since the solution is to make U.S. defense exports 
more competitive in general rather than just against ROK corporations. Although 
unable to match the quality of some U.S. defense exports, South Korean companies 
can often win contracts based on their lower costs and greater ability to transfer 
military technology to potential buyers. Obviously, there are countries, like the Arab 
monarchies, who can afford to pay the highest prices for the best quality weapons, 
and also hope their purchases generate influence in Washington. But many other 
countries will find South Korean weapons systems of sufficient quality for their needs, 
and also gain from the ROK’s less restrictive technology transfer policies. But in 
these respects, South Korean firms are joined by Russian and increasingly Chinese 
defense companies, which can capture defense markets where the buyer is seeking 
“good enough” weapons at substantially lower costs than their U.S. competitors and 
with more generous technology transfer provisions.66 In addition to ensuring a level 
playing field by denying foreign competitors access to unfair subsidies, proprietary 
information, or proliferation loopholes, meeting this challenge will require U.S. 
defense corporations to lower their costs, increase their reliability, and support the 
Obama administration and Congress in their efforts to reform U.S. defense export 
laws and regulations to make it easier for U.S. firms to transfer widely available 
military technologies to foreign buyers while still protecting U.S. defense secrets.
Conclusion
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States has been the largest supplier of 
defense systems to South Korea due to the imperative of maintaining substantial 
military interoperability with the U.S. armed forces. However, ROK officials 
have increased the amount of defense equipment, technology, and services that 
South Korea acquires from non-U.S. sources, with a priority given to domestic 
suppliers, as part of a general effort to diversify South Korea’s international ties 
and strengthen the country’s self-reliance. At first, ROK defense companies’ 
limited private R&D spending, structural inefficiencies, small number of 
exportable products, limited competitiveness in foreign markets, and bans on the 
sale of items with U.S. technology to third countries constrained their actual and 
potential contributions, but over time ROK firms have overcome many of these 
obstacles. In addition, the same factors that have enabled South Korea’s industry 
to substitute for previously imported defense items have made them better able to 
compete for foreign sales: the growing sophistication and size of South Korea’s 
civilian economy, the companies’ improving human capital and productivity, 
mandatory technology transfers and offsets, and extensive ROK government 
support for the industry. Ensuring that U.S. suppliers remain important partners 
of South Korea requires addressing ROK complaints that U.S. companies often 
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fail to provide the best deals in terms of cost, performance, and timeliness, and 
limit South Korea’s access to technologies that are readily provided by alternative 
suppliers. Although South Korea’s rising arms exports present a challenge for 
U.S. arms exports, they also offer U.S. firms and the Pentagon opportunities to 
purchase high-quality ROK defense items and thereby reinforce the traditional 
U.S-ROK military alliance as the alliance between the United States and South 
Korea continues to transform and strengthen.
Figure 2: ROK’s Defense Articles Exports
Source: Defense Acquisition Program Administration of ROK.
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Table 1: ROK's Defense Articles Exports [in US$ thousands]
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Exports 24,061 41,782 26,234 25,323 84,493 103,144 116,592 118,797 238,195 235,284
Maneuver 2,428 5,406 2,362 1,849 3,783 36,066 32,458 8,490 7,174 19,144
Warship 7,506 14,997 358 0 2 92 13,698 36,548 108,223 75,162
Aviation 6,305 10,352 16,413 10,169 44,028 25,895 9,893 23,780 84,979 65,283
Fire Arms/Guns 3,971 89 2,482 6,581 2,672 10,190 15,907 11,490 1,203 14,582
Ammunition 2,712 8,114 2,611 5,017 28,805 25,796 23,142 33,376 27,295 38,592
Communication
- Electronics 
Optics
25 1,754 76 434 1,125 4,022 17,192 2,591 6,338 14,821
Etc. 1,114 1,071 1,932 1,272 4,077 1,082 4,302 2,522 2,984 7,700
Source: Defense Acquisition Program Administration of ROK.
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South Korea hopes to become a major exporter of nuclear plants. Its success in 
building up its domestic nuclear industry, winning a $20.4 billion contract to build 
four nuclear power plants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), building Jordan’s 
first research reactor, and providing training programs and best practices to nuclear 
newcomer states indicates that established vendors should take this determination 
seriously. If South Korea draws the right lessons from its experience with the 
UAE and builds upon its competitive advantages in the international nuclear 
energy market—low cost, high credibility, high performance, strong political 
backing, attractive financing, and U.S. technology at a low cost—it could record 
similar success in the future.    
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South Korea hopes to become a major exporter of nuclear plants. Fresh off 
winning a highly competitive $20.4 billion contract to build four nuclear power 
plants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), building Jordan’s first research 
reactor, and providing training programs as well as sharing best practices with 
nuclear newcomer states, the ROK in 2010 announced that it would seek to 
export 80 nuclear reactors by 2030.1 Subsequently, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear 
accident in Japan, the global financial crisis, and the limitations of South Korea’s 
nuclear industry have forced the ROK to scale back these ambitious objectives. 
Nonetheless, South Korea remains intent on securing additional global reactor 
contracts in countries such as India, Vietnam, Poland, Saudi Arabia, and South 
Africa, as well as bigger markets such as China and the United States. If South 
Korea draws the right lessons from its experience with the UAE and builds upon 
its competitive advantages in the international nuclear energy market, it could 
record similar success in the future.  
Nuclear Deals
The UAE selected in 2009 a consortium led by Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO), a South Korean government-owned electric utility, for a contract to 
design and construct four APR-1400s in Barakah. The APR-1400 design is an 
advanced version of the Combustion Engineering (now Westinghouse) System 
80+. Shin-Kori Units 3 and 4, currently under construction in Korea, will serve as 
the “reference NPPs” for Barakah 1 and 2. 
Jordan has been collaborating with South Korea on building Jordan’s first research 
reactor and training Jordanian personnel. In March 2010, Amman signed a $130 
million agreement with South Korea to supply Jordan’s first nuclear research 
reactor. The Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Daewoo 
would construct the reactor at the Jordan University of Science and Technology 
(JUST). The reactor is expected to be online and operational by 2016. France’s 
Areva will supply the nuclear fuel for the reactor core and a reload batch.2,3 South 
Korea has agreed to finance most of the project, providing a $70 million soft 
loan, with 0.2 percent interest rate and repayment over 30 years, which includes 
a feasibility study on environmental impact.4 The ROK also plans to establish a 
nuclear training and technology center at JUST where Jordanian nuclear engineers 
and technicians would be trained by South Korean experts.5  
South Korea is also considered a leader in nuclear energy training and human 
development. KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School (KINGS), 
established in 2012 KEPCO in cooperation with George Mason University, plans 
to enroll foreigners as half of its student body, stating, “Raising talents from 
potential export countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Vietnam and Indonesia will 
produce valuable networks we need in the future.”6 The 62 students accepted 
in 2013 came from fifteen countries.7 Additionally, South Korean companies 
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and agencies such as KAERI, KINS, Korea Nuclear International Cooperation 
Foundation (KONICOF), and Korea International Cooperation Agency provide 
training for nuclear newcomers. South Korea also plans to open an International 
Nuclear Security Academy next year to help train other countries in nuclear 
security practices.8  
Of the two deals South Korea secured so far, the UAE deal is far more significant 
in terms of its financial impact, as a symbol of South Korea’s emergence as a 
global nuclear player, and the precedent it sets for other potential nuclear deals. 
As such, it is worth examining the factors that led to the UAE contract. 
Why the ROK Won the UAE Deal and 
Lessons for the Future 
The ROK’s successful bid for the UAE contract can be ascribed to political, 
technical, business, financial, and cultural factors. 
Political Factors
The nuclear deal was not the first large contract the ROK won in the UAE. The 
countries have been cooperating in strategic sectors, including oil production, 
finance, and health care. The close ties Korea has cultivated with the UAE in trade 
and infrastructure projects were of great importance in winning the bid. The UAE 
is the second-largest oil and natural gas exporter to Korea, and the Emirates have 
become South Korea’s largest export market in the Middle East.9 
Moreover, the Korean government was adept at using various policy channels 
to support the Korean consortium, including leadership at the highest levels, 
including then-Korean President Lee Myung-bak. That Lee was the former 
CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction, a central actor in the Korean 
consortium, added credibility to the diplomatic exchanges and the Korean bid.  
It is also not uncommon to add diplomatic “carrots” to a nuclear bid to make 
it more attractive. In the South Korea case, in addition to the nuclear deal, the 
countries also agreed to cooperate on renewable energy, education, shipbuilding, 
information communications technology and human resource development, as 
well as the strategic storage of six million barrels of Abu Dhabi oil in Korea. 
As part of the military cooperation, the ROK military committed to provide two 
years of special forces training to its UAE counterparts. The two countries will 
also hold joint military exercises and exchange defense industry technology and 
high-ranking military officials.10 
South Korea’s close relationship with the United States and Westinghouse’s 
participation in the Korean consortium also played a key role. The UAE 
appreciated the fact that the South Korean nuclear design is of U.S. origin and 
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Westinghouse would be involved in the project, making it difficult for the United 
States, its primary security benefactor, to object to the deal.11 
Technical Factors 
With 23 nuclear reactors in operation, KEPCO is renowned for having the 
highest “capacity factor”—the proportion of time that the reactor is generating 
electricity—and  the lowest “unplanned shutdown” rate in the world, at only 0.3-
0.5 times per month compared to 3.2 times per month in France (based on South 
Korean reports).12  
South Korea also appealed to the UAE’s desire to initiate and complete the project 
quickly, which not only shortens the time until electricity would be available but 
also reduces construction and financing costs—the primary cost-drivers in nuclear 
energy production.13 Korean companies have proved themselves able to build 
nuclear power reactors in a relatively short time and follow a predictable schedule. 
South Korean engineers have developed methods to speed up construction 
through the use of special quick-drying, high-quality concrete and management 
techniques that allow tasks to be performed simultaneously.14  
The overseas capacity of Korea’s nuclear industry will undoubtedly be 
judged based on its performance in the UAE, its first project outside of South 
Korea. While the APR-1400 is a new reactor that has not yet been completed 
in Korea and will have to be modified in order to comply with the regulatory 
and geographic specificities of the UAE, so far construction is on schedule, or 
even ahead of schedule, and Korea seems confident it will complete the project 
before the deadline.15 
Business Model 
KEPCO and its core group of subcontractors (see Figure 1) have worked together 
for years on the domestic Korean nuclear power program using a model similar to 
the one that the UAE is planning to implement. These factors compared favorably 
with the lack of coordination between Areva and EDF, EDF’s late inclusion into 
the bid, the high cost of EPR technology, and the fact that Areva planned to 
outsource some aspects of the reactor construction.16   
In addition, while in the initial French bid construction and operation risks were 
divided between Areva, TOTAL and GDF-SUEZ, in the Korean consortium 
all these risks are borne by KEPCO. This risk allocation puts responsibility on 
one organization, it reduces the litigation risks in case of delays or performance 
problems and increases the incentives for the contractor to meet the project 
delivery objectives.
As a nuclear newcomer, the UAE was looking for a supplier that would be willing 
and able to support local personnel development with extensive training, human 
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resources development and education.18 According to the UAE, one of the main 
criteria in awarding the contract to South Korea was the ROK’s “commitment 
and detailed planning for human resource development in the UAE in support of 
the development of a sustainable, domestically-sourced nuclear energy workforce 
that is dominated by competent national talent.”19 The ROK has also been assisting 
the UAE with upgrading its quality assurance standards and capabilities as well as 
training Emiratis both in the UAE and in South Korea. 
Financial Factors
As part of the Korean deal, the Korean government attached a letter of intent to 
the agreement to finance the project. The financing package includes investments, 
direct loans and external debt guarantees for the special purpose vehicle as well as 
preferred loans for domestic suppliers.20 The 23-year deal carries very low interest 
rates of 1.75 percent to 2.6 percent, with full government guarantees on the various 
project risks.21 KEPCO’s profit is intended to come out of the payment for the 
construction of the nuclear plant, a 60-year contract for equipment replacements 
and potential equity interest. Additional follow-on contracts for long-term 
operation and maintenance of the Barakah plant, worth as much as another 
$20 billion over 60 years, are being discussed with KEPCO and other vendors. 
Moreover, while the UAE has not declared publicly that it will standardize its 
nuclear reactor design and choose ROK as the supplier of future reactors, a senior 
UAE official indicated that this would be the case.22  
The ROK has relatively low execution costs, a distinct competitive advantage. 
The APR-1400s built in South Korea are the most inexpensive nuclear reactors in 
the world (the overnight cost23 is about 60 percent lower than that of the EPR in 
France and that of the AP1000 in China).24 It is estimated that even after taking 
into account the 10 percent cost of capital and the various adaptations of the 
reactor design to fit the UAE unique circumstances, the cost of the UAE APR-
1400 came in only about 30 to 40 percent above the declared cost of the APR-
1400 under construction in Korea—still a very attractive price.25  
Figure 1: KEPCO Consortium17
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the price tag of the South Korean bid was 
significantly lower than that of the other bids. While it is unknown what the final 
bid was for each of the proposals, it was reported that the South Korean price was 
unmatched.26 The Korean low price was in fact criticized within South Korea, 
with the opposition party claiming it was commercially unviable and that future 
buyers would expect similar terms.27 
Cultural Factors
At least from the South Korean side, there is a feeling that the two countries have 
similar historical backgrounds: both have experienced a colonial period, both are 
newly developed countries with “similar value systems,” and both have a concern 
for the preservation of traditional “ethics and manners.”28 The UAE leadership 
appreciated the fact that KEPCO formed a “war room” in the second basement of 
its Seoul headquarters in which 75-80 executives from the consortium coordinated 
the proposal and sales push for more than seven months.29 
Future Export Possibilities 
How well will these advantages translate into other ROK nuclear exports? 
Recently South Korean nuclear insiders have acknowledged that the worldwide 
decline in nuclear reactor demand after the Fukushima disaster and the global 
financial crisis, as well as shortages of qualified personnel, mean a more realistic 
expectation for South Korea to export ten nuclear plants (which can contain 
several reactors) by 2030. 
South Korea’s nuclear reactor exports will be shaped by the broad pull of global 
nuclear demand, the demand of individual potential customers, and how well 
South Korea stacks up against competitors in meeting those demands. According 
to the IAEA, 68 reactors are currently under construction in thirteen countries.30 
Of the seventeen reactors commissioned over the past five years, twelve are 
located in Asia.31  
Most nuclear plant customers choose to buy their plants based on their political 
relationship with the supplier and the economic criteria of reactor price (including 
financing), scheduling, and quality. In the future, the key question for South Korea 
is whether it will be able to meet these criteria for future customers in the same 
way it did for the UAE in the 2009 deal. For the economic criteria, two particular 
areas of importance will be financing and the availability of key resources needed 
to meet cost, scheduling, and quality goals. On the political side, Seoul’s ability 
to maintain and improve relations with the United States and with certain regional 
players is likely to prove essential. 
Reactor Price, Financing, and ROK Profit Margin. South Korean nuclear 
insiders have said that the ROK does not expect to offer as generous prices, and 
 Kane And Pomper: South Korea’s Nuclear Export Successes and Challenges 67
especially financing, to future customers as it did to the UAE, with one terming 
the UAE deal “the golden case that will not happen again.” Yet, other customers 
are likely to seek to pay similar prices as the UAE deal, potentially placing the 
ROK in a difficult position given the limits of its financial resources. 
Of particular challenge on that aspect is that South Korea is competing against 
Russia, which has been able to participate in build-own-operate (“BOO”) 
approaches to reactor construction and financing. First employed in the 
nuclear sector as part of Russia’s deal to sell four nuclear reactors to Turkey, 
BOO schemes have been employed for project finance in many other sectors, 
including other types of electricity generation. Under these arrangements, a 
government buyer only guarantees to purchase the electricity produced by the 
reactor at a certain price taking no equity in the reactor itself. Therefore, more of 
the project’s other risks, particularly the financing risks, are born by the nuclear 
vendor.32 For a country like Korea already facing financing limitations, BOO 
schemes may prove impossible. 
To be sure, this kind of business scheme has no proven record of success in the 
nuclear sector. So far, only Russia has made such an attempt, building four nuclear 
reactors in Turkey, but the arrangement was pushed by the Russian government as 
part of a broader energy cooperation agreement. Rosatom, as the implementer of 
the project, is a reluctant participant, doubting the project could prove profitable. 
Resource Availability: Personnel. Another concern that could prove an obstacle 
in future ROK export deals is a shortage of sufficient Korean personnel given 
the number of domestic reactors under construction and the need to staff the 
UAE plant. It is estimated that KHNP alone will involve 415 to 1,798 people 
in the UAE nuclear project between 2012 and 2020.33 According to Park Goon-
cherl, president of KINGS, “Korea is running far short of high-skilled manpower 
for industrial use of nuclear energy.”34 For future bids, the ROK would need 
to enhance its personnel and likely need to partner with personnel from other 
countries including Japan and the United States. 
A crucial question will be the degree to which South Korean exports will have 
to compete for personnel, financial, and manufacturing resources with the 
construction of domestic plants. Previously, South Korea planned to increase the 
nuclear share of electricity generation to 59 percent by 2030. For this purpose, 
five nuclear units are currently under construction and four more units are planned 
to be completed between 2018 and 2021.35 However, the Energy Ministry in 
October 2013 published recommendations by a study group of 60 experts that 
recommended reducing the portion of electricity generated by nuclear power to 
22-29 percent, compared to 41 percent proposed by President Park Geun-hye. If 
the new administration decides to hold off on initiating further construction of 
domestic nuclear plants this could free resources for exports. 
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Safety. Following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, South Korea hosted 
safety reviews by both domestic authorities and the IAEA at all of its operating 
reactors. As a result, the government has pledged an investment of $1 billion over 
the next five years to further bolster nuclear safety.36 Nonetheless, South Korea’s 
nuclear energy program has recently come under scrutiny after several safety 
scandals, such as the discovery of microscopic cracks in tunnels that guide control 
fuel rods and forgery by eight companies of 60 quality and safety certificates for 
7,000 parts of “non-core” components used in two reactors between 2003 and 
2012.37 During 2012 and 2013 the country’s nuclear reactors experienced multiple 
temporary unplanned shutdowns through a serious summer heat wave with harsh 
results. Due to maintenance, other glitches and the fraud investigation, seven of 
South Korea’s 23 nuclear reactors were closed, the heads of KEPCO and KHNP 
resigned and 100 personnel have been indicted for falsifying documentation.38 
While Emirati officials assessed that the UAE’s nuclear plants are “unlikely to 
be affected by the safety issues dogging Korean reactors,” safety, ethic, and 
organizational culture problems will certainly have to be seriously addressed by 
the South Koreans to reassure potential future clients.39 
Political Factor—the U.S. link. As noted above, the ROK’s links to the United 
States, both politically and commercially were important to winning the UAE deal. 
The connection to Westinghouse provided a testament to the quality of ROK reactors 
for the UAE which took a risk in becoming the first buyer of the ROK’s nuclear 
power plant exports. Politically, the U.S. connection allowed the UAE to avoid 
offending its primary security benefactor and provide a U.S. company with a piece 
of the economic pie.40 This indicates that the ROK may have a better shot at winning 
deals in those countries that enjoy similar strategic relationships with the United 
States such as Saudi Arabia. This is particularly important for the ROK because its 
major competitors have a more global reach and can offer greater security or other 
“carrots” while South Korea is considered a “middle power” in global terms.  
At the same time, however, it leaves South Korea vulnerable to any disruption 
in the U.S.-ROK nuclear relationship. In April, South Korea skirted but didn’t 
eliminate this threat when it agreed to a two-year extension of the current bilateral 
civil nuclear agreement which had been set to expire in March 2014.41 The 
countries have now two more years to try again to reach agreement on a new 
nuclear cooperation agreement. 
The decision to extend the agreement is very important to South Korea’s ability 
to cut export deals over the next three years. In addition, a failure to reach an 
agreement could have had major implications for both the South Korean and 
U.S. nuclear industries: South Korea is dependent on U.S. nuclear material and 
technology while many U.S. reactors are built with Korean components. An 
inability to reach an agreement could also have been perceived as a major blow 
to the alliance. 
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The key stumbling block in the talks has been South Korea’s desire that the U.S 
grant advanced consent to enrich and reprocess (pyroprocess)42 “U.S. origin” 
nuclear fuel. U.S. law since the late 1970s has sought to discourage nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) non-nuclear-weapon states like South Korea 
from engaging in such “alteration in form or content,” which can produce fissile 
material (enriched uranium or plutonium) that can be used either in nuclear 
weapons or civil nuclear fuel. 
Leaving aside the domestic justifications ROK mentioned for reprocessing and 
enrichment,43 one factor some South Korean technical specialists offer for the 
program is their belief that if the country adopted pyroprocessing for handling 
its own nuclear fuel it could then supply the reprocessing service to other 
countries, bolstering its reactor exports or at least enabling KEPCO to avoid the 
deep discounting that it was forced to offer in the UAE. Such a service, however, 
is unlikely to be viewed by ROK politicians as politically viable. It is Seoul’s 
difficulties in finding appropriate locations to store or dispose of its own spent fuel 
which have fueled some of the ROK’s interest in pyroprocessing. This political 
opposition is likely to be even higher in highly nationalist South Korea when it 
comes to accepting foreign spent fuel for reprocessing. And the service is only 
likely to prove attractive to other countries, however, if South Korea was willing 
to accept the high-level waste that would remain after pyroprocessing—a political 
non-starter in the ROK.44 
Some ROK officials are also interested in enrichment as a nuclear export 
component to reap both direct profits from selling enrichment services and 
perceived additional profits from being able to offer more of a “full-service” 
package when it sells nuclear reactors.45 Notwithstanding whatever domestic 
benefits Korea would reap from such an enrichment capability, South Korean 
investments in a domestic nuclear enrichment capability make little commercial 
sense. South Korea would likely find it difficult to compete with established 
enrichment suppliers who can add additional centrifuges at a much lower cost 
than building whole new facilities with indigenous ROK technology (Japan 
has struggled for years to build a domestic enrichment capacity). Nor have the 
existing suppliers expressed a willingness to transfer technologies to the ROK, 
even if they could maintain control. In addition, outside of some former Soviet 
clients who initially had little choice but to buy all front-end services bundled 
together (uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication), utilities 
prefer to strike separate deals for each service in order to obtain the best price. Not 
to mention the global enrichment market is a much smaller market in any case 
than the nuclear reactor market.46 
While the extension decision does not solve the fundamental disagreements 
between the two countries on pyroprocessing and enrichment, it does buy time. 
Negotiations are underway, yet, even under a successful negotiation of a new 
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agreement, South Korea is still likely to chafe at some elements of U.S involvement. 
In particular, the U.S. government is still likely to have a stronger say over ROK 
nuclear power plant exports than some ROK proponents of “nuclear sovereignty” 
may like. 
KEPCO formed a consortium with Westinghouse and its Japanese partner Toshiba 
Power Systems because there are technologies that South Korea has not mastered 
and some technologies that are patented by those companies. The inclusion of 
U.S. components and technology in the plants and the fact that commercial-
scale light-water reactors (i.e., APR-1400) Korea plans to exports are based on 
a Westinghouse design means that U.S. approval is required for such re-export 
under sections 123 and 131 of the Atomic Energy Act.47 In addition, Westinghouse 
would likely need to seek Part 810 Authorization (named after the relevant section 
of the U.S. code) from the U.S. Department of Energy and other U.S. agencies 
before it and its employees can conduct nuclear-related business abroad. 
The re-export of major U.S.-origin nuclear reactor components may also require 
the ratification of a nuclear cooperation agreement between the U.S. and the 
importing country. Such a requirement may prove a challenge, at least with regard 
to new nuclear aspirants, until the U.S. decides whether to include obligations 
to forgo enrichment and reprocessing in future nuclear cooperation agreements. 
It would also prove problematic for ROK future nuclear export if the U.S.-ROK 
cooperation agreement was to expire. Any uncertainty and potential delay as a 
result of an expired nuclear cooperation agreement would undoubtedly be a major 
source of concern to future Korean customers. 
Conclusions
Analyzing the reasons that the UAE has chosen South Korea as a supplier for 
the first four nuclear units highlights several advantages the ROK enjoys. First, 
South Korea has developed a distinct competitive advantage in terms of low cost, 
high credibility, and high performance. Second, South Korea sacrificed some of 
its potential profit margin to pass on its low costs to the customer and make the 
deal happen. In addition, it has benefited from strong political support from 
its government and president, and the deal included attractive financing. Third, 
South Korea provided U.S technology at a low cost and closely cooperated 
with Westinghouse, preventing any rupture in the UAE’s relations with its key 
security benefactor. 
So far, South Korea has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with 28 states.48 
But based on South Korea’s competitive advantages, it is fair to conclude that its 
most likely prospects, with the lowest risk factors, are in the Middle East—with 
lesser possibilities in Southeast Asia, South Africa, and even the United States (if 
it secures U.S. license approval for the APR-1400). 
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As the UAE experience shows, the Middle East looms as a particularly attractive 
market for South Korea. Like the UAE, several other countries in the region are 
faced with growing electricity demand and want to limit the potential economic 
and environmental costs of using fossil fuel for power generation, and are 
engaged in, or seriously considering, the development of civil nuclear power. In 
the Middle East, the main nuclear energy program after the UAE’s will be Saudi 
Arabia, with plans to generate 17.6 gigawatt of power progressively by 2032. In 
December 2011, the Saudi government announced it would invest more than $100 
billion in the construction of sixteen nuclear power plants.49 Even if only some 
of these investments materialize, Riyadh is clearly looking at an ambitious and 
diverse program where financing will not be a decisive factor and is a country 
where U.S. ties could prove helpful. 
In addition, the ROK has proven experience and prominence in running and 
operating mega projects in this region, especially in the energy sector. Korean 
construction companies have played a leading role in new infrastructure—
including quality assurance, desalination and grid upgrades—in many Middle 
Eastern states. Indeed, in 2012 South Korean firms dominated six of the top ten 
EPC Middle Eastern oil, gas, and petrochemicals contracts, and Doosan is leading 
numerous thermal water desalination projects in the region.50 The fact that South 
Korea understands and operates successfully in Middle Eastern cultures is a great 
asset and much appreciated by most governments in the region. This could work 
to South Korea’s advantage in securing future nuclear deals.  
The experience South Korea will gain from adapting its APR-1400 to the specific 
security and geographic characteristics of the UAE,51 as well as providing 
training, quality assurance and grid upgrade support, will provide South Korea 
with another competitive advantage over potential competitors. This will further 
strengthen South Korea’s existing advantages such as low cost, high credibility, 
high performance, strong political backing, and attractive financing. 
To be sure, financing, political relationships, and other factors mean that South 
Korean sales in the Middle East are far from a sure thing. Recently, Russia won 
another contract in the Middle East to construct two nuclear reactors in Jordan. 
Russia agreed to take on 49 percent of the plants’ $10 billion construction and 
operation costs while financial negotiations, possibly under the BOO model, are 
still taking place. Similarly, Turkey chose a Japanese/French team to build a $22 
billion, 4,800 megawatt, reactor site .
If and when it does win such Middle Eastern contracts, however, South Korea 
may reap benefits beyond the nuclear sector. Even though the UAE deal came 
with a very small profit margin, South Korean firms won a host of other deals 
as a direct or indirect result of the main agreement. Trade between the two 
countries grew 24 percent to $22 billion in 2011, with UAE exports to Korea 
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rising by 21.2 percent in 2011 and Korean exports to the UAE growing by 32.4 
percent.52 Another benefit the ROK secured as a result of the nuclear deal is 
a more stable supply of oil and gas. For example, the two countries agreed to 
store six million barrels of oil from Abu Dhabi in Korea and to enable Korea 
to use it in emergency situations. South Korea was also able to significantly 
increase (from 5 to 15 percent) of the ratio of its oil and gas imports secured 
through development and production by Korean firms.53 It is easy to envision 
similar benefits from other Middle Eastern gas and oil producers in the event 
that South Korea wins nuclear bids in these countries. 
Recommendations 
First, reaching agreement on a long-term nuclear cooperation agreement with the 
U.S. is crucial for future ROK nuclear exports. Seoul should use the two-year 
grace period granted by the extension to carefully weigh its strategic interests. 
Any uncertainty in the future and potential for delay related to the status of the 123 
agreement would undoubtedly be a major source of concern for future costumers. 
On the other hand, focusing on particular technologies such as enrichment or 
pyroprocessing should be seen as less important than finding a “win-win” solution 
where the two countries can work together to address Seoul’s core concerns: short-
and medium-term storage for spent fuel, sufficient fuel supplies for South Korea’s 
nuclear fleet, and enhancing South Korea’s nuclear export potential. In particular, 
the ROK and U.S. should continue to build on recent initial discussions on how 
the U.S. can support future ROK nuclear exports.54  
Second, instead of emphasizing enrichment and pyroprocessing as attractive 
options for future customers, South Korea should strengthen its competitive 
advantages. South Korea will be better off expanding into using nuclear energy 
for desalination, as well as offering training and maintaining qualified and 
experience engineers, managers, technicians and sales specialists. It could invest 
in the construction of additional centrifuge capacity at existing enrichment plants 
in return for guaranteed output. 
Third, to minimize Korean reliance on the U.S., the ROK should consider 
promoting Small Modular Reactors and KAERI’s “SMART” small nuclear reactor 
for export to small countries: smaller reactors that are cheaper, easier to manage 
and more adaptable to weak transmission networks and, therefore, better address 
the needs of many newer nuclear clients. Additionally, the SMART reactor design 
is not based on American technology, and it was certified by the Korea Institute 
for Nuclear Safety (KINS) in July 2012.55 This reactor would allow countries with 
a limited electricity network to access nuclear energy and could be particularly 
attractive to some countries in the Middle East due to its advantages in thermal 
heating, desalination, and lack of U.S.-origin technology. 
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Fourth, Korea should concentrate on counties that can afford nuclear energy, 
especially those in the Middle East that can provide the ROK with greater 
energy security. So far, South Korea has been targeting emerging economies that 
have limited financing capacity, and that have made supplier-provided project 
financing a key criterion; however, a more viable scheme for Korea would be 
to offer financing through export-import banks. In the long run, a market reform 
of domestic electricity tariffs in the ROK (that is ending substantial domestic 
subsidies to industry)56 would be helpful to support KEPCO’s financial capacity 
for overseas tenders and permit it to offer to take equity shares in future nuclear 
export tenders and thus reinforce the financial position of the Korean consortium. 
Last, while it is so far unclear whether the safety scandals South Korea experienced 
last year will hamper its efforts to sell nuclear technology globally, quick and 
decisive action will be important to ensure that it does not damage the ROK’s 
image as a leading nation in nuclear quality and safety. 
Should Seoul follow these recommendations, South Korea has the opportunity to 
make its nuclear reactor exports to the UAE the first of many. 
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DECISION TIME: U.S.-SOUTH KOREA 
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION 
Fred McGoldrick and Duyeon Kim 
Abstract
Washington and Seoul are negotiating the replacement of their 1974 civil nuclear 
cooperation agreement that expires in March 2014. Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Act (AEA) requires exports of U.S. nuclear material and equipment be 
made pursuant to a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, and that cooperating 
partners agree to stringent nonproliferation conditions as a condition of U.S. supply. 
The AEA also requires a proposed agreement lie before Congress for ninety days 
of continuous session before it may enter into effect. Given the Congressional 
calendar, an agreement realistically should be submitted to Congress by spring or 
early summer of this year. The clock is ticking, and the negotiators are stuck on 
two contentious issues: South Korean demands for U.S. approval to 1) enrich any 
natural uranium supplied by the U.S., and 2) reprocess (or in the case of South 
Korea, pyroprocess) used fuel produced from nuclear material covered by the 
agreement and reuse the recovered nuclear material in its peaceful nuclear power 
reactors. Since enrichment and reprocessing (or pyroprocessing) can yield both fuel 
for peaceful nuclear energy and material for nuclear weapons, the U.S. strongly 
opposes the spread of these technologies, particularly in areas of proliferation 
concern and instability such as the Korean Peninsula. Concerns are mounting that 
the allies may not be able to resolve their differences before the present agreement 
expires. How the two sides deal with these issues could have important implications 
not only for their nuclear trade but also for the U.S.-ROK-alliance, future U.S. 
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements, the global nonproliferation regime, and 
the North Korean nuclear threat.
Key words: economic reform, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Kim Jong-un, June 
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Introduction and Background
The U.S. and ROK nuclear industries have been interdependent since Westinghouse 
constructed South Korea’s first nuclear power plant that began operations in 1978. 
Since then, U.S. firms continued to remain closely involved in Korea’s nuclear 
industry. At the same time, Korean companies like Doosan supply a variety of 
goods to U.S. nuclear power plants and companies constructing plants overseas. 
Westinghouse, which is now part of the Japanese firm Toshiba, is involved in the 
South Korean contract for building four reactors in the United Arab Emirates. 
U.S. exports of nuclear material and equipment to South Korea are presently 
subject to the U.S.-Republic of Korea agreement for peaceful nuclear 
cooperation. The agreement contains a number of nonproliferation assurances 
by the ROK. It, however, does not contain reciprocal nonproliferation controls 
since South Korea was not a nuclear exporter and did not supply nuclear 
equipment or technology to the United States when the pact was concluded 
in 1974. The South Korean nonproliferation assurances to the United States 
include a guarantee that the ROK will not use materials and items subject to the 
agreement for atomic weapons, for research or development of atomic weapons, 
or for any military purposes, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards will be applied to the materials subject to the agreement. The 1974 
agreement also provides that the reprocessing or alteration in form or content 
of US-supplied materials may be performed only in facilities acceptable to both 
parties upon their joint determination that IAEA safeguards may effectively be 
applied to such nuclear operations. This provision constitutes a so-called “prior 
consent right”1 to reprocessing. The agreement also contains a U.S. right to 
approve the retransfer of any items subject to the agreement to a third country. 
It does not provide the U.S. with the right to approve enrichment since the 
purpose of the agreement was to supply already enriched uranium. 
The allies must conclude a new agreement before it expires in March 2014 in order 
to prevent a halt to U.S. nuclear exports to South Korea. Any new agreement must 
contain a range of new nonproliferation assurances and guarantees contained in 
the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) that amended the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Act (AEA).2 The amendments to the AEA are aimed at significantly 
expanding the nonproliferation guarantees, assurances, and rights that nuclear 
trade partners must give to the United States in all future agreements. These include 
peaceful, non-explosive use assurances, guarantees that IAEA safeguards will 
apply to all the peaceful nuclear activities of the recipient state (“comprehensive 
safeguards”), the perpetuity of those safeguards even if the agreement terminates, 
and assurances of adequate physical protection. Also included is a range of U.S. 
rights to approve sensitive nuclear activities such as enrichment, the reprocessing 
or alteration in form of content of used nuclear fuel, and storage of weapon-usable 
materials—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). 
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Unlike the existing agreement, a new U.S.-ROK agreement will contain 
reciprocal nonproliferation guarantees, thus removing the one-sidedness of the 
current agreement. On the other hand, the conditions required by the AEA for 
new agreements go considerably beyond those contained in the current bilateral 
agreement. For example, the existing pact does not contain a U.S. right of prior 
approval to enrichment or storage of plutonium or highly-enriched uranium 
(HEU). In addition, the requirement for prior consent to reprocessing and 
alteration in form or content is quite far-ranging in scope. The AEA requires 
that these prior consent rights apply not only to U.S.-supplied nuclear material 
but also to non-U.S.-supplied material irradiated in a U.S.-origin reactor. Thus 
the prior U.S. consent rights required by the AEA are much broader and more 
intrusive than that of the current U.S.-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Issues for a New U.S.-ROK Peaceful Nuclear  
Cooperation Agreement
The two governments agree on most of the nonproliferation conditions required 
by the AEA. However, they have been unable to resolve their differences over 
U.S. exercise of two consent rights mandated by the AEA. In particular, the 
ROK appears to want the U.S. to give it a one-time consent to enrich U.S.-origin 
uranium and pyroprocess used nuclear fuel subject to the new agreement for the 
life of the agreement. But the U.S. has been resistant, given its long-standing 
opposition to the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. U.S. views 
on these technologies are shaped by concerns that they can be used to produce 
nuclear weapons as well as to manufacture fuel for peaceful nuclear reactors. In 
addition, safeguarding reprocessing plants to detect the diversion of plutonium for 
nuclear weapons is deemed both costly and technically challenging.
As a result the U.S., as a matter of policy, does not export either technology. It 
has given consent to only a few of its cooperating partners to enrich US-supplied 
uranium but only up to 20 percent in the isotope 235. Enrichment beyond that 
level greatly accelerates the time it would take a country produce weapons-grade 
uranium (around 90 percent for U-235). The U.S. has peaceful nuclear cooperation 
agreements with 24 states, Taiwan, and two international organizations, but has 
limited its approval to the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 
Japan, and more recently, India. In each of these three cases the U.S. has given so-
called “programmatic consent,” i.e., advance consent to reprocessing and the use 
of plutonium in the peaceful nuclear programs of these countries under specified 
nonproliferation conditions for the life of the agreement. The U.S. consent to 
sensitive nuclear activities in these three cooperating partners is based on the 
rationale that those states possess major civil nuclear programs, already have a 
reprocessing capability, are adhering to their nonproliferation obligations, and are 
important strategic partners of the United States.
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Even though the ROK has a large civil nuclear program, adheres to its 
nonproliferation commitments, and is a close U.S. ally, Washington has been 
unwilling to grant similar approval to any enrichment or reprocessing of U.S.-
supplied material to South Korea. Although the U.S. is not concerned about Seoul 
using such facilities for nuclear weapons, it is apprehensive about the presence 
of such capabilities in areas of instability or serious proliferation concern 
such as the Korean Peninsula where Pyongyang continues to test missiles and 
nuclear weapons in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. Washington is 
concerned that U.S. consent to these sensitive activities in South Korea would 
make it extremely difficult to persuade Pyongyang to dismantle its enrichment 
or reprocessing programs and damage its efforts to prevent their spread to other 
countries. Moreover, some in Congress are seeking to enact new legislation that 
would pressure all potential nuclear trade partners to forswear enrichment and 
reprocessing capabilities – the so-called “gold standard,” an obligation that only 
the United Arab Emirates has accepted in its agreement with the United States. 
The view from Seoul is quite different. South Korea sees its civil nuclear power 
program as comparable to those in EURATOM, India, and Japan. Its 23 nuclear 
reactors generate roughly 35 percent of the country’s electricity, and Seoul plans to 
build an additional 16 reactors by 2030 to meet its energy needs (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Nuclear power has proven to be the cheapest source of energy for Korea (see Figure 
3). The country has also emerged as a major nuclear exporter that desires the ability 
to provide a full package of nuclear energy services in addition to reactors. 
Figure 1: Current Status of ROK Nuclear Power Plants
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Moreover, South Korea is a responsible member of the international community, 
and argues that it has the right to enrich and pyroprocess based on Article IV of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which the ROK is a Party, which states: 
“Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable 
right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”
Figure 3: Whole Sale Electricity Cost in Korea
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The ROK is not only compliant with its nonproliferation obligations under the 
NPT but is also a party to a number of nonproliferation treaties, conventions 
and arrangements, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It 
has also ratified the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA giving the Agency more information about, and greater access to, Korean 
nuclear activities. Seoul also takes pride in the leadership role it has played in 
hosting the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. In addition, Seoul is a strong ally 
of the United States, a factor of increasing strategic importance as the North 
Korean nuclear threat grows and as U.S. policy “pivots” to Asia to counter-
balance the rise of China. Given these credentials, Seoul takes the position that it 
should benefit from the same kind of treatment in the new U.S.-ROK agreement 
enjoyed by EURATOM, Japan, and India in their nuclear cooperation with the 
United States.
The Enrichment Debate
South Korea does not currently possess an enrichment capacity and argues 
that it needs to be able to enrich uranium to: 1) enhance its energy security by 
reducing its reliance on foreign uranium enrichment suppliers that costs about 
$300 million a year,3 and 2) secure its competitiveness in overseas reactor sales. 
The basis for the latter argument is that buyers are increasingly demanding fuel 
assurances with their purchase of reactors. Thus, having an enrichment capability 
would allow Seoul to compete more effectively with Russia’s Rosatom and 
France’s Areva that currently provide a package of fuel cycle services. 
The U.S. response is that South Korea has no reason to be concerned about 
security of supply because: 1) there are several enrichment service suppliers 
that South Korea may call upon, 2) the international market for enrichment 
services has worked smoothly over the last five decades, and 3) consumers have 
suffered few disruptions of supply and those were for nonproliferation reasons. 
Thus, the U.S. deems the security of supply argument as weak. In addition, 
many U.S. experts believe South Korean officials may be overestimating the 
potential value of enrichment in selling reactors, citing market economics.4 
They argue that Seoul has more efficient alternatives to a national enrichment 
plant to meet its domestic needs for enrichment services and to promote reactor 
sales by providing ancillary enrichment services. The ROK could partner with 
an existing enrichment supplier, such as URENCO or the U.S. Enrichment 
Corporation (USEC), to market its reactors. Seoul would, of course, not have 
access to the technology. Such arrangements not only increase South Korea’s 
security of supply, but could be employed to supplement Korean reactor sales. 
Moreover, the Korean demand for U.S. consent to enrich U.S.-supplied natural 
uranium supplied has little practical significance. The United States is not a major 
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producer or exporter of natural uranium and the international market has a fairly 
large number of low-cost uranium producers. South Korea can and does import 
natural uranium from a number of different countries, including Australia and 
Canada. It may enrich these materials without Washington’s approval. Although 
South Korea converts much of this uranium in the U.S., it does not need to since 
it can resort to other conversion suppliers, which therefore would not attract U.S. 
consent rights to enrichment. Thus, South Korea would not need U.S. consent to 
enrich uranium. However, it appears to be seeking U.S. consent to enrichment 
since it would signal U.S. political acknowledgment of a South Korean enrichment 
capability as acceptable from a nonproliferation point of view. 
U.S. resistance to giving this political endorsement is not the only obstacle that South 
Korea faces in obtaining a domestic enrichment capability. Seoul would either 1) have 
to undertake the formidable and costly task of building its own enrichment plant or 
2) would have to find a country willing to transfer this technology to South Korea for 
either a national or multinational facility that could take up to fifteen years to construct. 
However, there is a strong consensus among enrichment technology holders5 on the 
need to halt the further spread of national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. 
The only transfers of this technology in recent years have been to countries that 
already possess an enrichment capability. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has adopted 
a strict new set of guidelines on the transfer of enrichment technology. For a variety 
of reasons, the few enrichment technology holders that exist – France, Russia, China, 
the U.S., and URENCO (a tripartite organization of the Netherlands, Germany and 
the UK) – are unlikely to be willing to provide such technology to South Korea, 
particularly in the face of U.S. opposition.
Moreover, the fact that the U.S. is not prepared at the present time to grant consent 
to Seoul to enrich uranium does not rule out the possibility that Washington would 
not approve it in the future if nonproliferation and economic circumstances were 
favorable to such a development. 
For reasons mentioned above, U.S. refusal to approve South Korean enrichment 
should not be a deal-breaker. 
The Pyroprocessing Debate
Resolving differences over pyroprocessing, however, may prove far more difficult. 
Like other reprocessing methods, pyroprocessing recovers plutonium, although in a 
mixture, for use in new nuclear fuel and diminishes the volume of nuclear waste that 
would need to be disposed.
Korean scientists argue that while pyroprocessing is in the experimental study phase 
and untested on a production or commercial scale, it is still critical to managing 
Korea’s increasingly urgent spent fuel management problems. Their reasons are: 1) 
the absence of an adequate intermediate storage facility, 2) on-site storage will reach 
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saturation in 2016, 3) the absence of an adequate geological repository to dispose used 
fuel, requiring about ten repositories the size of Finland’s Olkiluoto, 4) the absence 
of an adequate measure to ensure the long-term safety of a repository over millions 
of years, and 5) it is a “bridge too far yet” to obtain support from the public and 
stakeholders for waste disposal.6 Korea has forecast about 1,100 tons of spent fuel will 
be generated annually if and when all planned reactors are constructed (see Figure 4).7
South Korea argues that pyroprocessing is more proliferation-resistant than 
classic PUREX reprocessing used by France, India, Japan and Russia that 
separates pure plutonium fully from the highly radioactive nuclear waste, thus 
removing the key barrier to using the plutonium for nuclear weapons either by a 
state diverting the material or by a terrorist stealing the plutonium. By contrast, 
pyroprocessing yields a material that contains some radioactive fission products 
that makes it less suitable for nuclear weapons. In other words, plutonium is left 
in a reactor-usable mixture with uranium and other transuranic elements8 (see 
Figure 5). Scientists at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) argue 
that the type of pyroprocessing technology currently being developed with the U.S. 
under a ten-year joint R&D study9 is proliferation-resistant and cannot separate 
plutonium, unlike both PUREX and even the existing pyroprocessing technologies 
(see Figure 6).10 They also believe it could reduce the volume and radioactivity of 
spent fuels while potentially allowing the used fuel to be recycled for further use.11 
South Korean scientists are thus reluctant to classify what they call a new method of 
pyroprocessing as reprocessing. 
Figure 4: Spent Nuclear Fuel Accumulation
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South Korea also believes that the US has sent conflicting signals on the issue 
of whether pyroprocessing is reprocessing, and whether it offers effective 
proliferation-resistance compared to traditional PUREX reprocessing. The two 
sides signed an R&D agreement on pyroprocessing in 2002 and South Korean 
scientists have participated in such joint experiments at U.S. laboratories.12 Some 
officials during the Bush Administration took the position that pyroprocessing 
is not as vulnerable to diversion to a nuclear weapon as conventional PUREX 
reprocessing. However, the view that pyroprocessing is more proliferation-
resistant than PUREX was not shared by all in the U.S. government. The 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) assessed a range of “proliferation resistant” 
technologies including pyroprocessing as part of its Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP) initiated by the George W. Bush Administration. In 2008, 
DOE released a draft Nonproliferation Impact Assessment (NPIA) of the GNEP 
Programmatic Alternatives that reached the preliminary conclusion that the 
candidate reprocessing technologies studied, including pyroprocessing, suggest 
Figure 5: PUREX vs. Pyroprocessing
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only modest improvements in reducing proliferation risk over existing PUREX 
technologies, and these would reduce the risks that non-state actors, but not 
states, would be able to gain access to the plutonium. 
As one U.S. official put it in 2011, Washington concluded that pyroprocessing 
poses proliferation concerns because its key elements – electro-reduction and 
electro-refining – “have moved to the point that the product is dangerous from a 
proliferation point of view. So, for that reason, pyroprocessing is reprocessing, and 
that’s part of the problem. [DOE] states frankly and positively that pyroprocessing 
is reprocessing. Period. Full stop. [DOE] did not take that position five years 
ago when we started down the road of cooperation on pyroprocessing. Then 
the product was not weapons usable.”13 Many American experts also believe 
pyroprocessing poses safeguards challenges and lacks effective mechanisms to 
detect the diversion of nuclear material. 
The two countries also have different perspectives on their current ten-year joint 
feasibility study, as well as the economic feasibility and proliferation resistance 
of pyroprocessing. South Koreans believe that the assumption underlying 
the study was that if it produces economically efficient and proliferation-
resistant pyroprocessing technology that deals with both the U.S.’ and South 
Korea’s spent fuel problems, Seoul would be able to proceed to put in place a 
pyroprocessing capability at the commercial level. The Americans did not make 
any such assumption about future pyroprocessing. There are also differing views 
on what constitutes “economically feasible” pyroprocessing technology. Korean 
Figure 6: Pyroprocessing Principle
Source: Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
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scientists argue that pyroprocessing is one of the most economic ways to manage 
the spent fuel problem, while most U.S. experts believe that the once-through 
fuel cycle is less expensive than any kind of reprocessing and should provide 
adequate security of fuel supply for at least one hundred years, perhaps more. 
Since Washington regards pyroprocessing as reprocessing, the U.S. has been 
unwilling to justify an exception for South Korea to its long-standing policy of 
preventing the further spread of this sensitive nuclear technology. Washington 
believes that exempting Seoul from this policy would be controversial 
domestically, set a poor nonproliferation precedent, and spark regional and 
global nonproliferation concerns. 
North Korea and Strategic Context
The North Korean nuclear threat hovers over the negotiation of the U.S.-ROK 
civil nuclear cooperation agreement. In 1992 the two Koreas signed a Joint 
Declaration in which they agreed not to possess either enrichment or reprocessing 
capabilities. Since then, North Korea has operated its reprocessing facility and 
constructed one or more enrichment facilities. It has also developed and tested 
nuclear weapons and missiles in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. 
Pyongyang claims the 1992 Joint Statement is null.14
One could argue that North Korean actions have rendered the 1991 Joint 
Declaration meaningless and that Seoul should no longer be bound by it. 
However, Seoul has exercised restraint on this issue despite calls from within 
and outside the South Korean government to scrap the 1992 pact in the aftermath 
of continued North Korean provocations. Moreover, the U.S. clearly maintains 
that the existence of any reprocessing plant in the ROK would be inconsistent 
with the commitments Seoul made in the 1992 Joint Declaration.15 In addition, a 
Six Party Talks agreement struck in September 2005 states that, “The 1992 Joint 
Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed 
and implemented.”16
Despite U.S. efforts to strike a sustainable deal with North Korea on 
dismantling its nuclear programs in return for a range of economic and 
security guarantees, Pyongyang continues to provoke the South, seems 
committed to continuing nuclear and missile tests in defiance of UN Security 
Council Resolutions, and now threatens that the U.S. mainland is “well 
within” the range of its nuclear weapons. North Korea also regards itself as 
a nuclear weapons state, and prospects for the DPRK ever abandoning its 
nuclear programs are increasingly doubtful.
The DPRK’s nuclear weapons program has been and will continue to be a 
major source of instability on the Korean Peninsula until it is resolved. The U.S. 
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believes that persuading North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs would 
be considerably more challenging if the South were to move toward acquiring 
enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. 
The U.S. Congress: A Potential Wild Card
Some in Congress are taking a very tough stance on preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons that may take the form of demanding future agreements contain 
a legal ban on enrichment and reprocessing by U.S. nuclear trade partners. In 
2009 the United States concluded a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement 
with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in which the UAE agreed to forswear the 
acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, a condition that became 
known as the “gold standard.” There has been an on-going debate in Washington 
on whether the U.S. should apply this gold standard to all future U.S. peaceful 
nuclear cooperation agreements. However, we understand that the U.S. is not 
pressing the ROK to renounce it rights to enrichment and reprocessing since 
Seoul has an advanced nuclear program, is compliant with its nonproliferation 
obligations, and is a close strategic ally. South Korea in any event seems highly 
unlikely to renounce what it regards as its sovereign right to such technologies 
as a Party to the NPT.
However, in 2011 the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) unanimously 
adopted legislation (H.R.1280) that, among other things, proposes to include 
the gold standard in all new agreements. In addition, the proposed legislation 
would change the existing congressional review process by requiring that a new 
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement could become effective only if both 
Houses of Congress cast an affirmative vote in its favor. However, the HFAC 
bill allows an exception if a new agreement contains the gold standard. New 
agreements that meet this condition would be subject to the current congressional 
review procedure that allows an agreement to enter into force after 90 days of 
continuous session unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. The 
administration has raised strong objections17 to H.R.1280, which died without 
a vote on the House floor. It is unclear whether an identical or similar bill will 
be introduced during this current session of Congress. Nevertheless, the views 
reflected in this bill may be important to the outcome of any congressional 
review of the new civil nuclear pact.
Options 
Given all these considerations, it is no surprise that Seoul and Washington have 
found it challenging to reach a mutual understanding on U.S. approval of South 
Korea enrichment and/or pyroprocessing. The question then is what options are 
realistically available to the two parties to resolve their differences given the fast-
approaching expiration of the existing agreement. 
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Enrichment
The U.S. is not likely to accommodate Korean demands for U.S. consent to enrich 
US-origin natural uranium. As noted above, South Korea does not need such consent 
since it can and already does purchase less costly natural uranium from several other 
countries. Moreover, Seoul would face major economic and technical obstacles if 
it sought to build its own enrichment capacity despite the South Korean industry’s 
impressive nuclear skills and capability. Enrichment technology holders are also 
unlikely to transfer enrichment technology to South Korea. Members of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group recently adopted a new set of guidelines to govern the transfer of 
enrichment technology. Among other things they agreed to:
- “avoid, as far as practicable, the transfer of enabling design and manufacturing 
technology associated with such items; and
- seek from recipients an appropriate agreement to accept sensitive enrichment 
equipment, and enabling technologies, or an operable enrichment facility under 
conditions that do not permit or enable replication of the facilities.”18
This is a so-called “black-box” condition. It is intended to limit an importer’s 
access to the technologies and prevent the replication or reverse engineering of the 
technology.
Multinational, black-boxed enrichment plant. Seoul might be quite amenable 
to establishing a multinational enrichment facility or a joint venture in Korea 
under black-box conditions. Proliferation risks could be reduced by placing any 
enrichment facility in South Korea under multinational or international auspices, 
and by implementing black-box controls. However, the U.S. has not been an 
enthusiastic endorser of multinational enrichment plants, and some U.S. experts 
doubt the effectiveness of black-boxing since it does not completely prevent the 
host state from acquiring information about centrifuge design and operation.19 
For example, centrifuges for the facility arrive in parts and are assembled on-site 
with operators having to understand how the centrifuges respond to variations in 
operating parameters. China is believed to have adopted Russian design details for 
its domestically made centrifuges after obtaining centrifuges from Russia on a black-
box basis. In essence, some view the black box as more of a grey box.20 Establishing 
a joint venture or multinational operation presents challenging management and 
operational problems that could affect the efficiency of any such operation. Finally 
as noted above, Seoul might find it difficult to find a technology holder to transfer 
such technology to South Korea even under black-box conditions. Still, the U.S. and 
ROK could cooperate in R&D studies on multinational approaches to the fuel cycle. 
For all reasons mentioned above, the most practical and most likely outcome of 
the negotiations may be that Seoul would go along with Washington’s refusal 
to grant its approval to South Korea to enrich U.S. natural uranium or to put 
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its stamp of approval on a South Korean enrichment capability. The fact that 
South Korea would have a reciprocal right with respect to any nuclear material 
it exports to the United States might help make this outcome more politically 
palatable to Seoul. South Korea would still be able to avoid any concerns about 
security of supply by relying on a well-functioning international market in both 
uranium and enrichment services. Security of supply could be further addressed 
by U.S. assurances that it would be prepared to give South Korea access to its 
national reserve of enriched uranium or support South Korean access to the IAEA 
nuclear fuel bank in the event of a supply disruption. Moreover, a U.S. right to 
consent to enrichment is not the same as a ban on enrichment and does not rule 
out the possibility that the Washington could give such consent at some time in 
the future if justified by nonproliferation and economic considerations. Finally, 
South Korea’s joint ventures with existing enrichment suppliers could help the 
marketing of Korean reactors on the global market.
Spent Fuel Management Options 
South Korea clearly faces a legitimate, pressing problem in managing the spent 
fuel from its power reactors. Its current at-reactor storage capabilities will 
reach their saturation point in 2016. If the ROK government cannot resolve this 
problem soon, some of the power reactors may have to be shut down. But Seoul 
has a few options. 
Pyroprocessing. Seoul claims pyroprocessing is the best way to manage its growing 
quantities of spent fuel, but pyroprocessing is not a realistic way forward, at least 
in the short term. Even if the ten-year U.S.-Korea study due for completion in 2021 
was to conclude that this technology is economically feasible and offers adequate 
proliferation resistance, Seoul could not build a commercial size pyroprocessing plant 
for at least two decades. Hence, even if the U.S. were to consent to pyroprocessing in 
the text of the new agreement, it would not immediately solve South Korea’s urgent 
spent fuel problem. Still, it would be prudent for the U.S. and ROK to continue R&D 
on pyroprocessing as well as other potential technologies for managing South Korean 
spent fuel problems. 
Transfer spent fuel out of country. One option that could provide near-term 
relief is to transfer some South Korean spent fuel to EURATOM for reprocessing. 
The ROK made informal inquiries with the U.S. about this possibility in the 1990s, 
but the Clinton administration quietly discouraged it. The ROK government 
is reportedly willing to revisit this question, and the U.S. may now be more 
willing to consider third country reprocessing. In 2009 the U.S. gave consent 
to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to ship spent fuel subject to the U.S.-UAE 
agreement to EURATOM for reprocessing. However, South Korean resort to 
this option is not without its problems. First, while France and the UK accept 
foreign spent fuel for reprocessing, both countries would require that the high-
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level waste as well as the recovered plutonium and uranium must be sent back to 
the ROK after reprocessing. Second, in granting its consent to Seoul to transfer 
spent fuel to EURATOM for reprocessing, the U.S. would insist on retaining prior 
consent rights over any further disposition of the recovered plutonium and, for 
nonproliferation reasons, it is highly doubtful that the U.S. would approve the 
retransfer of recovered plutonium from EURATOM back to South Korea. This 
would leave Seoul with the dilemma of what to do with the recovered plutonium. 
The world is awash in this material because reprocessing in EURATOM, Russia, 
and Japan has continued, while its use as fuel in commercial power reactors in 
many countries has not kept pace. Thus, Korea could not find a market for its 
plutonium in Europe that the U.S. would approve, and would be faced with the 
costly storage of this material. In addition, Seoul would find it difficult to take 
back its high-level waste from Europe because it has no available storage or 
disposal site.
A similar option would be to ship spent fuel to Russia. However, Russia takes 
back only used fuel produced from Russian supplied fuel. The U.S. would have 
prior approval rights over such transfers and it is not clear whether the U.S. would 
grant consent to such transfer. It is also unclear that Seoul would be politically 
comfortable in sending its spent fuel to Russia. 
Return of spent fuel to the U.S. Washington could help Seoul’s spent fuel problem 
by offering to take some of it back to the United States for storage and/or disposition. 
However this “cradle-to-grave” option is not realistic in the foreseeable future for 
several reasons. The U.S. has no national waste program of its own and no place to 
put the spent fuel currently stored at its own reactors. Moreover, bringing back foreign 
spent fuel to the United States would face formidable legal and political obstacles, and 
Congress would have to approve any such take-back. Still, it makes good sense for 
Washington to begin exploring the possibility of taking spent nuclear fuel back from 
countries that do not have sensitive fuel-cycle facilities.21 But such a policy will not 
come to fruition in the foreseeable future, if ever, and therefore offers no practical 
solution to South Korea’s immediate problems of managing its spent fuel.
Conditional consent. The two sides could strive to reach agreement on a conditional 
consent arrangement on pyroprocessing. Under this option, South Korea would 
not be allowed to reprocess or alter in form or content U.S. nuclear material 
until: 1) the joint study is completed so that South Korea would not engage in 
pyroprocessing for at least ten years, and 2) based on the study, both sides would 
conclude that pyroprocessing is economically feasible and affords adequate 
proliferation resistance. In addition, the U.S. would have to insist that it retain 
the right to determine whether South Korean pyroprocessing of U.S. nuclear 
material meets U.S. statutory standards. Section 131 of the AEA stipulates that 
prior to approving any requests for reprocessing, the Secretary of Energy must 
determine that the proposed consent “will not be inimical to the common defense 
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and security” of the United States and “will not result in a significant increase 
in the risk of proliferation” beyond that which exists at the time the approval is 
requested.22 Among the factors that the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of 
State must consider in making this judgment is whether or not the reprocessing 
or retransfer will take place under conditions that will ensure “timely warning” to 
the United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at which a nuclear 
weapon state could transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device.
South Korean negotiators may find it very difficult to accept any conditional consent 
arrangement that gives the U.S. the unilateral degree of discretion that the U.S. side 
believes it needs to meet its own legal requirements. Seoul would quite understandably 
seek greater predictability and certainty in any conditional consent arrangement, and 
strive to define a set of precise criteria that, if met, would allow it to proceed with 
some pyroprocessing, preferably on a long-term, programmatic basis for the life of 
the agreement, or at least proceed with some further development of the technology 
perhaps with the construction and operation of a pilot facility on a trial basis. 
Given its statutory requirements, the U.S. will have to resist accepting any specific 
set of conditions that, if met, would be sufficient for U.S. consent to South Korean 
pyroprocessing. Rather, Washington is likely to insist on considerable leeway in 
deciding whether approving the ROK pyroprocessing “will not be inimical to the 
common defense and security” and “will not result in a significant increase in the risk 
of proliferation.” Among other factors that will influence such a determination are: 1) 
how it would affect efforts to denuclearize the North, 2) the status of the North Korean 
nuclear program, 3) whether it would have an adverse effect on broad US interests in 
preventing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing, and 4) its impact on regional 
and global stability.
Agreeing on language on a conditional consent basis may prove difficult for both 
sides, but it may be the only way forward on the pyroprocessing issue. In the 
meantime, South Korea will have to find some way to store its spent fuel on an 
interim basis.
Dash to the Finish Line
Given the strong differences of views between the ROK and the U.S. over 
enrichment and reprocessing, it will be a monumental challenge to reach agreement 
on a text and to submit it to their respective legislatures for review and approval 
before the March 2014 expiration date. In the case of the United States, the AEA 
requires a proposed agreement lie before Congress for ninety days of continuous 
session before it may enter into effect. Given the Congressional calendar, this 
could take six or seven months. Therefore, the new agreement realistically should 
be submitted to Congress by spring or early summer of this year. This will be 
an extremely challenging schedule for the United States to meet. Once the two 
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sides agree to a text on an ad referendum basis, the executive branch by law 
must prepare extensive documentation in support of the agreement, including: 1) 
a nonproliferation assessment statement, 2) the secretaries of State and Energy 
must recommend the agreement to the president for his approval, and 3) the 
independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission must provide the president its views 
on the agreement. Then the president must approve the text for signature, and 
the two governments must sign the text. Only after all these steps are completed 
may the proposed agreement be submitted to Congress for its review. These 
various steps take considerable coordination and time to complete. There may 
simply be insufficient time to conclude the negotiations and prepare the required 
documentation in the coming months. The two sides are facing the real prospect 
that the agreement may lapse without a new agreement in place. 
While the Park Geun-hye administration that took office on February 25th is 
expected to maintain a position similar to the Lee Myung-bak administration on 
the U.S.-ROK nuclear trade pact, it is unclear what exact conditions it will find 
acceptable. Thus, the change of administration may delay the negotiations.
Given the challenges of the calendar, the U.S. and South Korea realistically have 
only a few options:
Lobby for an affirmative congressional approval. Given the positions of the 
two sides, it may be difficult to reach an understanding on these issues by spring 
or summer of this year. However, if the two sides manage to reach agreement but 
not in time to meet the ninety-day legislative review period before the existing 
agreement expires in March 2014, the U.S. administration could lobby Congress 
to pass a resolution of approval so that a lapse could be avoided. However, this 
increases the risk that some members of Congress could seek to add conditions 
to the approval of the agreement that would be unacceptable to either the U.S. 
administration or the South Korean government. As noted, some in Congress 
believe the U.S. should require all future cooperating partners, including South 
Korea, agree to a legal commitment to abstain from acquiring any enrichment 
or reprocessing capability. Proponents of the gold standard might vote against 
any new agreement that does not contain this provision, thus risking disapproval 
of the new U.S.-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation. In any event, persuading 
Congress to vote on the new agreement before the existing one expires would 
require a major lobbying effort by the administration.
Allow the agreement to lapse for a short period. The likelihood of a lapsed 
agreement currently appears greater than expected with both parties firm in their 
respective positions on enrichment and pyroprocessing. 
The economic consequences of such a lapse are uncertain for both countries. The 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade) estimates U.S. 
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exports to Korea of nuclear components and fuel elements at $818.8 million 
between 2001 and 2010, while large exports under licenses such as reactors and 
major components are estimated up to $200 million apiece.23 Korean officials have 
been unable to confirm or accurately track the value of U.S. imports dependent 
on the renewal of the US-ROK agreement. However, the $20 billion contract for 
Seoul to provide reactors to the UAE would be threatened by a lapsed agreement. 
Roughly $2 billion of work on the UAE Barakah plant is expected to go U.S. 
companies while some US components and subcomponents need to be exported 
to Korea for further fabrication before shipping to the UAE.24
However, the economic effects of a short-term lapse are not likely to be significant 
for two reasons. First, the U.S.-EURATOM agreement lapsed only for a couple 
of months without any significant economic or political fallout. Anticipating 
a lapse, U.S. companies took steps to obtain the relevant export licenses and 
approvals well in advance of the expiration date of the agreement and thus 
avoided significant disruptions in trade. American and Korean companies could 
do the same in the event of a likely lapse of their agreement. Second, the Atomic 
Energy Act requires an agreement for cooperation only for the export of nuclear 
material, nuclear facilities and their major components (in the case of reactors—
the pressure vessel, the complete control rod system, the primary coolant pump, 
fuel charging, and discharging machines). The U.S. does not manufacture the last 
item, and all other nuclear components and substances may be exported without 
an agreement, provided the ROK gives the U.S. appropriate nonproliferation 
assurances. Under the AEA and existing Department of Energy regulations, 
U.S. technology may be exported outside an agreement for cooperation. The 
export of any nuclear technology to a specified list of countries requires specific 
authorization of the Secretary of Energy. However, South Korea is not on that 
list, and most technologies may be exported under general license to the ROK. 
Only sensitive nuclear technology (SNT) to the ROK would require a DOE 
approval, and the US as a matter of policy does not export SNT.25 Hence some 
nuclear trade may legally continue in the absence of an agreement. However, it 
is not clear that the US would be willing to issue licenses or approvals in the 
absence of an agreement.
However, a lengthy lapse could have adverse economic and political consequences. 
The South Korean industry could lose confidence in the U.S. as a reliable supplier 
and turn to other partners. Politically, a lengthy lapse would show that the two 
close allies cannot agree on the important subject of their nuclear cooperation. The 
U.S.-ROK alliance has never been stronger as it was during the Barack Obama-
Lee Myung-bak administrations. However, both presidents postponed settling 
some of the most complex and sensitive bilateral issues for their successors. It is 
now up to Presidents Obama and Park Geun-hye to settle other outstanding issues 
without straining the alliance. Top security issues include the transfer of OPCON 
(operational command), defense cost burden sharing amid fiscal constraints in 
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both countries, the relocation of U.S. bases within Korea, and the North Korean 
threat. Both sides will want to avoid a repeat of the beef issue that ignited anti-
American sentiment in South Korea and will not want to add civil nuclear trade to 
the list of unsettled issues. Failure to come to closure on a peaceful nuclear trade 
pact may lead to South Korean public criticism of the alliance.
Short-term extension of the existing agreement. The two sides could agree to try 
to extend the current agreement for a specified period of time, such as two or three 
years or perhaps until the joint study is completed in ten years. This option would give 
both sides more time to reach agreement on the enrichment and pyroprocessing issues. 
However, this course of action carries considerable risk. Since the existing U.S.-
ROK agreement does not meet all the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act for 
a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, the agreement may not enter into effect 
after the U.S. president has submitted it to Congress for a ninety legislative day 
review. Rather, approval of the agreement would require an affirmative vote by 
both houses of Congress. It is proving increasingly difficult to pass important issues 
through Congress, and it is questionable whether both Houses would take a vote on 
a timely basis. Even in the event of a timely vote, this option would run the same 
risks noted above of Congress possibly seeking to add conditions onto the approval 
of the agreement that would be unacceptable to either the U.S. executive branch or 
the South Korean government. This option would require a major lobbying effort 
by the administration.
Conclusions
A new bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement offers the potential for 
strengthening the ROK-U.S. nuclear partnership and could open up new avenues of 
collaboration such as combining Korea’s nuclear manufacturing and construction 
abilities with U.S. technology, and global marketing outreach aimed at strengthening 
joint competitiveness in the global nuclear market that is currently dominated by 
France and Russia.26
To realize this potential, the two sides will have to resolve their differences over the 
enrichment and pyroprocessing issues. This will require acknowledgment of the 
political sensitivities and legal requirements of both countries. South Korea views 
its existing relationship with the U.S. as one-sided and giving the U.S. unilateral 
control over its civil nuclear program. It also sees the U.S. policy as discriminatory 
compared to Washington’s treatment of Japan and India. In addition, Seoul believes 
that the US needs to implement the current “strategic alliance” declared by then 
President Lee Myung-bak and President Barack Obama in 2009.27 On the other 
hand, Seoul has to recognize US nonproliferation priorities, America’s strict legal 
requirements for approving sensitive nuclear activities, its concerns about setting 
a damaging nonproliferation precedent, and the implications of a new U.S.-ROK 
civil nuclear trade pact for denuclearizing North Korea.
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None of these options discussed here are ideal. All have real costs and risks, but the 
two sides need to move quickly in deciding how they wish to work their way out of 
the political thicket, avoid the political and economic costs of failure, and come to a 
timely closure on a new peaceful nuclear trade pact.
Addendum
Since the March publication of this paper, the U.S. and the ROK agreed in 
April 2013 to extend the existing peaceful nuclear cooperation for two years 
until 2016. The intention was to provide ample time for negotiators to resolve 
the ENR issue during the presidential terms of both President Barack Obama 
and President Park Geun-hye.28 This extension, however, will require approval 
by the U.S. Congress. The House of Representatives passed a bill (HR 2449)
in September registering its approval of the extension. The Senate passed a bill 
(S. 1901) in January 2014 extending the U.S.-ROK agreement for two years. 
However, the House and Senate versions of the bill are not identical and the 
two Houses of Congress will need to reconcile these differences before the 
existing agreement expires in March. The two countries will still need to move 
expeditiously to resolve their differences over enrichment and pyroprocessing. 
At the time of the extension agreement, a proposal was already on the table to 
allow the ROK to conduct some research and development at ROK facilities 
including first phase pyroprocessing (electro-reduction).29 Since then, the chief 
U.S. negotiator has changed to Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Security and Nonproliferation Thomas Countryman, and ROK President 
Park Geun-hye has set three priorities: 1) spent fuel management, 2) reliable 
enriched uranium fuel supply assurance, and 3) ROK competitiveness as a 
nuclear exporter. Failure to come to an agreement in two years may result in 
another extension. 
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Abstract
Security and political issues over the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula 
remain as flashpoints in East Asia since WWII. In the aftermath of the Cold War, 
these two cases share certain similarities: each government wishes to maintain a 
relatively stable relationship with its adversary, namely, China and North Korea, 
despite ideological differences. Research in International Relations (IR) has shed 
light on how certain rivals gradually reconciled with each other throughout history. 
Rapprochement makes conflict unlikely between two foes. In the case of Tai-wan 
and mainland China relations, economic interdependence and positive political 
and societal interactions contributed to rapprochement between the two under 
the Ma Ying-jeou administration, while North Korea continued to threaten the 
existence of South Korea in the Lee Myung-bak era despite the latter’s provision 
of economic assistance.
The authors argue that economic interdependence, together with negotiations and 
the political will of top leaders to pursue peace and stability, create a virtuous circle 
across the Taiwan Strait. This research further explores whether these conditions 
exist in inter-Korean relations.
With identification of the conditions under which peace was maintained through 
these years, this comparative study provides policy suggestions for not only Korea 
and Taiwan, but also for the United States. Trustpolitik, as proposed by President 
Park Geun-hye, seems to be the right direction in which regional stability is more 
likely to occur on the Korean Peninsula, due to its emphasis on nurturing goodwill 
with the North. This comparative study also provides lessons learnt from each other.
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Introduction
Security and political issues over the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula 
remain as flashpoints in East Asia since WWII. In the aftermath of the Cold War, 
these two cases share certain similarities: each government wishes to maintain a 
relatively stable relationship with its adversary, namely, China and North Korea, 
despite ideological differences. This paper aims to explore and compare how the 
policy choices adopted by the two governments contributed to regional peace and 
stability, or the lack thereof. 
Research in International Relations (IR) has shed light on how certain rivals 
gradually reconciled with each other throughout history. The conception of 
rapprochement, defined as a process to reestablish cordial relations between 
two previously hostile countries, is central to this research. Rapprochement 
makes conflict unlikely between two foes. In the case of Taiwan and mainland 
China relations, economic interdependence and positive political and societal 
interactions contributed to rapprochement between the two under the Ma Ying-
jeou administration, while North Korea continued to threaten the existence of 
South Korea in the Lee Myung-bak era despite the latter’s provision of econo-mic 
assistance. In other words, globalization and trust worked together to achieve 
rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait, but were lacking in the case of the 
Korean Peninsula during the period of time under scrutiny.
Then, what are the factors behind a seemingly virtuous circle between Taiwan 
and China, in which economic interdependence seems to take roots in shaping 
top leaders’ mindset and result in the absence of war since the 1990s? This is a 
question central to this research. The authors argue that economic interdependence, 
together with negotiations and the political will of top leaders to pursue peace and 
stability, create a virtuous circle across the Taiwan Strait. This research further 
explores whether these conditions exist in inter-Korean relations.
With identification of the conditions under which peace was maintained through 
these years, this comparative study provides policy suggestions for not only 
Korea and Taiwan, but also for the United States. Trustpolitik, as proposed by 
President Park Geun-hye, seems to be the right direction through which regional 
stability is more likely to occur on the Korean Peninsula, due to its emphasis on 
nurturing goodwill with the North. This strategy in turn may create constituencies 
within the authoritarian North Korean regime.
Rapprochement in Cross-Strait and  
Inter-Korean Relations
The study of war and peace has been central to IR scholarship. If a government 
believes that war is a constant in international affairs, then preparation for war 
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and investment in defense seems to be the optimal policy choice. If peace is 
considered more likely to exist, then more trade and other economic activities are 
expected to follow.
One school of thought in IR, realism, has tended to deem war as the constant in 
world politics, and balance-of-power as a means that can help maintain peace. 
How to acquire and resort to “guns” rather than “butter” becomes crucial to 
understand and explain a world from a realist perspective. In other words, trade 
would give way to political antagonism between rivalries.
However, others in IR emphasize that maintaining peace despite war seems to be 
a constant in world affairs. In broader literature on peace research, rapprochement 
is defined as the reestablishment of bilateral relations between two rivals 
after a conflict. A school of thought in IR scholarship suggests that economic 
interdependence helps to sustain peace in the post-Cold War era.1 Economic 
interdependence, as Richard Rosecrance maintains, could help to foster peace 
among “trading states,” that usually see trading more profitable than invading.2 
And, the increase of communication resulted from trade would consequently 
nurture mutual trust in their dyadic relations. Thus, “butter” seems to be the main 
theme in world politics and the leadership of any given country should cooperate 
for mutual benefits.
Scholars who side with Rosecrance seem more sanguine to argue that the growing 
trade volume has played a crucial role in preventing direct conflict in the dyadic 
relations between two antagonist countries and the high volume of trade has 
helped to forge a strong interest in peace.3 Though this sort of statement seems 
logically sound, many critics are suspicious of assertions of a causal relationship 
between trade and peace. While liberals argue that trade could lead to peace, the 
evidence also suggests that, in the face of deep trade relations with other European 
countries, Germany still engaged in WWI and WWII. In addition, by considering 
a snapshot of the level of trade relations at a single point in time, the causal arrow 
could be reversed so as to suggest that it is peace that leads to trade. 
Cross-Strait and inter-Korean relations provide the case in point to test the validity 
of the realist and liberal respective arguments about war, peace, and economic 
interdependence. For one, if realism holds true that political and security 
considerations trump economic ones, then political antagonism would precede 
economic interdependence and there should not have been economic interactions 
between mainland China and Taiwan. If liberals are right about the positive effect 
that trade leads to peace, then both sides of the Korean Peninsula should have 
been closer with less degree of political antagonism. Nevertheless, these two cases 
seem to provide a way of thinking that can further integrate the liberal and realist 
perspectives. In other words, these two paradigms are not inherently in conflict 
with each other, especially when we are conducting problem-solving research 
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that aims to respond and deal with war and peace – the real world problem. The 
arguments of economic interdependence and societal exchanges fit in to liberal 
thinking, and issues regarding political will of leadership relate to the realist 
tradition. Only with a mutually complementary view of these two paradigms, can 
we better understand war and peace.
Most current studies adopt this complementary view to explore “how” to 
facilitate peace between two rivals. Miles Kahler and Scott Kastner investigated 
the conditions under which economic engagement strategies worked best to 
change target countries’ policy behavior.4 They suggested that economic 
engagement policies are more likely to succeed in changing the target country’s 
policy when there is a broad consensus within the initiating country, along with 
the fact that the target is a democracy. In other words, regime type matters when 
economic interdependence is considered a tool to achieve political goals. Cross-
Strait and inter-Korean relations between 2000 and 2006 were the main focus 
of their research.
As part of the analysis of bilateral interactions, other scholars and analysts employ 
different IR theories to demonstrate how economic cooperation between Taiwan 
and mainland China has steadily led to peace across the Taiwan Strait, while 
realism seems to dominate, once and again, in the inter-Korean relations under the 
Lee Myung-bak administration.5 According to Hyug-baeg Im and Yu-jeong Choi, 
functionalism and neo-functionalism are contributing to stabilizing cross-Strait 
and inter-Korean relations, and yet constructivism in the former and realism in 
the latter are responsible for setbacks.6 In other words, the paradigm shift in top 
leaders’ mindset is a necessary condition for rivals to escape the security dilemma 
and to facilitate cooperation.
A more nuanced evaluation on Taiwan’s mainland China policy under Ma Ying-
jeou and South Korea’s North policy under Lee Myung-bak advised that the 
two-level game theory constituted an indispensible part. Both countries need to 
deal with the regional context set by the United States while leaders are required 
to respond to domestic challenges from opposition parties.7 Steve Chan and his 
colleagues put greater emphasis on the international setting than domestic politics, 
wherein Ma’s mainland China policy worked to preserve peace because the U.S. 
preferred a relatively stable relationship with China, and Lee’s policy was highly 
constrained by Bush’s hostile policy toward the North. Nevertheless, U.S. support 
also helped both governments to ward off domestic oppositions and criticisms. 
From the aforementioned research, the relationship between war, peace, and 
economic interdependence deserves further exploration in considering overall 
cross-Strait and inter-Korean relations in recent years. This essay accepts the 
liberal assumption that economic interdependence can serve to change state 
preferences and to raise costs of conflict, thus potentially altering state behavior. 
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However, while the liberal view adopts a snapshot analysis that focuses on a 
single point of time in which trade coexists with peace between two players, we 
argue that political will for cooperation as another variable may also serve to 
stabilize the current cross-Strait relations. Economic interdependence, along with 
negotiations and the political will of top leaders to pursue peace and stability, 
create a virtuous circle across the Taiwan Strait and may shed light on inter-
Korean relations.
Rapprochement in Taiwan-China Relations, 
1987-2012
Since late 1987, societal level interactions have contributed to gradually transform 
the cross-Strait relations. These interactions have two major components: trade 
and personal visits. Economic ties remain crucial to peace across the Taiwan 
Strait. Figure 1 indicates the trading relationship between Taiwan and China 
from 1979 to 2012. The increase of trade volume between the two foes creates a 
common interest across the Taiwan Strait. When mainland China began to reform 
economically in late 1978, cross-Strait economic relations improved significantly. 
From 1979 to 1987, Taiwan’s export to mainland China has increased from 
US$21.47 million to US$1,226.5 million. Total trade between Taiwan and China 
increased from US$77.76 million in 1979 to US$1,515.4 million in 1987. This 
number reached US$127.56 billion in 2012.
Tourism is another person-to-person interaction that contributes to stabilizing 
cross-Strait relations. Since 1988, the Taiwanese government has allowed 
Taiwanese people to visit mainland China for humanitarian reasons. In that single 
year, there were 437,700 trips made from Taiwan to China. In the same year, 386 
Figure 1: Cross-Strait Trade Relations, 1979-2012 
Year
Source: Data compiled from Mainland Affairs Council, Cross-Strait Economic Statistic Monthly (various years).
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trips were made from China to Taiwan, for cultural exchanges and humanitarian 
needs. Through the end of 2012, this number accumulated to 70,319,789 from 
Taiwan to China, and to 8,946,850 from China to Taiwan, including Chinese 
tourists that were granted after 2002. The statistics regarding visits across the 
Taiwan Strait are demonstrated as Figure 2.
With trade and more people-to-people interactions, there emerged the need for 
cooperation between both governments across the Taiwan Strait to cope with the 
issues resulting from these interactions. As a result, the Taiwanese government 
established the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) to cooperate with its counterpart 
on mainland China, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits 
(ARATS). To date, there are more than 40 rounds of meetings between SEF and 
ARATS, with the significant Koo-Wang Talks authorized by both governments. 
These meetings are symbolic and substantive, functioning as a platform for both 
sides to iron out difficulties or concerns such as trans-border crimes. Appendix 1 
indicates 17 rounds of meetings conducted by heads and high-level officials of 
SEF and of ARATS from 1991 to July 2013.
These talks and negotiations on routine issues, we argue, played a facilitating 
role in locking in the positive interactions between both sides across the Strait. 
Economic interdependence increases the costs of waging a war against each other, 
and negotiations and talks spread the dividends to other groups in the societal 
level, which contributes to nurture constituencies favorable to a stable relationship 
between both sides (the doves). This is a crucial component of the mechanism of 
two-level games.8
Economic interdependence and businesslike talks provide the incentives for 
rapprochement, and yet, these two factors are not a guarantee to peace across the 
Taiwan Strait. Political will of top leaders is the key to shaping political agendas, 
Figure 2: Visits Across the Taiwan Strait
Year
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Summary of the Exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, 2013.4 (http://www.mac.gov.tw/
public/Data/364179671.pdf, accessed 2013/6/5). *Taiwan’s visit to China in 1992 is not available.
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with support from doves on both sides. Nevertheless, if a political leader believes 
that his power base does not come from the doves, then it becomes more likely he 
will pursue a more hawkish policy to satisfy those who hold a hostile view on cross-
Strait relations (the hawks).
It is important to take this component into account. Mainland China delivered a plan 
for peaceful unification in as early as 1979, and this plan was further formalized 
by Chinese Marshal Ye Jianying, the Chairman of the National People’s Congress, 
in 1981. It was dubbed “Ye’s Nine-Point Proposal,” in which Taiwan was able to 
maintain its social and economic system, and even military forces, if it were to 
rejoin the mainland. This proposal was in line with mainland China’s need for larger 
investment from abroad. This argument of political will also helps us understand 
why mainland China turned to a hawkish policy under Jiang Zeming from 1995 
leading up to Taiwan’s first presidential election in 1996, despite the growing 
numbers in economic and societal exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. On the 
Taiwan side, Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” and Chen Shui-bian’s “one country 
on each side statement” aimed to boost their own popularity domestically but had 
Figure 3. Taiwan’s Perception of Mainland China’s Hostility, 2002-2012 (Unit: %)
Hostility toward ROC 
government
Hostility toward ROC people
Survey conducted by: 
 (a) Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taipei (886-2-29387134) 
(b) Burke Marketing Research, Ltd., Taipei (886-2-25181088) 
(c) China Credit Information Service, Ltd., Taipei (886-2-87683266) 
(d) Center for Public Opinion and Election Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung  
 (886-7-52520000) 
(e) Survey and Opinion Research Group, Dept. of Political Science, National Chung Cheng   
 University, Chiayi (886-5-2720411) 
(f) e-Society Research Group, Taipei (886-2-27213658) 
(g) Center for Public Opinion and Public Policy, Taipei Municipal University of Education, Taipei  
 (886-2-23113040)
Respondents: Taiwanese adults aged 20-69 accessible to telephone interviewers
Source: Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of Republic of China (Taiwan), released April 2012, http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/
Attachment/24249412649.gif (accessed 2012/5/30).
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a negative impact on cross-Strait relations. In the meantime, as illustrated in Figure 
1, Taiwan has been promoting economic ties to increase its gains from trading with 
mainland China, while also hoping that more interactions might someday change 
mainland’s “at-whatever-it-costs” mindset for unification. Mainland China is also 
exerting the economic “carrot” as leverage to raise the cost for Taiwan’s de jure 
independence. In other words, “economics first, politics later” has served the 
interests of both sides. President Lee Teng-hui’s “no rush, be patient” and President 
Chen Shui-bian’s “active opening, effective management” efforts, aimed at slowing 
down the pace and scope of Taiwan’s ties on trade and investment with mainland 
China, has turned out to be futile.
President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, and Taiwan began to adopt the 
approach of “viable diplomacy,” in which Taiwan will not pursue the increase of 
diplomatic allies at the expense of national resources and of its relations with China. 
This approach demonstrated Taiwan’s unilateral accommodation to build trust with 
Appendix 1: Chronology of Meetings between Taiwan and Mainland China, 
1991-2013
No. Name of Meeting Date Place Subject
1 1st Chen-Tang Talks Apr. 28 -May 4, 1991 Beijing Discussion of procedural issues re-
lated to cross-Strait joint prevention 
of maritime crime
2 2nd Chen-Tang Talks 
(Meeting on Procedural 
Issue Related to Cross-
Strait Joint Prevention 
of Maritime Crime)
Nov. 4-7, 1991 Beijing Discussion of procedural issues re-
lated to cross-Strait joint prevention 
of maritime crime
3 Koo-Wang Talks Apr. 27-29, 1993 Singapore Discussion and finalization of the 
four agreements to be signed by SEF 
and ARATS
4 1st Chiao-Tang Talks Jan. 31-Feb. 5, 1994 Beijing Discussion of how to implement the 
“Joint Agreement of the Koo-Wang 
Talks” and issues for follow up 
routine meetings
5 2nd Chiao-Tang Talks Aug. 4-7, 1994 Taipei Discussion of SEF and ARATS af-
fairs and routine consultation issues
6 3rd Chiao-Tang Talks Jan. 21-28, 1995 Taipei Discussion of SEF and ARATS 
affairs, routine meeting issues, and 
cross-Strait exchanges
7 Shi-Zhang Talks (Talks 
between officials in 
charge at SEF and 
ARATS to decide the 
agenda of the 
Koo-Wang Meeting)
Sep. 22-24, 1998 Beijing Discussion of the agenda for the 
Koo-Wang Meeting
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mainland China. The Ma administration continued efforts to restore mutual political 
trust with mainland China. With the statement “no unification, no independence, and 
no use of force” as the utmost guiding principle for cross-Strait relations, President 
Ma restored meetings between SEF and ARATS. President Ma further proposed to 
institutionalize cross-Strait relations with the signing of the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010. In return, China also showed reciprocal 
self-restraint not to compete with Taiwan via dollar diplomacy. Figure 3 indicates 
Taiwan’s perception of China overtime.
Rapprochement seems to take roots in cross-Strait relations, as indicated from the 
above discussion. Economic interdependence, as manifested in China’s aim for 
economic development and in Taiwan’s need for continuous prosperity, plays a 
significant role in stabilizing this dyadic relationship. And, the political will of top 
leaders also factors into rapprochement.9
Chief  
Negotiators
Results
C.V. Chen,  
Tang Shubei
Established a cross-Strait communications channel and exchanged opinions on relevant 
issues
C.V. Chen,  
Tang Shubei
The two sides extensively exchanged views on cooperation areas and held substantive 
discussions on the place and time, without achieving concrete results
Koo Chen-fu, 
Wang Daohan
The two sides sign four agreements: the Agreement on the Use and Verification 
of Certificates of Authentication Across the Taiwan Straits; Agreement on Matters 
Concerning Inquiry and Compensation for [Lost] Registered Mail Across the Taiwan 
Straits; Agreement on the System for Contacts and Meetings between SEF and AR-
ATS; and Joint Agreement of the Koo-Wang Talks
Chiao Jen-ho,  
Tang Shubei
1. The two sides issue the “joint press release by Mr. Chiao Jen-ho and 
Mr. Tang Shubei.”;  
2. “Measures on Facilitating the Entry and Exit of SEF and ARATS Personnel” 
are finalized
Chiao Jen-ho, 
Tang Shubei
The two sides issue the “joint press release on the SEF and ARATS Taipei Talks”
Chiao Jen-ho, 
Tang Shubei
The two sides extensively exchange views
Shi Hwei-you, 
Zhang Jincheng
The two sides reach a decision on the agenda for the Koo-Wang meeting
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Appendix 1: Chronology of Meetings between Taiwan and Mainland China, 
1991-2013
No. Name of Meeting Date Place Subject
8 Koo-Wang Meeting Oct. 14-18, 1998 Shanghai, 
Beijing
Negotiations on “cross-Strait char-
ter flights” and “allowing Chinese 
tourists to visit Taiwan”
9 1st Chiang-Chen 
Meeting
June 11-14, 2008 Beijing Negotiations on cross-Strait air 
transport, sea transport, postal 
services, and food safety
10 2nd Chiang-Chen 
Talks
Nov. 7-11, 2008 Taipei 1. Negotiations on cross-Strait 
joint crime-fighting and mutual 
judicial assistance, cross-Strait 
financial cooperation, regular 
cross-Strait flights and allowing 
mainland investment in Taiwan. 2. 
Arrangements for issues that SEF 
and ARATS should actively plan and 
prepare for in the next phase.
11 3rd Chiang-Chen 
Talks
April 25-29, 2009 Nanjing Negotiations on cross-Strait 
cooperation in inspection and 
quarantine of agricultural 
products; avoiding double 
taxation and improving 
cooperation on tax operations; 
cooperation in respect of 
standards, metrology, inspection 
and accreditation; and cooperation 
in fishing crew affairs.
12 4th Chiang-Chen 
Talks
Dec. 21-25, 2009 Taichung Negotiations on cross-Strait 
cooperation in inspection and 
quarantine of agricultural 
products; avoiding double 
taxation and improving 
cooperation on tax operations; 
cooperation in respect of 
standards, metrology, inspection 
and accreditation; and cooperation 
in fishing crew affairs.
13 5th Chiang-Chen 
Talks
June. 28-30, 2010 Chongqing 1. Negotiations on the “Cross-Strait 
Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement” and the “Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Intellectual Property 
Rights Protection and Cooperation”;  
2. Arrangements for the priority 
issues of next stage
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Chief  
Negotiators
Results
Koo Chen-fu, 
Wang Daohan
Consensus is reached on “strengthening dialogue between the two sides to promote 
the resumption of institutionalized negotiations,” “agreement between the two 
sides on enhancing promotion of the exchange activities between SEF and ARATS 
personnel at all levels,” “agreement between the two sides to actively provide mutual 
assistance in resolving cases involving the rights and interests of the people,” “invit-
ing Mr. Wang Daohan to visit Taiwan and Mr. Wang’s agreement to visit Taiwan at an 
appropriate time.”
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. SEF and ARATS officially restore mechanisms for institutionalized dialogue and 
negotiations. 2. The two sides sign the “Minutes of Talks on Cross-Strait Charter 
Flights “ and “Cross-Strait Agreement on Travel by Mainland Residents to Taiwan.” 
3. Arrangements are made for following up on the issues negotiated between SEF 
and ARATS. 4. A course is set for future cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. 5. 
Dialogue and exchanges between SEF and ARATS are strengthened. 6. Chen Yunlin 
agrees to visit Taiwan at an appropriate time.
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides sign the “Cross-Strait Air Transport Agreement,” “Cross-
Strait Sea Transport Agreement,” “Cross-Strait Postal Service Agreement” and 
“Cross-Strait Food Safety Agreement.” 2. The two sides reviewed the results and 
implementation situation of the two agreements signed last time. 3. Arrangements 
are made for following up on the issues negotiated between SEF and ARATS. 4. 
It further confirms the institutionalized contact and exchange approach between 
personnel of the two organizations.
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed “Agreement on Joint Cross-Strait Crime-Fighting and 
Mutual Judicial Assistance,” “Cross-Strait Financial Cooperation Agreement “ and 
“Supplementary Agreement on Cross-Strait Air Transport.” They also reached a 
consensus on matters pertaining to promoting mainland investment in Taiwan. 2. 
The two sides re-examined the results and progress of implementation of the six 
agreements the two organizations have signed since last year. 3. Arrangements are 
made for following up on the issues negotiated between SEF and ARATS. 4. SEF and 
ARATS further consented to promoting exchanges in various areas.
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed three agreements: the “Cross-Strait Agreement on 
Cooperation in Inspection and Quarantine of Agricultural Products”; the “Cross-
Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Respect of Standards, Metrology, Inspection and 
Accreditation”; and the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Fishing Crew 
Affairs.” 2. Re-examined the results and progress of implementation of the nine 
agreements the two organizations have signed since last year. 3. Arrangements are 
made for following up on the issues negotiated between SEF and ARATS. 4. The two 
organizations further consented to promoting exchanges in various areas.
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed two agreements: the “Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement” and the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Intellectual Property 
Rights Protection and Cooperation”; 2. Re-examined the results and progress 
of implementation of the 12 agreements the two organizations have signed; 3. 
Consensus reached on the priority issues of the next stage; 4. The two organizations 
further consented to promoting exchanges in various areas.
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Appendix 1: Chronology of Meetings between Taiwan and Mainland China,
1991-2013
No. Name of Meeting Date Place Subject
14 6th Chiang-Chen 
Talks
Dec. 20-22, 2010 Taipei 1. Negotiations on the “Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Medical and Health 
Cooperation” and “Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Investment Protection”;  
2. Arrangements for the priority issues 
of next stage
15 7th Chiang-Chen 
Talks
Oct. 19-21, 2011 Tianjin To conduct negotiations 
concerning a possible cross-Strait 
agreement on nuclear power safety 
cooperation, investment protection 
and industrial cooperation
16 8th Chiang-Chen 
Talks
Aug. 8-10, 2012 Taipei To conduct negotiations concerning 
a possible cross-Strait agreement 
on investment protection and 
customs cooperation
17 9th Round of Cross-
Strait High-Level 
Talks
Jun. 20-22, 2013 Shanghai 1. The first meeting to be held 
between the two sides since new 
leaders of SEF and ARATS took 
office. 2. Trade in Service agreement 
is the first free trade agreement 
to be concluded between the two 
sides on the basis of the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) and the WTO’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).  
3. To facilitate negotiations on 
possible agreements on trade in 
goods and dispute settlement.
*ARATS was not yet established at this time. Tang Shubei attended the talks as deputy director of the 
Taiwan Affairs Office under the State Council.
Rapprochement in South Korea-North Korea 
Relations, 1989-2012
South Korea, like Taiwan, needs to reconcile with its adversary for better economic 
development and other national goals. Besides, South Korea and Taiwan are both 
eager to maintain superiority in social and economic terms as a role model to their 
counterparts, so that they can lead the process of rapprochement.
Unlike the course in cross-Strait relations, post-Cold War inter-Korean relations 
began with South and North Korea’s accession to the United Nations concomitantly 
on September 17, 1991. Both sides signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, 
Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation in 1992. However, this seemingly 
promising rapprochement was soon challenged by North Korea’s nuclear gambit 
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Chief  
Negotiators
Results
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Medical and Health 
Cooperation”; 2. Staged consensus reached on the “Cross-Strait Agreement on 
Investment Protection”; 3. Re-examined the results and progress of implementation 
of those agreements the two organizations have signed; 4. Established the mechanism 
for re-examining the implementation of those cross-Strait agreements; 5. Consensus 
reached on the priority issues of the next stage; 6. The two organizations further 
consented to strengthening exchanges.
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
Signed the “Cross-Strait Nuclear Power Safety Cooperation Agreement”
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
Signed the “Cross-Strait Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement” and the 
“Cross-Strait Customs Cooperation Agreement”
Lin Join-sane, Chen 
Deming
1. Signed the “Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement”; 2. A Joint Opinion on the 
Kinmen water supply issue.
in the early 1990s. Under the Clinton administration, parties concerned reached the 
1994 Agreed Framework in which North Korea agreed to a gradual, step-by-step 
approach that would ultimately lead to a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula, 
the construction of two light-water reactors (LWR) in the North, and normalized 
ties between Pyongyang and Washington.
With a relatively calm relationship between North Korea and the United States, 
President Kim Dae-jung extended an olive branch to the North under the name of 
the “Sunshine Policy” in 1998. In other words, the view of “doves” seemed to take 
root not only in South Korea but also in the North, with no evident opposition from 
the United States. With supporters, especially business groups within the South, 
trade volume between South and North Korea began to grow in the same period of 
time as indicated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Volume of Inter-Korean Trade 
Year
Source: Data management (Korean Statistical Information Service Team), Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea. 
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Although the trade volume is considered small compared to that in cross-Strait 
relations, many still expect that economic interdependence between the two 
Koreas would lead to peace. South Korea sees these trade ties as indirect economic 
exchanges in essence, no tariffs for these intra-Korean exchanges. In addition to 
economic interactions, people-to-people exchanges started with a relatively slow 
pace, partly due to the nature of North Korea’s authoritarian regime.
Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that both Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-
il agreed to hold a summit meeting in 2000, with the remarkable June 15th 
North-South Joint Declaration. Both sides agreed to have ministerial talks 
and military working-level talks, and President Kim Dae-jung received the 
Nobel Peace Prize for staging the summit. Appendix 2 indicates 23 rounds of 
meetings conducted by the heads and high-level officials of South and North 
Koreas from 2000 to 2007.
However, the U.S. labeling of North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” put 
an end to the amicable atmosphere between South and North Korea. Toward 
the end of 2002, North Korea had adopted a more hostile policy toward other 
countries, including missile tests and even withdrawal from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. While facing nuclear tensions, 
Appendix 2: Chronology of Meetings between South and North Korea, 2000-2007
No.
Name of 
Meeting
Date Place Subject
1 1st Inter-Korean 
Summit
June 13-15, 2000 Pyongyang Discussion of unification, Inter-Korean 
communication, family reunion
2 2nd Inter-
Korean Summit
Oct. 2-4, 2007 Pyongyang Reaffirmed the spirit of the June 15 Joint 
Declaration and discussion on various issues 
related to realizing the advancement of South-
North relations
3 1st Inter-Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
July 29-31, 2000 Seoul Emphasized the great significance of the historic 
summit talks between the heads of South and 
North Korea and the June 15 Joint Declaration
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South Korea prioritized aid for peace as a strategy to persuade North Korea to 
retreat from its nuclear confrontation with the U.S. 
President Roh Moo-hyun assumed office in February 2003 and continued a 
“politics first, economics later” policy. He initiated a more proactive South 
Korean role in inter-Korean relations to somewhat contradict Washington’s 
hawkish stance. This was in sharp contrast to the U.S. stance on the nuclear 
issue, to which North Korea even resorted to the first nuclear test in October 
2006. President Roh, under these circumstances, still initiated a second 
summit with the North in October 2007. Nevertheless, in spite of North 
Korea’s continuing provocations, conciliatory policies adopted by Presidents 
Kim and Roh were perceived as a failure.
President Lee Myung-bak assumed office in 2008, wherein inter-Korean 
relations were about to enter a new phase given the changing international 
environment and the political power shift from a liberal to a relatively 
conservative government. To respond, the Lee Myung-bak administration 
proposed the “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness” initiative, in 
which South Korea was willing to create an environment for the North to 
denuclearize and for both Koreas to prosper economically. 
However, North Korea’s truculent behavior made it more difficult, with only 
limited to no reciprocation. With the same analytical framework, inter-Korean 
trade started in 1989, and the total volume continued to grow under the Kim 
Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun years. Economic cooperation improved over 
the years, especially in the aftermath of the June 15th joint communiqué 
made in Pyongyang in 2000. The Mt. Kumkang sightseeing project, Gaesung 
industrial complex project, and other inter-Korean trade initiatives have 
significantly contributed to improved bilateral relations. Nevertheless, this 
trading relationship remains unidirectional, with South Korea importing more 
from North Korea.
Chief  
Negotiators
Results
Kim Jong-il, 
Kim Dae-jung
Signed the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration
Kim Jong-il,  
Roh Moo-hyun
Signed Peace Declaration (eight-point agreement) 
Cheon Kum-jin,  
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, including resuming the operations of the South-North Liaison 
Office at Panmunjeom, rehabilitating the Seoul-Shinuiju Railway
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Appendix 2: Chronology of Meetings between South and North Korea, 2000-2007
No.
Name of 
Meeting
Date Place Subject
4
2nd Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Aug. 28 -Sep. 1, 2000 Pyongyang Emphasized anew the great significance of the 
June 15 Joint Declaration
5
3rd Inter-Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Sep. 27 -30, 2000 Jeju Island Reaffirmed the points agreed to after the 
announcement of the June 15 Joint Declaration
6 4
th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Dec. 12-16, 2000 Pyongyang Assessed the projects undertaken during the 
last six months to implement the June 15 
Joint Declaration
7
5th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk 
Sep. 15-18, 2001 Seoul Discussion of the family reunions and 
developing dialogue and cooperation between 
the two sides
8
6th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Nov. 9-14, 2001 Mt. 
Kumkang
Discussion on the changing international affairs 
after 9/11
9
7th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Aug. 12-14, 2002 Seoul Confirmed the willingness to carry out 
faithfully the June 15 Joint Declaration
10
8th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Oct. 19-22, 2002 Pyongyang Discussion on recent inter-Korean relations 
and confirmed the basic spirit of the June 15 
Joint Declaration
11
9th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Jan. 21-24, 2003 Seoul Exchanged each other’s views on the 
nuclear issues
12
10th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
April 27-29, 2003 Pyongyang Discussed matters of common concern in 
connection with the implementation of June 15th 
Joint Declaration
13
11th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
July 9-12, 2003 Seoul Discussion on the issues of mutual concern 
related to the promotion of peace on the 
Korean Peninsula and of the inter-Korean 
reconciliation and cooperation
14
12th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Oct. 14-17, 2003 Pyongyang Discussion on current issues, agreed to 
continue cooperation in promoting peace on the 
Korean Peninsula
15
13th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Feb. 3-6, 2004 Seoul Discussion on the prosperity of the Korean 
people and all problems to make substantive 
progress in inter-Korean relations
16
14th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
May 4-7, 2004 Pyongyang Shared the view that inter-Korean relations 
should be developed based on the basic spirit of 
the June 15 Joint Declaration
17
15th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
June 21-24, 2005 Seoul Assessed the accomplishments made over 
the past five years since the June 15 Joint 
Declaration and agreed to promote peace and 
prosperity on the Korean Peninsula
LU, PARK, TSAI: Taiwan’s and Korea’s Reconciliation with Adversaries 119
Chief  
Negotiators
Results
Cheon Kum-jin,  
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement,  including family reunion, holding talks between South and North 
Korean military authorities, establishing a legal framework for economic cooperation
Cheon Kum-jin, 
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, including  family reunions, establishing a Committee for 
the Promotion of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation, expanding exchange and 
cooperation in academic, cultural and athletic areas
Cheon  
Kum-jin,  
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, including establishing and operating Inter-Korean Economic 
Cooperation Promotion Committee, cooperating in the fishing industry
Kim Ryeung-sung, 
Hong Soon-yong
Joint Press Statement, including revitalizing Mt. Geumgang tourism, connecting 
railroads among the South, the North and Russia, construction of the Gaeseong 
Industrial Complex
Kim Ryeung-sung, 
Jeong Se-hyun
No Joint Press Release because South and North Korea failed to reach an agreement
Kim Ryeung-sung, 
Jeong Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including the military assurance measures for the reconnection of 
the inter-Korean railways and roads, family reunions, North Korea’s participation in 
the 14th Asian Games in Busan
Kim Ryeung-sung, 
Jeong Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including making common efforts to guarantee peace and 
security on the Korean Peninsula, construction of the Seoul-Sinuiju and East Sea 
railways and roads
Kim Ryeung-sung, 
Jeong Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including agreeing to hold the 10th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks 
from April 7 to 10, 2003 in Pyongyang
Kim Ryeung-sung, 
Jeong Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including agreeing to hold the 10th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks 
from April 7 to 10, 2003 in Pyongyang
Kim Ryeung-sung, 
Jeong Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including discussing fully the other party’s position regarding the 
nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and continual cooperation
Kim Ryeung-sung, 
Jeong Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, but without specific agreements except setting a date for the 
next talk
Kim Ryeung-sung, 
Jeong Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including cooperating for a fruitful second round of the Six-Party Talks, 
holding a military authorities’ meeting, reunion of separated families
Kwon Ho-woong, 
Jeong Se-Hyun
Joint Press Release, but without significant results due to the North’s nuclear weapons
Kwon Ho-woong, 
Jeong Dong-yong
Joint Press Release, including family reunions, the ultimate goal of the denuclearizing 
the Korean Peninsula, to hold the 3rd inter-Korean General-level Military Talks, agreed 
to allow North Korean civilian vessels to pass through the Jeju Strait
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Appendix 2: Chronology of Meetings between South and North Korea, 2000-2007
No.
Name of 
Meeting
Date Place Subject
18
16th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Sep. 13-16, 2005 Pyongyang Praised successful hosts of the June 15 National 
Unification Festival held in Pyongyang and 
the August 15 Grand National Festival held 
in Seoul
19
17th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Dec. 13-16, 2005 Jeju Island Made a positive assessment of developments in 
inter-Korean relations during this year which 
marked a turning point in the implementation 
of the June 15 Joint Declaration
20
18th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Apr. 21-24, 2006 Pyongyang Evaluated accomplishments made since the 
June 15 Joint Declaration, agreed to make 
proactive efforts to advance inter-Korean 
relations to a higher level
21
19th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
July 11-13, 2006 Busan Discussion on missile launch, return to Six-
Party Talks
22
20th Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
Feb. 27-Mar. 2, 2007 Pyongyang Shared a view that the two should normalize 
inter-Korean relations expeditiously and the 
relations ought to be upgraded to a higher level
23
21st Inter-
Korean 
Ministerial 
Talk
May 29-June 1, 2007 Seoul No real practical discussion
Source: Ministry of National Unification of ROK, http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000586 
(accessed2013/10/8), and compiled by the authors.
Humanitarian concerns also play a great role in South Korea’s policy with the 
North. Reunions of separated families, abductee issues, and disaster relief, among 
others, deeply impacted Lee Myung-bak’s policy design vis-à-vis the North. 
However, North Korea’s launch of long range missiles in 2009, together with 
other belligerent behavior such as the 2010 Cheonan incident, proved once again 
the shiftiness of North Korea’s policy. In other words, trust between the two 
Koreas becomes an illusion. 
In this aftermath, the “Vision 3000” initiative, which contained the ideas of peaceful 
co-existence and mutual respect, gave way to a new peace initiative: a more 
comprehensive idea that required the North to abandon nuclear weapons as the first 
step to build mutual trust between North and South Korea. However, this “New 
Peace Initiative for the Korean Peninsula” was dead before too long.
The low intensity of the trade relationship together with the North’s truculent 
behavior, made it difficult for both sides to build trust over time. In regards to the 
economic interaction and incentives for both North and South Korea, however, with 
the increase of imports from North Korea, this relationship seems lopsidedly in 
favor of the latter. We argue that a third party such as China needs to be considered. 
Since China has been the largest trade partner for North Korea over the past ten 
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Chief  
Negotiators
Results
Kwon Ho-woong, 
Jeong Dong-yong
Joint Press Statement, including agreed to give up all face-saving practices and to take practical 
measures to promote national reconciliation, agreed to take active measures to remove obstacles 
to economic cooperation and facilitate investment and exchanges between the two sides
Kwon Ho-woong, 
Jeong Dong-yong
Joint Press Statement, including sharing a view that the Joint Statement of the Fourth 
Round of the Six-Party Talks should be implemented at an earliest possible date for 
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, agreed to expand and develop inter-
Korean economic cooperation
Kwon Ho-woong, 
Lee Jong-suk.
Joint Press Statement, including continue their endeavors for the denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula, agreed to make efforts for the national unity, cooperating in an 
economic field
Kwon Ho-woong, Lee 
Jong-suk
No Joint Press Statement because South and North Korea failed to reach an agreement
Kwon Ho-woong, Lee 
Jae-jung
Joint Press Statement, including agreed to resume joint projects in the humanitarian 
areas and endeavor to practically resolve separated family issues, and agreed to 
expand and develop economic cooperation for common development and prosperity of 
the Korean people
Kwon Ho-woong, Lee 
Jae-jung
Joint Press Statement
years, North Korea has become less motivated to increase trade ties with the 
South. This makes it even more difficult to nurture the doves in the North who 
prefer stability on the Korean Peninsula. A lack of doves prevents North Korea 
from further economic reform.
In addition, societal integration and business negotiations resulting from people-to-
people exchanges are less salient in inter-Korean relations. This lack of integration 
is demonstrated through North Korean refugees in the South. There are thousands 
of refugees living in South Korea today and they face extremely difficult situations 
due to their lack of education, severe competition, and some level of discrimination. 
Also, the cultural similarity between the North and South has widened, which in 
turn has made the refugees feel like outsiders. Furthermore, a generation of new 
narratives and identities is difficult to find in Korea as societal integration and 
cultural exchanges between the two Koreas are lacking — resulting in a vicious, not 
virtuous circle. Therefore, making stable peace through societal exchanges seems 
very unlikely for the Korean Peninsula.
Strong political will, as revealed in inter-Korean relations, is not a guarantee 
to generating peace. In other words, even though South Korea under Kim and 
Roh initiated rapprochement with North Korea, a “politics first, economics later” 
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approach without strong economic and social ties rendered it very difficult to 
complete a virtuous circle and futile to sustain a positive inter-Korean relationship.
Lessons Learned
With the above discussion on cross-Strait and inter-Korean relations, certain 
similarities can be drawn. Beyond the historical reasons, first and foremost, Taiwan 
and South Korea are taking the leading role for rapprochement in the dyadic 
relationship with their respective rivals. The backbone to sustain such policy is their 
strength in economy vis-a-vis mainland China and North Korea. In the past, Taiwan 
and South Korea were among the Four Tigers, and now the GDP per capita in 
each country has exceeded $20,000. Superiority in economic strength seems to be 
leading the way.
Second, with strength in economy and as full-fledged democracies, both Taiwan 
and South Korea are willing to reach out to their counterparts. And yet, North Korea 
has not reciprocated to South Korea as mainland China has done with Taiwan, 
which makes it difficult to generate a virtuous circle in inter-Korean relations.
Table 1: Major Comparison on Political Issues between Cross-Strait and 
Inter-Korean Relations
Cross-Strait Relations Inter-Korean Relations
Reason for Separation Civil war between the Nationalists and the 
Communists
Confrontation between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Korean War
Plan for Unification Prior to 1980, each side was devoted to the 
extinction of the other.
Since the 1980s, peaceful unification has 
emerged to become a more attractive 
proposal, while mainland maintains the use 
of force as the last resort.
Since 1996, most Taiwanese people 
prefer “status quo” instead of immediate 
unification/independence.
Prior to 1973, each side was devoted 
to the extinction of  
the other.
Since the 1980s, mutual non-denial.
In 1992, both sides reached the 
agreement for co-existence.
In 2000, both sides agreed to seek 
for common ground for unification.
Positions on International 
Recognition
Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has pragmatically 
accepted co-existence between both sides.
Mainland China, however, has continued to 
see itself as the sole legitimate government of 
China and Taiwan a renegade province.
Both sides have accepted dual 
recognition since the  
late 1980s.
The concept of “one nation-state” 
continues and both see inter-Korean 
relations as a special relationship 
within the same nation.
Positions on International 
Participation
Taiwan has accepted co-existence 
with mainland in major international 
organization since the early 1990s.
Mainland China has continued to reject 
this idea but begun to accommodate 
ad hoc arrangements for Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation in certain 
organizations since 2008. 
Both sides joined the United 
Nations in 1991.
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Third, the role of the United States is important in ensuring a relatively stable 
external environment for Taiwan and South Korea to pursue rapprochement 
with their counterparts. Though the U.S. does not formally ally with Taiwan, its 
indispensible role has been evident in 1995-1996 when mainland China exerted 
coercion over Taiwan and was at last deterred by the deployment of U.S. aircraft 
carriers. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait have become more pragmatic ever since. 
By the same token, the U.S. has assisted South Korea, its ally, in deterring North 
Korea’s truculent behaviors, although these efforts are often compromised by 
other international parties.
Having said that, differences exist in our close examination of these two cases. 
First, Taiwan and South Korea have different emphases in dealing with their 
counterparts. Taiwan adopts an “economics first, politics later” approach, in 
which economic interdependence comes first and helps consolidate the bilateral 
relationship across the Taiwan Strait. Also, this approach provides Taiwan’s 
leaders an opportunity to distance themselves if cross-Strait relations do not 
evolve positively. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 3, in 2004-2005 when mainland 
China adopted the anti-secession law against Taiwan, most Taiwanese people 
perceived hostility against Taiwan’s government and less to the people, and 
trade and societal interactions continued to grow. 
For South Korea, a “politics first” approach does help to demonstrate the 
leadership’s resolve in forging a peaceful Korean Peninsula, nevertheless, it 
leaves little to no room for the South to distance itself from the North during 
times of belligerence. In other words, the “economics first” approach helps 
Taiwan’s leadership to demonstrate flexibility in dealing with mainland China.
Second, how their counterparts respond also differentiates Taiwan from South 
Korea. Mainland China has prioritized economic development as the chief 
national task since the late 1970s, therefore when Taiwan reached out to establish 
trade relations, it became less difficult for the two to reconcile politically. North 
Korea, however, has yet to demonstrate its willingness to reform economically 
and politically, which constitutes a great barrier for peace to take root in inter-
Korean relations because no “doves” can voice in a repressive political regime.
Besides, Taiwan under the Ma Ying-jeou administration has been striving to 
institutionalize cross-Strait relations, with economic and societal interactions 
as the basis to continue rapprochement. North Korea, however, has been using 
interaction as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis South Korea. The North’s “on again, 
off again” attitude on cooperation with the South is leading inter-Korean 
relations nowhere.
Third, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons makes the U.S. reluctant 
to support South Korea’s policy to the North, especially under the Kim and Roh 
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administrations. On the contrary, the U.S. expresses appreciation for positive 
developments over the Taiwan Strait and thus helps the Ma administration in 
Taiwan to pursue an institutionalized relationship with mainland China.
Economic interdependence, societal interactions with business-like negotiations, 
and the political will of top leaders to push relations forward, constitute a virtuous 
circle for peace across the Taiwan Strait. For inter-Korean relations to evolve 
peacefully, it is important for the South to revise its previous “politics first” 
approach to an “economics first, politics later” approach. Also, for Taiwan to 
further institutionalize its relations with mainland China, it should reconsider the 
political differences over the Taiwan Strait. As opposed to the two Koreas’ pursuit 
of a unified Korean Peninsula, how to cope with mainland China over political 
issues in which China maintains a relatively rigid “one China” principle becomes a 
paramount task for Taiwan. The existence of a virtuous circle is essential to peace 
over the Taiwan Strait, nevertheless, Taiwan should note that domestic consensus 
and international support are prerequisites to direct political negotiations with 
mainland China — an important lesson from inter-Korean relations.
Conclusion
For the time being, cross-Strait relations seem to continue the path for stability, 
and a virtuous circle composed of economic interdependence, business-like 
negotiations, and political will between two rivalries is taking root in Taiwan-
mainland China relations. This virtuous circle has not yet emerged in inter-
Korean relations.
In 2013, President Park Geun-hye declared that she would pursue a relatively 
modest but pragmatic course to cope with North Korea. With the concept of 
trustpolitik, Park Geun-hye aims to reach out to North Korea with economic aid 
and cultural contacts and expects goodwill in return. This approach, according 
to Park, is essential to gradually reshape North Korea’s truculent behavior for 
the past decades and to ensure peace and prosperity in East Asia. The goal of 
this approach is twofold: on the one hand, it aims to re-establish economic and 
cultural ties in exchange for more responsible behavior from North Korea; on the 
other hand, it can sustain, if not help, President Park’s popularity domestically by 
punishing the North if the latter decides not to cooperate. “To ensure stability,” 
Madame Park contended, this approach “should be applied consistently from 
issue to issue based on verifiable actions.” In other words, South Korea and the 
international community will closely monitor North Korea’s conduct to make 
sure it is well intended, and then provide a reward accordingly.
This paper argues that economic interdependence, followed by societal 
exchanges and business-like negotiations between two rival governments, 
constitute a necessary condition for rapprochement. Nevertheless, the “doves” 
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as a constituency can give support for political leaders to further stabilize the 
relationship. From the experience of cross-Strait relations, South Korea may need 
to make a policy shift. Step-by-step economic and societal exchanges are the 
foundation, and lower-level official talks might help to generate consensus and to 
create a larger constituency in both South and North Korea to prioritize stability. 
From inter-Korean relations, Taiwan shall be advised that in lack of domestic 
and international support, it would be premature for high-level talks or summit 
meetings across the Taiwan Strait.
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Luxury Goods in North Korea: 
Tangible and Symbolic Importance to 
the Kim Jong-un Regime 
Soo Kim
Abstract
North Korea’s adherence to self-sufficiency has its foundations in the country’s 
juche ideology, meaning a spirit of self-reliance. The juche spirit still lives on in the 
DPRK, but stubbornly so, as the regime over the past several decades has confronted 
the limitations of being a truly self-reliant country, faced declining economic and 
humanitarian conditions, and has become increasingly isolated from the rest of the 
world. Pyongyang’s insistence upon its own terms in diplomatic engagements and 
provocative behavior have further isolated the country, and very few countries are 
willing to cooperate with the DPRK, for doing so would cost their own reputations.
Consequently, North Korea pursues illicit avenues to fund the lavish lifestyle of 
its leader, develop its weapons programs, and strengthen the elite’s allegiance to 
the Kim regime. One such way the Kim Jong-un regime achieves these aims is 
through the acquisition of luxury goods. High-end items, such as wine, liquor, 
jewelry, and automobiles are acquired through third-party countries to fulfill 
Kim’s penchant for luxury goods and buy the loyalty of North Korean elites. The 
international community is aware of the regime’s dependence upon these items. 
As a result, sanctions have been imposed to restrict the North’s access channels 
to luxury products and curtail its provocative behavior. The effectiveness of 
sanctions has been debated, for they often lack consistency in definition and 
application among participating countries. Yet, due to their symbolic value as 
punitive measures and potential to be more effective with proper application, 
there is still value in implementing sanctions.
Key words: luxury goods, North Korean leadership, sanctions, elite loyalty, China
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Background
North Korea’s self-proclaimed, unswerving adherence to self-sufficiency has its 
foundations in the country’s juche ideology, meaning a spirit of self-reliance. The 
spirit of juche still lives on in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 
but stubbornly so, as the regime over the past several decades has confronted the 
limitations of being a truly self-reliant country, faced declining economic and 
humanitarian conditions, and has become increasingly isolated politically from 
the rest of the world. What had once been a self-imposed ideological conviction 
is now a reality that the North is forced to accept. Pyongyang’s insistence upon 
its own terms in diplomatic engagements and provocative behavior have further 
isolated the country. Yet the North has shown very little unequivocal signs of 
wanting to change its course. For abandoning the juche philosophy would mean 
the regime’s ineluctable opening of the country to the rest of the world, and the 
North would have to consider the terms of the United States, South Korea, and 
other like-minded countries—probably a last-resort move the Kim regime would 
try to avoid making at all costs. The DPRK most likely will not accept regime 
change by the international community’s terms in the foreseeable future. Yet the 
state of the country renders it difficult for the regime to be truly self-sufficient. 
Very few countries are willing to cooperate, trade with or openly support the 
DPRK, for doing so would cost their own reputations, a risk they are hesitant or 
unwilling to take. 
Consequently, the North Korean government pursues illicit avenues to satiate the 
appetites of its top leaders, continue to develop Pyongyang’s weapons programs, 
obtain currency, and strengthen the elite’s allegiance to the Kim regime. One such 
way the Kim Jong-un regime achieves these aims is through the acquisition of 
luxury goods. High-end items such as caviar, wine, liquor, jewelry, and automobiles 
are acquired through third-party countries to fulfill Kim’s penchant for luxury 
goods and bribe the upper echelons of North Korean leadership to maintain 
their loyalty to the Kim regime. North Korean elites have no trouble acquiring 
these goods as long as they have the money to purchase them. The international 
community has become increasingly aware of the DPRK’s surprisingly easy 
access to these goods, as well as the regime’s dependence upon these items to 
maintain stability and further its political objectives. As a result, sanctions have 
been imposed on several occasions, both at the multilateral and bilateral level, to 
restrict Pyongyang’s access channels to luxury products and curtail the regime’s 
provocative behavior. The effectiveness of sanctions has been debated by many 
North Korea watchers, for these regulations often lack consistency and uniformity 
in definition and application among participating countries. Yet, because there is 
still a symbolic messaging value in these punitive measures as well as the potential 
for sanctions to be more effective with the proper application and participation 
from countries crucial to clamping down on the North Korean regime, there is still 
value in implementing and applying sanctions.
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A Delineation of “Luxury Goods”
To make its restrictions and sanctions policy vis-à-vis North Korea clearer to both the 
participant countries and Pyongyang, the international community set out to define 
what constitutes as a luxury good. The United Nations approved Security Council 
Resolution 2094 (UNSCR) in response to the DPRK’s February 12, 2013 nuclear 
test to strengthen and expand its existing sanctions against the North by targeting the 
illicit activities of diplomatic personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and North Korea’s 
finance relationships. The resolution prevents the provision of financial services or 
other assets and resources to North Korea, its entities and individuals that could 
contribute to the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs or other prohibited 
activities.1 It also imposes a travel ban and asset freezes on named North Korean 
entities deemed the primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment 
related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.2  
More importantly for the scope of this paper, UNSCR 2094 delineates and 
defines “luxury goods.” It clarifies that the term includes but is not limited to the 
following items specified in the annex: jewelry, including jewelry with pearls, 
gems, precious and semi-precious stones (e.g., diamonds, sapphires, rubies, 
emeralds), and jewelry of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal; and 
transportation items, including yachts, luxury automobiles and motor vehicles to 
transport people, station wagons, and racing cars. 
In addition to imposing UN sanctions against the North, many individual countries 
have adopted their own measures to express disapproval of Pyongyang’s course 
of actions and policy. In August 2010, as a response to the DPRK’s sinking of the 
South Korean navy corvette Cheonan, the Obama administration signed Executive 
Order 13551, which targets the DPRK’s arms imports and exports, imports of 
luxury goods, counterfeit currency, money laundering, and narcotics trafficking.3 
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) enumerates items that are subject to 
a policy of denial in exporting or re-exporting to the North. As defined by the CFR, 
the U.S. has banned the following luxury goods from going into North Korea: 
luxury automobiles; yachts; gems; jewelry; other fashion accessories; cosmetics; 
perfumes; furs; designer clothing; luxury watches; rugs and tapestries; electronic 
entertainment software and equipment; recreational sports equipment; tobacco; 
wine and other alcoholic beverages; musical instruments; art; and antiques and 
collectible items, including but not limited to rare coins and stamps. 
In 2011, Canada imposed sanctions (Special Economic Measures Regulations) 
against North Korea under its Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) to send 
the message that Pyongyang’s aggressive behavior is unacceptable. The SEMA 
prohibited any person in Canada any Canadian outside the country from knowingly 
directly or indirectly exporting, selling, supplying, transferring or shipping arms 
and related material, resources contributing to the North’s weapons program and 
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luxury goods.4 Canada defines luxury goods as jewelry, gems, precious metals, 
and watches; cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, perfume, designer clothing and 
accessories, furs, sporting goods, and private aircraft; lobster and gourmet foods 
and ingredients; computers, television and other electronic devices.5 The UN and 
individual countries’ definitions of luxury goods banned to North Korea aims to 
restrict the regime’s access to these items. Recent reports indicate, however, that 
Pyongyang is still able to acquire these goods.
North Korean Leaders’ Lavish Lifestyles
The North Korean regime has had a robust appetite for luxury goods since the 
late Kim Jong-il was designated successor to his father Kim Il-sung in the 1970s. 
Kim Jong-il created Office 39, a secret organization that served as a repository to 
generate slush funds for Kim’s personal use. Kim used the funds generated through 
Office 39 for developing weapons of mass destruction, constructing idolization 
monuments and buildings throughout North Korea, maintaining elite loyalty, and 
fulfilling his penchant for luxury items. Fujimoto Kenji, Kim’s longtime sushi 
chef, said that Kim had a predilection for cognac and other expensive European 
alcohol and wines, Iranian caviar, melons and grapes from China, sushi, and 
shark fin soup.6 Kim reportedly also owned six luxury travel trains that included 
conference rooms, satellite phones, and flat-screen TVs.7
Kim’s youngest son, Kim Jong-un, was considered the North’s heir apparent in 
2010 and succeeded his father following the elder Kim’s demise in December 
Table 1: Definition of Luxury Goods
“Luxury Goods” defined as...
United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 2094
pearls, gems, precious and semi-precious stones, jewelry of precious metal or 
of metal clad with precious metal, transportation items, including yachts, luxury 
automobiles and motor vehicles to transport people, station wagons, and 
racing cars1
United States Code of 
Federal Regulations
luxury automobiles, yachts, gems jewelry, luxury watches, fashion accessories, 
cosmetics, perfumes, furs, designer clothing, rugs, electronic entertainment 
software and equipment, recreational sports equipment, tobacco, wine and 
other alcoholic beverages, musical instruments, art, antiques and collectibles2
Canada’s Special Economic 
Measures Regulations
jewelry, gems, precious metals, and watches, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, 
perfume, designer clothing and accessories, furs, sporting goods, and private 
aircraft, lobster and gourmet foods and ingredients, computers, television and 
other electronic devices3
1. Security Council Resolution 2094. United Nations Security Council. 7 March 2013. Accessed 2 December 2013.
2. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations. Title 15. Commerce and Foreign Trade, Part 746: Embargoes and Other Special 
Controls. http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=ba72db1459378288126c85af43a7b7d8&node=15:2.1.3.4.30.0.1.4&rgn=d
iv8, 2 December 2013. Accessed 4 December 2013.
3. Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Government 
of Canada Justice Laws Website. http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2006-287/FullText.html, modified 22 
November 2013. Accessed 2 December 2013.
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2011. The 30-year-old leader spent several of his formative years abroad, having 
attended the International School of Berne, a boarding school fifteen minutes away 
from the capital of Switzerland. At the English-language school, Kim befriended 
the children of American diplomats and learned to speak French and German.8 
He was also reportedly an avid fan of the NBA, idolizing basketball players such 
as Michael Jordan, loved skiing, and spoke highly of actor Jean-Claude Van 
Damme.9,10  In accordance with his age, the young Kim projected a more modern, 
Western lifestyle to the public in his first year as the country’s leader. Alongside 
Kim appeared his wife, Ri Sol-chu, on some of the leader’s public outings. The 
North’s first lady wore Western-style clothing and was even spotted carrying a 
Christian Dior bag in one of her public appearances.11,12 The lavish lifestyle of 
Kim and his wife had been equally the focus of attention and point of criticism 
for many Korea watchers, as they noted the salient contrast between Kim’s lavish 
lifestyle with the poverty and hunger confronting the average North Korean.
It appears that Kim Jong-un has not only inherited his father’s penchant for luxury 
goods, but the young Kim’s decadent lifestyle may well surpass that of Kim Jong-
il’s. In October, South Korea’s ruling party lawmaker Yoon Sang-hyun released 
an analysis that examined Pyongyang’s import of luxury goods between 2010 and 
2012. According to the analysis, under the Kim Jong-un regime, North Korea’s 
import of luxury items surged every year, from $446 million in 2010 to $584 
million in 2011 and $645 million in 2012.13 The North’s tally of imports in 2012 
was more than twice the average under Kim Jong-il, which totaled approximately 
$300 million per year.14
An examination of UN and Chinese trade data in 2012 revealed a significant 
increase in the export of cars, tobacco, laptops, cellphones, and domestic 
electrical appliances to North Korea over a five-year period.15 According to 
Representative Yoon, the value of North Korea’s luxury imports in 2011 was 
enough to buy 1.96 million tons of wheat.16 Imports of cell phones had risen 
by more than 4200 percent. In the South Korean National Assembly’s analysis, 
the most popular items to be imported to North Korea included liquors, such as 
scotch and wine, electronic devices, perfumes, cosmetics, fur coats and luxury 
items.17 The North also imported expensive pet dogs and pet supplies, European 
and U.S. baby products, and German-made sauna facilities. From China alone, 
the North imported $519,402 worth of caviar and roe in 2012—almost a 50-fold 
increase in volume from the previous year.18 Pyongyang also imported carpets 
worth $448,728, 33 times higher than in 2011.19 The DPRK imported 661.7 
kilograms of silver worth $653,128 dollars from China this January; observers 
speculate the regime may have used the silver as presents for Kim Jong-un’s 
birthday on January 8. Kim has also imported scores of Chinese Shih Tzu dogs.20 
In 2011, shipments of luxury cars were reported at over $230 million.21 Kim 
reportedly uses a Mercedes-Benz GL-Class sport-utility vehicle when he goes 
on his inspection tours throughout the country.22
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In addition to importing luxury items, the North Korean regime has vigorously 
pursued the construction of recreational and leisure facilities, most likely for 
Kim’s enjoyment purposes. The young leader is an avid sports fan and enjoys 
throwing parties. Since September 2010, when Kim Jong-un was designated 
successor to his father, North Korea has been constructing new villas or expanding 
existing ones. For instance, Kim Jong-un’s office “Official Residence Number 15” 
in central Pyongyang has been torn down and a new building is being constructed 
in its place. Because the location is where Kim’s mother, Ko Yong-hui had lived, 
and also where Kim resided during his youth, it can be inferred that the new 
building will most likely be intended for Kim’s personal use.23 North Koreans 
have also deconstructed Kim Jong-il’s personal villa, imported building materials 
from abroad, and begun constructing a new vacation house that includes banquet 
halls and villas. In Kim Jong-un’s personal villas, he has built docks from which 
he could sail yachts and go jet skiing.24 Pyongyang has also imported equipment 
to produce artificial snow for the leader’s ski resorts.25 The South Korean press 
reports that in 2012, North Korea entered into negotiations to acquire some high-
end European luxury yachts priced at approximately $10 million each. Between 
2009 and 2010, North Korea imported a dozen Italian jet skis. In Kim’s vacation 
house in Kangdong County, the North Koreans constructed a new banquet hall 
and horse race tracks, and invited Chinese and Russian architects to build an 
ice rink and indoor gym. Recently, North Korea has imported dozens of special 
Russian horses for Kim. Pyongyang has also imported sauna equipment from 
Finland and Germany, possibly to “help him beat hangovers and fatigue” from 
late night partying.26
An Instrument to Solidify Kim’s Power Grip
In the case of Kim Jong-il, luxury goods were acquired to satisfy Kim’s decadent 
lifestyle, construct monuments idolizing the leadership, reward his supporters, 
and fund the country’s weapons programs. What about his son, Kim Jong-un? 
With barely two years of experience leading the country, the 30-year-old Kim 
is young and lacks credible experience as a leader. Though he is the de facto 
leader of North Korea, Kim most likely relies on some of the officials from Kim 
Jong-il’s rule for support and guidance. The majority of the North’s old guard is 
several decades older than the young Kim; many of them are contemporaries and 
colleagues of his father. As a result, there is a generational gap that separates Kim 
and the Party and military elites ideologically and practically. Kim has also had 
exposure to the outside world in his formative years, which, to a certain extent, 
may have shaped his views on his country, its people, and relations with foreign 
countries. In any country, it is important for the leader to maintain a close network 
of supporters and affiliates to assert his leadership and ensure success of his policy 
goals. In North Korea, where allegiance to the leadership is crafted around a cult 
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of personality, dissent is not tolerated, and the leader wields absolute, seemingly 
undisputed control, the support of his cronies and the top echelons of the Party, 
military, and government is especially important to the leader’s longevity and 
maintaining of power. And for Kim Jong-un, a young and inexperienced leader, 
loyalty from the top ranks in the Party and military is particularly crucial to 
ensuring a strong grip of the country. He may therefore place greater emphasis 
on securing his leadership in the first years of his rule by way of “buying off” the 
support of the older, more experienced high-ranking Party and military officials 
with expensive gifts. 
The Kim Jong-un regime imports luxury goods for Kim’s personal use, just as his 
father Kim Jong-il did during his rule. However, given Kim’s recent assumption 
of rule and the lack of a solid power base around him, it is likely that luxury goods 
are of political import for the new leader. Kim is using these expensive items as 
gifts for the country’s elites. One foreign official who visited North Korea in April 
2012 said the regime appeared to be focusing more efforts on pampering the elites, 
with luxury items from Japan and the construction of high-rise condominiums 
for the privileged classes.27 Kim has also spent money on parties for the North’s 
high-ranking officials and purchased expensive products to buy their loyalty. For 
example, Kim gave Yamaha electronic violins and cellos to the North’s all-female 
Moranbong Band.28 Elite support had been an important fixture to regime survival 
during both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s rules, but it is even more important for 
Kim Jong-un, as he tries to show both the international community and the North 
Koreans that he is in charge of the country. 
Dealing with North Korea  
Through Sanctions
The international community is well aware of the North Korean leadership’s 
predilection for luxury items and the regime’s dependence on these goods to 
encourage elites to remain loyal and supportive of the Kim leadership and generate 
revenue that is used to finance Pyongyang’s illicit activities and programs. It 
understands both the tangible and political value luxury items hold for North Koreans 
and the Kim Jong-un leadership – no matter how dismal the national economy may 
be, the upper echelons of North Korean society will be able to access and obtain 
these expensive items. So long as Kim intends on securing and maintaining his 
power grip of the country and preventing an outbreak against his leadership, he will 
continue to rely on the support and loyalty of the North’s Party and military elites, 
and he will obtain their support by lavishing them with gifts and rewards. Luxury 
goods will remain an important fixture to the Kim regime’s survivability. 
The United States and the United Nations are at the forefront of promulgating 
punitive, restrictive measures against the Kim regime in the form of sanctions. 
These sanctions are the international community’s responses to the North’s 
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provocative behavior, namely, the Kim regime’s nuclear and missile tests. The 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, for example, was 
passed following the North’s October 2006 nuclear test. As demonstration of 
the international community’s condemnation of the nuclear test, the resolution 
prevented an enumerated list of goods from entering and leaving the DPRK, 
imposed an asset freeze and travel ban on individuals related to the nuclear 
program, and prohibited the provision of large-scale arms, nuclear technology 
and training, and luxury goods to the communist country.29 Similarly, the UNSC 
responded to the North’s May 2009 nuclear test, December 2012 satellite launch, 
and February 2013 underground nuclear test with tightened sanctions aimed to 
put a chokehold on any activities and transactions funding North Korea’s illicit 
behavior or strengthening the Kim regime. 
Most recently, the UN in March 2013 approved Resolution 2094, which, much like 
the preceding resolutions, condemned the North’s nuclear test but also included 
tougher financial measures in an attempt to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear activities. 
UNSCR 2094 imposed travel bans and asset freezes on individuals and entities 
responsible for exporting goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and 
conventional weapons and the research and development of advanced weapons 
systems.30 The resolution increased the number of individuals and entities subject 
to these travel bans and asset freezes and for the first time established a common 
definition of “luxury goods” by providing examples of banned items, including 
yachts, racing cars, expensive automobiles, and several types of gems and 
jewelry.31 Prior to the passage of UNSCR 2094, each country was responsible 
for deciding its own definition of luxury items that were banned to North Korea. 
Efficacy of Sanctions in Curbing  
the North’s Behavior
For all intents and purposes, sanctions are penalties enforced by the international 
community to provide incentives for the state or entity to obey international 
norms and regulations. In the case of North Korea, international sanctions are 
designed to restrict the country’s access to funds and goods that enable the regime 
to maintain stability, pursue, develop, and proliferate weapons of mass destruction, 
and encourage the extravagant lifestyle of the leadership. Declaring and enforcing 
sanctions on Pyongyang have been the routine practice of the United States, 
United Nations, and other states that have an interest in safeguarding international 
security conditions and preserving peace. 
Though sanctions send a message of disapproval vis-à-vis North Korea’s chosen 
behavior, their efficacy as an instrument to curb or prohibit Pyongyang from 
perpetuating its actions and incentivize the regime to abide by international 
norms has been debated among North Korea watchers. Through loopholes, North 
Korea has been able to circumvent these punitive measures. A June 2011 visit to 
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Pyongyang by a group of U.S.-based researchers found that despite the imposition 
of the 2009 sanctions on the DPRK, North Koreans had no trouble acquiring 
luxury items and electronics. The visitors remarked on the number of luxury 
foreign cars traveling on the roads in Pyongyang—including BMWs, Mercedes-
Benz, and Lincoln Continentals—as well as their newness.32 Several new Hewlett-
Packard and Dell computers were seen in the country’s academic and research 
institutions, and factories were using modern machinery and equipment imported 
from Europe and Japan.33
Furthermore, sanctions do not appear to have had much negative impact on 
North Korea’s trade with foreign countries. According to Chinese customs 
data, Beijing in 2012 exported $77.5 million worth of pearls, precious metals 
and coins to Pyongyang, and $266.9 million worth of sound and television 
equipment—more than triple the amount it exported in 2007.34 The European 
Union’s exports to North Korea totaled approximately 45 million euros in 2012, 
up from 42 million euros in 2011.35
The adoption of UNSCR 2094 was initially speculated to deal a substantial blow 
to the North Korean economy. The resolution, by obligating UN member states 
to crack down on the North’s financial transactions and inspect cargo suspected 
of carrying prohibited WMD-related items, was expected to inflict damage on 
Pyongyang’s trade relations and weigh on its missile and nuclear ambitions. 
Yet international media reported the sanctions having little adverse impact 
on the North’s financial transactions and access to luxury goods from abroad. 
In late March, shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 2094, international press 
reported the extent of shopping by North Koreans in Beijing. It indicated that 
North Koreans—the elites, in particular—did not have any difficulties acquiring 
televisions, cameras and perfumes from stores near the North Korean embassy in 
Beijing.36 Sources living close to the North Korea-China border said they had not 
observed or heard of tighter measures on the North’s access to luxury goods since 
the sanctions were announced. 
The actual effectiveness of sanctions in changing the North’s behavior or cutting 
off the regime’s access to luxury items may not be apparent or significant, but it is 
one way for the international community to convey a message of disapproval and 
attempt to gradually change the course of Pyongyang’s actions. The international 
community may not be able to alter North Korea’s calculus through these sanctions 
and restrictions within an envisioned timeline – sanctions are not a short-term 
solution for the North Korea dilemma. However, there is an understanding that 
sanctions on luxury items demonstrate the community’s awareness of the value 
the regime places on these goods to fund its illicit programs and strengthen 
Kim’s power base. As long as the regime depends on these goods for survival, 
the international community will most likely go after Pyongyang’s avenues for 
accessing these products.
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Beijing’s Stance Matters
The international community’s concerted efforts to restrict North Korea’s access 
to financial assets and luxury items are, without a doubt, necessary in sending the 
DPRK an unequivocal message of intolerance toward its behavior and chosen 
policy path. The United States and the UN have been at the forefront of imposing 
these sanctions and punitive measures against the North, but what about China’s 
stance? Clearly, as much as the efforts of the US and UN have helped mobilize a 
collective, unified approach with Pyongyang, and as much as their involvement 
is crucial to sending a clear message to the DPRK, China also has an important 
role to play in negotiating with the Kim regime. For one, China and North Korea 
share an intimate bond since the Korean War days. Beijing-Pyongyang ties are 
so close, the two countries frequently allude to the relationship as being intimate 
as “lips and teeth.” Despite small ruptures in bilateral relations in recent years, 
North Korea still regards China as its biggest economic and political support. 
Beijing supplies Pyongyang with almost all its fuel and more than 83 percent of 
its imports, ranging from heavy machinery to grain and consumer goods.37 It is 
North Korea’s largest trading partner, with DPRK-PRC two-way trade totaling 
approximately $1.3 billion in the first three months of this year.38 In 2012, trade 
between the two countries totaled around $6 billion.39 Trade with China makes up 
almost 62 percent of North Korea’s imports.40
Pyongyang manifestly reaps economic and political benefits by maintaining close 
ties with Beijing. China, too, has political interests in backing the Kim regimes. 
For one, China’s support for the DPRK serves as a bulwark against U.S. and South 
Korean political interests. As China views the U.S. as its archrival, it will have a 
political, economic, and security interest in balancing or thwarting U.S. influence 
in the East Asia region by propping up the North Korean regime. Additionally, it is 
in Beijing’s interest to maintain regional stability; the enforcement of strict policies 
toward the North could potentially induce Pyongyang to pursue provocative, 
destabilizing means to get what it wants. China has, for the most part, nominally 
echoed international voices condemning North Korea, but it has stopped short of 
imposing practicably harsh sanctions and punitive measures against Pyongyang. 
Beijing’s hesitation to fully cooperate with world efforts to handle the North has 
been a perennial issue of criticism by the international community. For instance, 
China had been criticized for failing to publish a list of items it sanctioned under 
the UNSCR 1718 in 2006 and for a lax implementation of the sanctions compared 
with other countries. Beijing will notionally agree with the Security Council’s 
decisions, but do nothing to actually implement the sanctions.
China’s response to the North’s December 2012 nuclear test, however, runs 
counter to its usual practice of extending nominal support for international 
punitive measures against Pyongyang’s bad behavior, suggesting it is sincere in 
meeting its commitments to cooperate with the international community’s efforts 
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to be less tolerant of the DPRK’s actions. In addition to supporting UNSCR 2094, 
China began cracking down on the North shortly after the passage of the resolution 
by cutting back on exporting seafood to Pyongyang and the number of freight 
forwarders for cargo passing into North Korea through Dalian from around twenty 
to two.41 The reduction in freight forwarders shrank the number of cargo ships 
that enter North Korea from Singapore from seven to three. Chinese authorities 
also attempted to curb the North’s illegal money laundering activities by putting 
the brakes on the operations of the Beijing and Dandong offices of several North 
Korean banks.42 In May, the state-run Bank of China announced it would be 
ending all dealings and shutting down its account with North Korea’s Foreign 
Trade Bank.43 In September, China published a list of weapons-related technology 
and products banned from export to North Korea because of the potential for 
these materials to be used in building nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
as well as long-range missiles.44,45 The U.S., South Korea, UN, and other parties 
intent on changing the course of North Korean behavior have viewed the change 
in China’s stance with cautious optimism. 
Recommendations
Patently, North Korea’s unwillingness to cooperate under international norms and 
access to luxury goods and assets to sustain the Kim regime cannot be curbed or 
discouraged through one swift action or policy, no matter how concerted the efforts 
of the involved parties may be. It should be underscored that the international 
community’s handling of the DPRK’s luxury goods issue yields repercussions 
on other North Korea-related issues, ranging from Pyongyang’s leveraging 
power vis-à-vis contentious foreign policy dilemmas such as its nuclear and 
missile programs, to the viability and stability of the Kim regime and the DPRK’s 
economic conditions. Devising economic sanctions and other punitive measures 
that successfully tighten the North’s access to luxury goods may therefore help to 
weaken the Kim regime, as it runs low on funds and high-quality items with which 
it could bribe officials and reward those who have successfully accomplished the 
North’s foreign policy and security goals. The weaker and lackluster the elite 
support for Kim, the less maneuverability the young leader has in both pushing 
forward his domestic and foreign policy objectives. On the other hand, ineffective 
handling of the issue would not only create loopholes for the DPRK and do very 
little to curb the regime’s bad behavior, but it could also bolster Kim Jong-un’s 
confidence to play in the international field on his terms. 
The efficacy of economic sanctions in punishing the North is demonstrably debatable. 
On the one hand, sanctions send Pyongyang a message that the international 
community disapproves of its behavior and to a certain extent incentivizes the 
regime to moderate its aggression. As symbolic and nominal the actual effects of the 
sanctions are, they do contain a messaging value. On the other hand, sanctions appear 
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to be more effectual at certain points than others. For instance, a clear definition of 
prohibited luxury goods denies Pyongyang access to specific items. Specifying the 
items banned to the North and individuals and companies to be boycotted not only 
makes the sanctions more palpable to the regime, but it also sends a message to 
the DPRK of the international community’s seriousness in its intent to punish the 
North’s bad behavior and illicit practices. Furthermore, member countries should 
go beyond nominally supporting international sanctions against Pyongyang, but, as 
the United States and in recent months China has done, take direct, concrete steps to 
targeting specific behavior, individuals, and entities. The more palpable the effects 
of the sanctions are to Pyongyang, the more seriously it will take these international 
condemnatory measures. 
The international community should take both multilateral and bilateral 
approaches to condemn the North’s behavior. A multilateral approach combines 
the strengths and interests of numerous countries to send a powerful message to 
Pyongyang that it is not a single country that is refusing to condone the DPRK’s 
actions, but rather a bevy of like-minded states and entities intent on changing 
the North’s behavior. Bilateral approaches, on the other hand, indicate that the 
individual country disapproves of Pyongyang and will take direct, confrontational 
measures to punish the North. 
China’s role is clearly important in this. As the North’s longstanding ally and 
source of political and economic support, Beijing’s policy vis-à-vis Pyongyang 
could determine dramatically different outcomes. Should China decide to take a 
weaker approach with the North by nominally supporting international efforts to 
punish Pyongyang, the Kim regime may become more emboldened, as it interprets 
Beijing’s actions as a tacit sign of support or approval. But if Beijing takes a clear 
stance in echoing the international community’s stern approach by taking concrete 
measures to curb North Korea’s provocative acts, Pyongyang could perceive its 
biggest ally as withdrawing support for the Kim regime. This is not to say that 
China is North Korea’s single viable ally; however, as Pyongyang’s biggest and 
most reliable neighbor, Beijing’s refusal to tolerate the North’s policies and illicit 
activities could send a strong message to the latter to reconsider taking the path 
that would further isolate the regime.
In view of the fact that there is no one-stop, end-all solution to the North Korean 
dilemma, the US, UN and the international community should continue to pursue 
multilateral and bilateral solutions and send a clear, direct and stern warning of 
punishment to the North with palpable consequences to its political and economic 
future. Furthermore, as China’s close relationship with the DPRK is of import 
in determining Pyongyang’s response, the international community should make 
concerted efforts to encourage Beijing’s greater participation in these efforts.
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